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Abstract 
Body awareness, the sense that our body is ours, is constructed by 
dynamic integration of several sensory modalities, including exteroceptive 
(originating outside the body), and interoceptive (originating within) and can 
be divided into awareness of body ownership and of motor deficits. This 
study examined the contribution of different, top-down and bottom-up inter-
acting, cognitive and emotional factors, in the construction of body and motor 
awareness, by focusing on Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP), a syndrome 
of motor awareness disruption. AHP refers to the inability of (usually) right 
hemisphere stroke patients to acknowledge their motor deficits. Clinical 
presentation of AHP varies, with some patients even displaying disruption of 
the sense of body ownership.  
Current AHP theories, based on predictive coding, suggest belief op-
timisation, based on a multilevel system of top-down predictions and bottom-
up feedback, is disrupted due to neurological damage, combined with prior 
patient’s traits. Combinations of disruptions account for the variability of AHP 
and affect the patient’s ability to incorporate feedback about their paralysis 
into their pre-existing schema of themselves, remaining fixated into delusion-
like beliefs. Under the same framework, right hemisphere patients with and 
without anosognosia were recruited from the NHS setting, underwent neuro-
psychological assessments and participated in experimental studies examin-
ing this model on different levels. At the sensory level, the effect of self- and 
affective touch was examined, given their interoceptive properties and role 
affecting bodily awareness. AHP patients’ belief updating ability was tested, 
by examining how their performance predictions and confidence change fol-
lowing motor failures. Given anosognosics’ deficits in perspective taking and 
proper emotion processing, their ability to update beliefs about themselves 
and others on cognitive and emotional level and their ability to spontaneously 
adopt another person’s perspective were examined. Given the elements of 
denial observed in AHP, presence of memory repression was examined by 
means of a memory test with deficit-related content. 
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1. Introduction 
“And the bodies themselves, are they simply ours, or are they us?” 
(William James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890, p. 291) 
1.1. The concept of ‘self’ 
How does one define the sense of self? This question has received a 
lot of interest from philosophy and psychology (e.g. Gallagher, 2000; James, 
1890), but its study has often resulted in disregarding its scientific basis 
(Damasio, 1998; Prigatano, 2010). James (1890) was the first to suggest the 
existence of different senses of self, as being both the object and subject of 
experience, while Gallagher (2000) hypothesised the existence of two main 
categories of self, the ‘minimal self’ and the ‘narrative self’. The latter is 
thought to be constructed from self-defining experiences and is based on au-
tobiographical memories, beliefs and intentions (Conway, 2005, Gallagher, 
2000). The minimal self, on the other hand, refers to a pre-reflective and non-
conceptual form of body awareness, believed to rely on sensory experiences 
associated with the sense of agency (i.e. the experience of initiating and con-
trolling a movement or physiological state), and the sense of body ownership 
(i.e. the experience that our body belongs to us). In other words, this frame-
work suggests that self-awareness (or body awareness) is constructed by a 
sense of ownership and a feeling of agency (Gallagher, 2000).  
Disruptions of self-awareness have traditionally fascinated psychiatry 
and neurology, since the time of Freud and Babinski. According to the con-
cept of self-awareness discussed above, its disruption could include disor-
ders of body ownership (e.g. in asomatognosia, the inability to recognise 
one’s own body; Cutting, 1978) or disruptions of body agency. The present 
thesis will focus on a specific disturbance of body agency, namely Ano-
sognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP), the apparent inability of patients to 
acknowledge motor deficits following stroke (Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, 
Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2009). 
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1.2. The concept of anosognosia 
Reported cases of unawareness of deficits following brain damage 
date long back in time (for review see McGlynn, & Schacter, 1989). The first 
documented descriptions were made from Von Monakow (1885), Anton 
(1893); also see Bisiach, & Geminiani, 1991, and Prigatano, 2010, while Ba-
binski (1914) was the first to introduce the term anosognosia (from the Greek 
a: without; Noso: disease; Gnosis: knowledge), to describe unawareness of 
disability in hemiplegia. Today, the term has been more widely used to de-
scribe unawareness in diverse neurological and medical conditions, including 
traumatic brain injury (Prigatano, 1988), Alzheimer’s dementia (Reed, Ja-
gust, & Coulter, 1993) and schizophrenia (Mohamed, Fleming, Penn, & 
Spaulding, 1999). The present study will focus on Anosognosia for Hemiple-
gia (AHP), one of the most impressive forms of anosognosia. The term AHP 
has been used in the literature to describe and include different characteris-
tics of the syndrome (see below), but for the purposes of the study, AHP will 
operationally be defined as the unawareness of, or inability to perceive one’s 
paralysis following stroke (Cocchini, et al., 2009).  
Understanding AHP has many important clinical and theoretical impli-
cations. Regarding the latter, studying a disorder of disruption of body 
awareness provides a useful window to understanding how awareness and 
the feeling of ‘self’ are constructed (Marcel, Tegner, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004). 
Knowledge about AHP would also have a tangible effect in the clinical set-
ting. AHP often poses a challenge for clinicians, ward staff and family mem-
bers as anosognosic patients are considered ‘difficult’ patients, being in 
greater risk for injuries for often attempting to perform actions they cannot 
do, such as get out of bed or try to walk (McGlynn, & Schacter, 1989). Fur-
thermore, AHP patients have poorer prognosis that non-anosognosic hemi-
plegics, while their rehabilitation is often ineffective due to their failure to 
acknowledge their paralysis (Heilman, Barrett, & Adair, 1998). Understanding 
the causes of the syndrome and designing suitable rehabilitation pro-
grammes could thus yield significant clinical improvements.  
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1.3. Incidence and duration 
AHP is more often encountered after right rather than left perisylvian 
lesions (Cocchini, et al., 2009; Heilman, et al., 1998) and is usually a transi-
ent phenomenon, resolving spontaneously hours or days after the stroke 
(Vocat, Staub, Stroppini, & Vuilleumier, 2010), with only a third of the pa-
tients proceeding to the chronic phase (i.e. more than three months after the 
stroke) (Heilman, et al., 1998). Estimates on its exact prevalence vary, and 
the discrepancies are largely dependent on the different diagnostic criteria 
and various assessment tools (see below), and on the time interval since the 
cerebrovascular event (Orfei, et al., 2007; Orfei, Caltagirone, & Spalletta, 
2009; Vuilleumier, 2004). Classical studies report frequencies ranging from 
33 to 58% (Cutting, 1978; Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno, & Berti, 1986), 
while more recent systematic reviews report prevalence of 20 to 44% (Pia, 
Neppi-Modona, Ricci, & Berti, 2004) and of 7 to 77% (Orfei, et al., 2007). 
However, in a study where a more stringent diagnostic criterion was used, 
namely the Bisiach scale (Bisiach, et al., 1986) with a cut-off score of 2, the 
prevalence was reported to be 10-18% in acute and sub-acute stroke pa-
tients (Baier, & Karnath, 2005).  
1.4. Clinical presentation and characteristics 
The presentation of AHP is rich and complex, taking different forms 
that need to be considered both when investigating the etiology of the syn-
drome and when classifying patients (Marcel, et al., 2004; Vocat, et al., 
2010). According to the literature, AHP is characterised by a number of fea-
tures that vary between patients (Marcel, et al., 2004; Prigatano, & Schacter, 
1991). One such feature relates to the specificity of AHP, that is the inability 
of AHP patients to recognise their motor deficits, although they are able to 
acknowledge other medical problems (Marcel, et al., 2004). It is also possible 
for AHP patients to only be aware of the paralysis of one of the two affected 
limbs (e.g. only for the leg), or to acknowledge their hemiplegia but be unable 
to perceive the consequences of it (e.g. admit they cannot walk, but attempt 
to get out of bed). Partiality is another important feature of AHP, manifesting 
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as dissociation between implicit and explicit awareness (Cocchini, Beschin, 
Fotopoulou, & Della Salla, 2010; Nardone, Ward, Fotopoulou, & Turnbull, 
2008). Specifically, a number of AHP patients show implicit awareness of 
motor deficits, as they deny any motor deficits while at the same time are 
willing to stay in the hospital and receive care (including using a wheelchair), 
use jokes and metaphors about their deficits (Prigatano, & Weinstein, 1996), 
or have strong emotional responses when presented with deficit-related con-
tent (Kaplan-Solms, & Solms, 2000). The opposite presentation has also 
been reported, with AHP patients being implicitly unaware and explicitly 
aware of their hemiplegia. Another intriguing form in which partiality is ex-
pressed, is the difference in awareness between third- (3PP) and first-person 
perspective (1PP): AHP patients appear to have higher awareness of deficits 
in third-, versus first person tasks (Fotopoulou, Rudd, Holmes, & Kopelman, 
2009; Marcel, et al., 2004). Their awareness is also improved when observ-
ing themselves in a video replay (Besharati, Kopelman, Avesani, Moro, & 
Fotopoulou, 2014; Fotopoulou, et al., 2009). 
From the early days, AHP had been associated with aberrant emo-
tional attitudes, which have been the topic of theoretical debates and de-
scriptions (Bisiach, & Geminiani, 1991; Weinstein, & Kahn, 1955, Turnbull, 
Fotopoulou, & Solms, 2014). Such attitudes include inappropriate cheerful-
ness (Gainotti, 1972), indifference towards the paralysis (anosodiaphoria) 
(Babinski, 1914; Critchley, 1953, 1957, see Heilman, 2014), or hatred to-
wards the paralysed limb (misoplegia) (Vocat, et al., 2010). The role of emo-
tion, however, has been systematically ignored and its contribution to AHP 
has not received much empirical attention (see Vuilleumier, et al., 2004 for 
review). Recently, however, there has been an increased interest towards 
this field, and findings have suggested that, although able to experience a 
normal range of emotions, AHP patients have fewer catastrophic reactions 
and appear overly optimistic, (Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2005; Turnbull, 
Jones, Reed-Screen, 2002). The emotional state of patients also seems to 
be closely related to their body awareness. Specifically, after improvement of 
their awareness following video-replay, patients became depressed 
(Fotopoulou, et al., 2009). Similar observations were made for anosognosic 
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patients who had episodes of transient awareness, during which they exhib-
ited depressive symptoms. (Kaplan-Solms, & Solms, 2000). A study by 
Besharati and colleagues (2014) also established the inverse relationship, 
that is, experimentally induced negative (and not positive) feelings were 
found to improve motor awareness in AHP patients. Besides aberrant emo-
tional experiences, a number of AHP patients also experience body owner-
ship delusions, including rejecting the ownership of their own limb (asoma-
tognosia), misattributing their limb to another person and/or claiming another 
person’s limb as theirs (somatoparaphrenia), treating the limb as a person 
(personification), or believing to have more than two limbs (Gerstmann, 
1942). This clinical variability further suggests the existence of several sub-
types of the syndrome.  
1.5. Rehabilitation and recovery 
As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, although some progress in 
AHP management and rehabilitation has been achieved (Jenkinson, Pres-
ton, & Ellis, 2011), there is still no systematic, evidence-based rehabilitation 
method for AHP (Kortte, & Hillis, 2011). However, the literature suggests that 
certain interventions are able to restore unawareness, albeit most often tem-
porarily. Vestibular stimulation has been long used in AHP patients with es-
tablished success in temporarily improving awareness (Cappa, Sterzi, Vallar, 
& Bisiach, 1987). Fotopoulou and colleagues (2009), however, with a novel 
intervention, were able to reverse unawareness permanently and immediate-
ly, for the first time in the literature. In their study, a video replay was used of 
the patient undergoing an awareness interview by the experimenters. The 
video was played back to the patient and, presumably due to the third person 
perspective (3PP) in combination with ‘offline’ predictions (i.e. watching one-
self performing an action without actually attempting to perform it), the pa-
tient was able to regain awareness (see Besharati et al., 2015 for a replica-
tion). Another recent study showed that a combination of prism adaptation, 
optokinetic stimulation and transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation can 
also temporarily improve awareness in five severe AHP patients (Beschin, 
Cocchini, Della Sala, & Allen, 2012). 
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Further studies are needed to assess the feasibility and potential ef-
fectiveness of the aforementioned interventions. Specifically, the video inter-
vention developed by Fotopoulou et al. (2009) should be further tested in a 
larger sample, including hyper-acute and chronic patients, while individual 
differences and emotional factors in each patient should also be considered.  
1.6. Clinical assessment and diagnosis 
To this day, no “gold standard” assessment of AHP exists, and differ-
ent tools and criteria are being used to diagnose it (Jenkinson, et al., 2011; 
Orfei, et al., 2007; see Nurmi, & Jehkonen, 2014 for review). One of the first 
formal assessments for AHP was developed by Cutting (1978), who de-
signed a detailed questionnaire to aid clinical observations. Bisiach and col-
leagues (1986) improved AHP assessment by introducing a 4-point scale, 
which allowed for classification of the severity of the patient’s unawareness, 
as non-existent, mild, moderate or severe. This tool allowed clinicians to as-
sess if patients were unaware of their hemiplegia but able to identify it after 
confrontation (i.e. after attempting and failing to perform and action), or if pa-
tients confabulated and continued having false beliefs about their condition, 
even after motor failure. Another sensitive measure was later developed by 
Feinberg, Roane and Ali (2000), which, by means of a 10-question interview 
assessed not only the severity of AHP, but also the presence of delusional 
component (e.g. illusory movements). The scoring of the interview per ques-
tion was 0 for lack of AHP, 0.5 for partially correct answers, or 1 for proper 
unawareness. A shortcoming of both Bisiach and Feinberg assessment was 
their reliance on verbal and explicit means of assessment, not taking into ac-
count implicit unawareness. Another interview was designed by Berti, Làda-
vas and Corte (1996), which differentiated between explicit and implicit 
awareness, for upper and lower limbs, using both verbal and behavioural re-
sponses. This tool also examined awareness of motor ability in activities of 
daily living, using theoretical everyday examples, such as walking or clapping 
hands. More recently, other assessments have been developed (see Coc-
chini, et al., 2010; Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin, & Cameron, 2009; Marcel, 
et al., 2004; Starkstein, Jorge, Mizrahi, & Robinson, 2006) to allow more reli-
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able diagnosis and classification of AHP, as they assess the clinical variabil-
ity of the syndrome in depth. Despite existing progress, more research needs 
to be conducted on this field, to design and develop novel assessment tools 
that will use specific clinical criteria not only for the identification of the pres-
ence or absence of unawareness of motor deficits, but also to capture the 
various clinical presentations of the phenomenon (Vocat, et al., 2010). 
1.7. Etiology of AHP 
Despite decades of systematic research, the exact neurological and 
psychological causes of AHP have not yet been established (Marcel, et al., 
2004; Orfei, et al., 2004). It has, however, become widely accepted that not a 
single deficit, but rather a combination of several factors, is responsible for 
the variable clinical presentation of AHP (Vuilleumier, 2004; Vocat, et al., 
2010). In this section, the neuroanatomical and neuro-psychological theories 
proposed over the years will be reviewed.  
1.7.1. Neuroanatomical theories 
As aforementioned, although cases of AHP following left hemisphere 
damage have been reported (e.g. Cocchini, et al., 2009), the syndrome is 
most commonly observed after right hemisphere lesions (Pia, et al., 2004). 
Several lesion sites have been identified and associated with AHP through-
out the years and these discrepancies can possibly be accounted for by the 
variability of AHP in different patients and by the different scan qualities and 
methods used in the studies (Jenkinson, et al., 2011). In this section, lesion 
sites reported in studies in chronological order will be reviewed.  
A meta-analysis by Pia and colleagues (2004) examining anatomical 
data, CT and MRI scans of 85 AHP patients from 1938 to 2001, reported 
that, on the cortical level, selective damage to frontal, parietal and temporal 
structures could equally frequently lead to the development of AHP, but re-
garding involvement of more than one brain areas, a combination of frontal 
and parietal lesions had the highest probability of leading to AHP. Subcortical 
structures were also found to be of importance, with basal ganglia and the 
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thalamus being the most likely lesion sites to cause AHP. It was suggested 
that the combination of cortical and subcortical lesions were important in the 
development of the syndrome. In a lesion analysis study, Karnath, Baier and 
Nägele (2005) analysed CT and MRI scans of AHP and HP patients and 
found that the right posterior insula was the area with greater damage in the 
AHP group. Berti and colleagues (2005) compared the anatomical distribu-
tions of lesions in patients with AHP, unilateral neglect and hemiplegia, in pa-
tients with unilateral neglect and left hemiplegia but no AHP, and in one pa-
tient with AHP and hemiplegia. The study found that unawareness is associ-
ated more with lesions in the inferior frontal gyrus and the middle frontal gy-
rus (particularly Brodmann’s areas 6 and 44, dorsal premotor areas), the 
postcentral and precentral gyrus (somatosensory cortex; primary motor cor-
tex and Brodmann’s area 4, respectively), Brodmann’s area 46, the insula, 
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Interestingly, in the case of the patient 
with AHP without neglect, the same brain areas were identified, with the ad-
dition of the insula, and the exception of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
Overall, the findings suggested that anosognosia is more associated with le-
sions in areas involved in motor monitoring. A longitudinal study by Vocat 
and Vuilleumier (2010), which analysed CT and MRI scans, found that the 
hyperacute period of AHP (first three days after stroke) was associated with 
lesions in the insula, especially in its anterior part, and the adjacent subcorti-
cal structures. More persistent AHP in the subacute phase (7-10 days post-
stroke) was associated with additional lesions in the premotor cortex, parieto-
temporal junction, cingulate gyrus, and hippocampus and amygdala. A more 
recent study examined the neural correlates of explicit and implicit aware-
ness in AHP, using CT and MRI data (Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd, & 
Kopelman, 2010). It was found that AHP patients, in relation to aware con-
trols, suffered more lesions in the anterior parts of the insula, the inferior mo-
tor areas, the basal ganglia, limbic structures and deep white matter. One 
AHP patient without implicit awareness was found to have more cortical le-
sions, especially in frontal areas, but also in the occipital and parietal lobes. 
Similar results were reported another study investigating CT and MRI data, 
which reported that implicit unawareness was associated with lesions in sub-
cortical areas including basal ganglia, while explicit unawareness was more 
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often associated with lesions in cortical areas, including temporal, parietal 
and frontal areas (Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli, & Cordioli, 2011). Kortte and 
colleagues (2015) performed a study on 35 acute (first 48 hours post-stroke) 
right-hemisphere patients. Eight were classified as having severe AHP, 
based on the assessment and cutoff-scores of Baier, & Karnath, 2005). The 
authors acquired clinical MRI scans and behavioural scores, and found evi-
dence for the unique involvement of inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in the syn-
drome of AHP. This area, also known as the frontal operculum, consists of 
pars orbitalis (BA47), pars triangularis (BA 45) and pars opercularis (BA 44). 
The results demonstrated that the pars orbitalis and the IFG were damages 
in six out of eight anosognosic patients, with aware patients not having defi-
cits in this area. Moreover, pars opercularis and pars striangularis were also 
found to be often lesioned in AHP patients, compared to aware patients. 
Lastly, the most recent study was conducted by Moro et al. (2016), and re-
cruited 70 right-hemisphere patients that were classified, according to Berti 
interview, into four groups, patients with AHP, patients with AHP and DSO, 
patients with pure DSO without AHP, and HP control patients without DSO. 
The authors identified that acute AHP mostly involves damage in the Roland-
ic operculum, the insula and the Heschl and superior temporal gyri. Regard-
ing subcortical areas, acute AHP was most commonly associated with le-
sions in the basal ganglia, while lesions in the white matter were usually 
found to affect the superior corona radiate and the external capsule. Damage 
to the insula and basal ganglia was considered by the authors critical for the 
persistence of the symptoms beyond 40 days. In cases of DSO co-occurring 
with AHP, the pattern of lesions was reported to shift towards the latero-
medial direction and to mostly involve the basal ganglia. 
Together, the results demonstrate the great advances over the last 
years in our understanding of the neural correlates of AHP. However, alt-
hough informative, the studies do not lead to any firm conclusions yet. This 
fact could be attributed to different factors, including unequal and usually 
small sample sizes, different AHP classification criteria, and discrepancies in 
time of AHP assessment and scanning. However, certain conclusions can be 
safely drawn, such as the importance of damage in the pre-motor areas and 
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the insula, the fronto-parietal damage, and the subcortical areas, in particu-
larly the basal ganglia. Studies have also provided evidence for the different 
neural correlates underlying implicit and explicit awareness.  
1.7.2. Neuropsychological theories 
Motivational theories, emotion and delusions in AHP 
As discussed above, despite being underestimated later, the role of 
emotion in AHP had been included in early descriptions of AHP. Indeed, 
there has been a tradition of conceptualizing AHP on a purely psychological 
basis, as being driven by motivational factors and Weinstein and Kahn 
(1955) were among the first to suggest such a psychological account of AHP, 
claiming that it stemmed from the patient’s need for self-esteem and inability 
to cope with failure. It was also postulated that distressing symptoms in AHP 
could either be completely blocked from awareness, or be disguised in a 
symbolic form (e.g. in somatoparaphrenia) (Weinstein, Cole, Mitchell, & 
Lyerly, 1964). This purely psychological approach, however, has in general 
been discredited, due to its inability to produce experimental data, and for 
not being able to explain the lateralisation of AHP (Heilman, et al., 1998) and 
its various clinical presentations (Bisiach, & Geminiani, 1991; Marcel, et al., 
2004). In recent years, the notion that motivational and emotional factors are 
involved in the development of AHP has regained interest (Fotopoulou, et al., 
2010; Nardone, et al., 2008; Turnbull, et al., 2014). New theories have been 
put forward, attempting to explain AHP on the neural basis of cognitive and 
emotional processes (e.g. Fotopoulou, 2010; Turnbull, et al., 2014). Motiva-
tional theories, unlike pure motor accounts, have been able to account for 
several features of AHP, such as implicit or explicit awareness or anosodia-
phoria, and for the awareness fluctuations described in studies (Besharati, et 
al., 2014; Kaplan-Solms-Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou, et al., 2009). The rela-
tionship between emotion and AHP and its coverage by more recent theories 
will be further discussed in the following chapters, as understanding this rela-
tionship and its effect on cognition will be a key aim of this thesis. 
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Some of the features of AHP bear striking similarities with delusions, 
such as the fixation of patients to beliefs (e.g. that they can move) despite 
clear evidence to the contrary. Based on this observation, Davies et al. 
(2005) suggested that theories for AHP could borrow concepts from existing 
theories of delusions. Specifically, they proposed that adherence to delu-
sional beliefs in AHP is the result of the combination of deficits in perception, 
which give rise to abnormal beliefs, and deficits affecting higher-order, moni-
toring processes that should correct them, consequently allowing them to 
become abnormal beliefs. To address the same feature, Vuilleumier (2004) 
proposed the “ABC model”, according to which AHP results from a combina-
tion of deficits affecting three main processes: Assessment, Belief and Con-
trol. Different combinations of deficits in those processes were believed to 
result in the different presentations of AHP. These accounts successfully 
highlight the multifaceted nature of anosognosia and attempt to approach its 
delusional aspect by identifying the cognitive processes behind belief for-
mation. However, they have been accused for not being falsifiable (Vallar, & 
Ronchi, 2009), and for conceptualizing the cognitive deficits as simply addi-
tive, resulting from simultaneous lesions in functionally independent brain ar-
eas. 
 Sensory deficit and combination theories 
Usually AHP following right hemisphere damage co-occurs with neu-
rological deficits, such as memory loss, sensory deficits, generalised cogni-
tive impairment, or personal and extrapersonal neglect (Orfei, et al., 2007). 
Therefore, early theories conceptualised AHP as being the secondary con-
sequence of such primary deficits, and especially of neglect (Cutting, 1978; 
Levine, Calvanio, & Rinn, 1991; Starkstein, Fedoroff, Price, Leiguarda, & 
Robinson, 1992). It was also suggested that the combination of sensory and 
higher order deficits led to the development of AHP, and that different com-
binations of those deficits in each patient accounted for the different clinical 
presentations of AHP (Berti, et al., 1996; Levine, et al., 1991; Starkstein, et 
al., 1992). Several studies, however, have established double dissociations 
between AHP and primary (Bisiach, et al., 1986; Marcel, et al., 2004) and 
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higher-order deficits (for review see Heilman, & Harciarek, 2010), and these 
results suggest that these deficits cannot play a causal role in the develop-
ment of the syndrome. It is nevertheless probable that such primary, or com-
binations of neurological deficits could predispose patients towards develop-
ing AHP, in the presence of other factors, or that they result in greater severi-
ty of unawareness in patients (Fotopoulou, 2014; Marcel, et al., 2004). To-
gether, evidence suggests that cognitive or sensory deficits cannot cause or 
explain AHP (Bisiach, et al., Vocat, et al., 2010). 
 Theories on computational models of motor control  
More recent accounts of AHP focus on motor planning and are based 
on computational models of motor control. According to these models, the 
intention for movement is associated with an efference copy of motor com-
mands, which predicts the sensory consequences of the intended move-
ment. Awareness, according to those models, relies on predictions. When 
the action is performed, a comparator compares sensory feedback to the ex-
pected consequences and if no mismatch is detected, awareness of the exe-
cution is not challenged. If there is a discrepancy between the predicted and 
experienced feedback, then awareness is updated. Based on this framework, 
Heilman and colleagues (1998) proposed an influential theory, according to 
which, AHP is the result of aberrant forward motor monitoring, that is, ano-
sognosic patients are unable to detect movement failure because there is no 
forward signal that the movement has been intended. In other words, the pa-
tient is unable to create motor intentions, therefore no predictions are gener-
ated, the mismatch between the intended and the performed movement is 
not identified and the patient does not become aware of their failure to move. 
An alternative theory named the ‘efference copy hypothesis’ (Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) suggested that AHP can, in fact, produce motor 
representations of intended movements, but they fail to acknowledge the 
discrepancy between the predicted and the actual feedback. It was further 
suggested that this failure was due to lack of information about the affected 
side because of neglect, or due to brain lesions to relevant brain areas. Simi-
larly, Berti and Pia (2006) suggested that the inability of AHP patients to de-
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tect such discrepancies is due to damage directly to the comparator, and not 
due to neglect as previously suggested. Consequently, they suggested that 
the awareness of AHP patients is mainly based on intact representation of 
movement. According to the authors, this theory is supported by the fact that 
brain areas responsible for the monitoring of correspondence between motor 
commands and sensory feedback (i.e. Brodmann premotor areas 6 and 44) 
are damaged in AHP (Berti, et al., 2005). Further evidence came from the 
temporary remission of AHP following vestibular stimulation, which they sup-
ported, led to hyper-activation of the comparator, which in turn restored 
awareness.  
Evidence indeed supported the claim of these theories about intact 
motor intentions in AHP. Fotopoulou et al. (2008) used prosthetic hands to 
create visual feedback of movements to patients, manipulating the intention 
to move (self-intention, or other). They found that in AHP patients the illusory 
perception of movement occurred more in the self-intended condition, than in 
the other-intended, suggesting the dominance of motor intentions over the 
sensory and visual feedback information. Garbarini et al. (2012) provided fur-
ther evidence by using an interference task on right-hemisphere stroke pa-
tients compared to healthy controls. Participants were asked to draw lines 
with their right hand and circles with the left (affected for AHP patients), while 
blindfolded. AHP patients drew more oval lines, demonstrating that the left 
hand had intact movement intentions. Also based on their lesion mapping 
analysis, the authors suggested that premotor areas and the insula could be 
considered the neural basis of the comparator for the motor system. These 
two studies confirm the suggestions of the two theories suggesting intact mo-
tor intentions in AHP, and indeed, these theories can provide explanations 
not only for the motor unawareness in AHP, but also for the delusional belief 
of patients that they have moved (illusory movement), despite no movement 
having taken place. However, despite their value, these modular motor theo-
ries cannot account for all the aspects of AHP, including as aforementioned, 
its partiality and specificity, and the remission after the experience of nega-
tive feelings.  
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A novel computational theory 
Having reviewed the theories of AHP proposed until today, it becomes 
apparent that the majority have approached AHP from purely psychological, 
motor or cognitive points of view. Undoubtedly, they are useful in explaining 
several facets of AHP each. What is still missing, however, is a plausible, 
comprehensive framework to accommodate the dynamic nature of AHP, its 
clinical variability and rich symptomatology, including the transformation of 
symptoms over time and its (temporarily) induced, or spontaneous remission. 
Such a framework would also need to link emotion and cognition as well as 
the distinctions between different perspectives observed in AHP. 
Such a theory has recently been proposed by Fotopoulou (2014; 
2015), based on predictive coding and free energy principle. Before examin-
ing this theory, it is necessary to take a step back and describe the theoreti-
cal framework on which it rests (Friston, 2010). This framework attempts to 
provide a model about how the brain works, and is a synthesis of concepts 
and principles (described below), some of which come from theoretical phys-
ics and mathematics. According to the free energy principle, humans, as all 
living organisms, need to remain within certain boundaries of sensory states 
in order to survive (Friston, 2005) and to achieve this, we must be able to ac-
tively predict the causes of our sensory states, despite the limited abilities of 
our sensory organs. Therefore, our brain has to act as a “prediction ma-
chine”, using the (inaccurate) sensory data to create probabilistic models for 
the causes of these data, while constantly utilizing the sensory input to up-
date its models. This inferential process in understood to occur in Bayesian 
terms, which dictate the optimal procedure to update the probabilities as-
signed to one hypothesis according to new evidence (Friston, 2010). The ul-
timate goal of this process is to minimise surprise, that is, the discrepancy 
between the predicted and expected sensations (prediction error). Due to 
cortical hierarchy and asymmetries, these predictions are recurrently trans-
ferred via top-down connections from higher and more abstract levels (e.g. 
prefrontal cortex), to lower and more sensory ones (e.g. the early visual cor-
tex) (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013; Hohwy, 2007), while they receive con-
stant updating from bottom up connections (feedback). These are either 
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“cancelled out”, if no discrepancy is identified, or used to update the model, if 
a prediction error has occurred. Besides simply becoming better at predict-
ing, that is, amending our predictions to optimally represent the world (per-
ceptual inference), this framework also allows that we change the feedback 
we receive from the world, to correspond to our predictions (active infer-
ence). 
Going back to the theory of AHP, Fotopoulou (2014; 2015) suggested 
that AHP is essentially a disorder of body awareness. Based on the notion 
that body awareness relies on the aforementioned computational model, 
then body awareness is essentially based on inferences, which are the ab-
normal factor in AHP. Aberrant inferences can be understood as a disruption 
in the balance between prior beliefs and prediction errors, and Fotopoulou 
(2014; 2015) suggested five candidate sources for this disruption, that, each 
alone or in combinations, can account for the different manifestations of the 
disorder. Firstly, lack of active inference (i.e. sampling of the environment) 
due to paralysis results in failure to update the representation of the affected 
limb. This deficit, although probable to contribute to the complex presentation 
of AHP, is unlikely to be a causing factor. Aberrant perceptual inference is 
the second candidate. Deficits in the representation, or re-representation and 
organisation of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals about the affected 
side of the body might lead to weak or absent prediction errors. Deficient 
prediction errors might, in turn, fail to update awareness, and, in presence of 
intact prior beliefs, lead the patient to adhere to past experiences and expec-
tations about how their body should feel. Thirdly, deficits directly to the brain 
areas responsible for learning and updating, namely the limbic areas, might 
lead to a “fixation” to past experiences about the state of the body and relat-
ed beliefs, and to inability to update awareness based on the new state. Do-
pamine-depleting lesions might also have a role, as, by means of neuromod-
ulation, they might lead to less precise prediction errors, reducing their sali-
ence and eventually the long- and short-term learning. Lastly, individual 
premorbid priors might be strong and resistant to change.  
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Furthermore, this framework also provides plausible and sufficient ex-
planations about the differences in awareness observed between 1st and 3rd 
person perspectives. Specifically, it postulates that our perception of the 
world, including our perception and action possibilities, also includeds our 
ability to see objects not only from our own, 1st person perspective, but also 
as they would be perceived from another agent, from a 3rd person perspec-
tive (Fotopoulou, 2015). However, with regards to the body, this ability is 
challenged, as our body is both perceived as being ours, separate from the 
world and the subject of our experiences, while at the same time it is also a 
socially perceived object. Mostly, however, we are able to understand that 
the body seen from another perspective is still ours, that is, the body seen in 
a mirror is the one feeling standing in front of this mirror. As discussed 
above, this seems to not be the case in AHP, where patients are able to ac-
curately perceive their body from a 3rd person perspective, they still hold the 
delusional beliefs from a 1st person perspective, and appear to be unable to 
perceive that their body is a social object that needs to behave one unique 
existence.  
1.8. Study rationale and overview 
In summary, so far purely motor or psychological theories, as well as 
combination theories, have failed to fully explain AHP, including its delusional 
elements and emotional disturbances. Improving on the shortcomings of pre-
vious theories, a new account of AHP has been put forward, conceptualizing 
anosognosia as the inability to update body awareness, by failing to properly 
incorporate new (interoceptive, motor, or overall) salient information about 
the paralysed limbs (i.e. having abnormal inferences), and to perceive the 
body from different perspectives as one, unique object (Fotopoulou, 2014; 
2015). This promising new approach has provided a framework in which per-
ception and cognition are not separate, as they had been treated by previous 
theories (e.g. according to computational models of motor control), but they 
interact to create optimal inferences about the world, and it is these infer-
ences that are believed to be deficient in AHP. Findings of previous studies 
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can be incorporated and support this account, but no studies so far have ex-
amined AHP based on this framework. 
This thesis suggests that a revised approach to AHP should focus 
more on the disruptions in top down (predictions) and bottom up (feedback) 
processes on different hierarchical levels, from low, sensory levels, to high-
order ones, as well as on the role of motivation and emotion in constructing 
motor awareness. The specific aims of this thesis were to advance the cur-
rent state of knowledge on (1) the role of interoceptive and exteroceptive in-
teraction in body awareness disorders; (2) disruptions in inferential process-
es underlying AHP; and (3) the contribution of emotion and cognition in mo-
tor awareness. These findings will allow a more thorough and unified under-
standing of the various, and sometimes seemingly unrelated, features of 
AHP, ultimately also leading to the design of better rehabilitation methods for 
patients. The specific aims of the experimental studies in this thesis were: 
1. To experimentally investigate the role of proprioception and agency of 
touch on body awareness, both in body ownership and in motor 
awareness (Chapter 3) 
2. To experimentally investigate the belief updating process of AHP pa-
tients, regarding motor tasks (Chapter 4). 
3. To experimentally investigate the ability of AHP patients to spontane-
ously adopt another person’s visuo-spatial perspective (Chapter 5). 
4. To experimentally investigate the updating patterns of AHP patients in 
relation to cognitive and emotional information, from 1st vs. 3rd person 
perspectives (Chapter 6). 
5. To experimentally investigate the role of motivation and emotion in 
memory, in AHP patients (Chapter 7). 
1.9. Summary of chapters  
Chapter 2 provides a general description of the methods used in the 
present thesis, including recruitment, neuropsychological assessments and 
AHP diagnosis. Detailed information about patients’ groups, neuropsycholog-
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ical scores and statistical analyses will be separately specified in each indi-
vidual chapter. 
Chapter 3 examined the role of the individual and reciprocal interac-
tion of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals in affecting body awareness. 
The aim of the study was to examine how self or other touch (an exterocep-
tive modality) and pleasant touch (an interoceptive modality) interact to affect 
disruptions of body ownership and motor awareness. 
In Chapter 4, the process of updating motor inferences in AHP was 
examined. The aim of the study was to investigate how AHP patients update 
their prior beliefs, and the role of precision (confidence) and salience of 
feedback in this process.  
The ability of AHP patients to spontaneously switch visuospatial per-
spectives was examined in Chapter 5. The aim of the study was to investi-
gate whether AHP patients have deficits in their ability to spontaneously 
adopt the 3rd person perspective, in social situations that have been found to 
elicit this response. 
In Chapter 6, the ability to update in different domains, from different 
perspectives in AHP was examined. The study aimed to investigate the pro-
cess of updating inferences about cognition and emotion in AHP, from 1st 
and 3rd person perspectives, in AHP and HP controls.  
The effect of motivation on memory in AHP was examined in Chapter 
7. The aim of the study was to assess whether AHP patients intentionally, 
although subconsciously, forget more (i.e. suppress) materials they cannot 
perform, compared to those they can perform, in relation to HP controls.  
Lastly, a general discussion of the results is included. The findings are 
discussed in the context of the current theoretical approaches, while limita-
tions and future directions are also examined. 
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2. General Methods 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the meth-
odology used in this study, including participant’s recruitment and inclusion 
criteria. The methods described herein are the ones common in the following 
chapters.  
2.1. Participants 
The main sample for the present study was adult acute stroke pa-
tients, with a clinically confirmed right-hemisphere stroke and contralateral 
(left) hemiplegia (see below for inclusion criteria). Using awareness assess-
ments (see below), patients were classified as having Anosognosia for Hem-
iplegia (AHP group), or being hemiplegic controls (HP group) without AHP. In 
some experiments, pilot studies were conducted using healthy volunteers 
(see below). 
2.1.1. AHP (target) group 
Target patients were adult stroke patients with right-hemisphere le-
sions and left hemiplegia, presenting with clinical indications of AHP, formally 
tested as described in section 2.4 below. Inclusion and exclusion criteria are 
listed below. 
Inclusion criteria  
6. Clinical indications of AHP, confirmed and quantified by formal testing 
in this study. 
7. Right hemisphere damage, detected by imaging methods and con-
firmed by neurological assessments. 
8. Recent pathology, less than four months after the incident. 
9. Left hemiplegia or severe motor impairment, confirmed by neurologi-
cal assessments. 
10. Right handedness. 
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Exclusion criteria 
1. Generalised brain damage 
2. Neurological and/or psychiatric medical history 
3. Less than seven years of education 
4. Severe language and communication impairments  
5. Premorbid diagnosis of dementia 
2.1.2. Control (HP) group 
Control patients were adult stroke patients with right hemisphere le-
sions and left-sided hemiplegia. Formal awareness testing confirmed that no 
control patient presented with any indications of AHP. Inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria are listed below and are identical to the ones of the target group, 
with the exception of the presence of AHP. 
Inclusion criteria 
1. Right hemisphere damage, detected by imaging methods and con-
firmed by neurological assessments. 
2. Recent pathology, less than four months after the incident. 
3. Left hemiplegia or severe motor impairment, confirmed by neurologi-
cal assessments. 
4. Right handedness. 
Exclusion criteria 
1. Generalised brain damage. 
2. Neurological and/or psychiatric medical history. 
3. Less than seven years of education.  
4. Severe language and communication impairments. 
5. Premorbid diagnosis of dementia. 
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2.1.3. Healthy controls 
Groups of healthy volunteers were also recruited to participate in spe-
cific pilot studies. Inclusion and exclusion criteria are listed below. 
Inclusion criteria 
1. Neurological and/or psychiatric medical history. 
2. Less than seven years of education. 
3. Severe language and communication impairments. 
2.2. Ethics approval 
The present study obtained approval from the National Research Eth-
ics Service (NRES) in the UK, while Research and Development (R&D) ap-
provals were individually obtained from each recruitment site. The investiga-
tor held honorary contracts with all recruitment sites in the UK. The study 
was additionally approved by the corresponding ethics committee in Italy, the 
collaborating recruitment site. 
2.3. Patient identification and recruitment 
2.3.1. Identification 
Patients were identified and recruited from admissions to hyper-acute 
and acute stroke wards in seven hospitals in London: St. Thomas’ Hospital; 
King’s College Hospital (KCH); St. George’s Hospital, The National Hospital 
for Neurology and Neurosurgery (NHNN), Royal Free Hospital, Homerton 
Hospital, University College London Hospital (UCLH). For specific studies, 
patients were also recruited from the collaborating team from the Rehabilita-
tion Unit of the Sacro Curora Hospital in Negrar, Verona, Italy, and met the 
aforementioned inclusion and exclusion criteria. Healthy participants were 
recruited from university campuses, retailers shop and from a local voluntary 
women’s organisation. The recruitment process took place approximately 
from September 2013 to February 2017. Possible limitations of the recruit-
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ment from several hospital sites and in different languages are discussed in 
General Discussion (Chapter 8).  
2.3.2. Recruitment procedure 
Written, informed consent was obtained from each participant. The in-
vestigator explained the purpose of the study and asked if they were willing 
to participate. Participants were informed that their participation would be 
voluntary and they would be able to withdraw at any point, without giving a 
reason and that doing so would not have any consequences. It was empha-
sised that the participant did not have to decide immediately and that they 
could do so within a two-day period. If the participant agreed to take part in 
principle, the experimented read through the information sheet and consent 
form and addressed possible questions from the participants. If they agreed 
to participate in the study, the participant was then asked to sign the consent 
form, however, it was explained that they did not have to make a decision 
immediately. A copy of the Information sheet(s) and Consent form for pa-
tients is attached in Appendix A. 
Patients were tested at the bedside, in their rooms inside the hospital 
ward. There was no fixed time and number of testing sessions with patients, 
as this depended on their availability in the wards, as well as their medical 
condition, mood and fatigue. Testing was usually completed in between five 
and ten sessions, preferably on consecutive days, lasting no more than one 
hour each.  
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Figure 2.1: Summary of patients identified, recruited and tested 
* Patients were unable to participate due to medical complications, discharge from the hos-
pital, severe fatigue or unexpected death. 
2.4. AHP assessment and patient classification 
As previously discussed (see Chapter 1), no standard assessment for 
AHP exists. In this study patients were classified as having AHP based on 
the scoring scale developed by Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno and Berti 
(1986) (see Appendix B). Since the questions are not specified by Bisiach et 
al. (1986), a brief questionnaire based on the structure of the scales devel-
oped by Cutting, et al. (1978) and Berti, et al. (1996) was followed. Specifi-
cally, the questionnaire included: (i) two general questions (“Where are 
you?”; “Why are you here?”); (ii) four questions about motor ability in the left 
upper and lower limb: two specific (“Can you move your left arm/leg?”) and 
two confrontation questions (“Please move your left arm/leg. Have you done 
it?”); (iii) two questions examining anosognosic phenomena, namely Non-
belonging (e.g. “Is this your hand? Does it feel like it belongs to you?”. The 
questionnaire is scored on a 4-points scale, based on the original by Bisiach 
et al. (1986) assessment (0= disorder is spontaneously reported or men-
tioned by the patient following a general question about his complaint; 1= 
Total number of patients 
screened:  
N = 545 
Patients excluded due to 
study criteria:  
N = 494 
Number of patients re-
cruited and consented:  
N = 51 
Patients consented but 
unable to participate*:  
N = 10 
Patients recruited from 
Italian collaborator:  
N = 6 
Total number of patients 
included in the study:  
N = 41 
Final total number of pa-
tients:  
N = 47 
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disorder is reported only following a specific question about the strength of 
the patient’s left limb; 2= disorder is acknowledged only after its demonstra-
tion through confrontation; 3= no acknowledgement of the disorder can be 
obtained). Only patients scoring 2 and 3 were classified as AHP as it has 
been argued that a score of 1 might not be the result of AHP, but of the pa-
tients spontaneously mentioning other deficits they consider more important 
or disabling (Baier, & Karnath, 2005). This questionnaire was administered at 
the beginning of the first session with the patient. The two last questions 
were also used to identify disturbed sensation of limb ownership (DSO).  
In order to increase the validity of the AHP classification, the Feinberg, 
et al. (2000) questionnaire was used as a secondary measure of AHP (see 
Appendix C). Compared to the one developed by Bisiach et al. (1986), this 
tool includes additional types of questions, such as assessing knowledge of 
the motor deficit during demonstration of the deficit, and in addition it gener-
ates a continuous score that allows greater range of statistical comparisons 
between groups. The original questionnaire consists of 10 items concerning 
the upper limb, including general questions, e.g. “Do you have weakness an-
ywhere?” and confrontation questions, e.g. ‘Left arm is lifted and dropped in 
right hemispace. “It seems there is some weakness, do you agree?” It is 
scored on a 3-point scale (0= full awareness; 0.5= partial awareness; 1= full 
unawareness). A similar questionnaire for the lower limb was also used. The 
first seven questions remained the same as in the upper limb questionnaire, 
but the last three questions were modified as follows: Instead of a) confronta-
tion in the left hemispace, b) confrontation in the right hemispace and c) as-
sessment of personal neglect, A) confrontation was assessed while the ex-
perimenter simply lifted the patient’s leg, B) the patient was asked to move 
their leg and report if they achieved it, and C) they were also asked if they 
can walk without help. Scoring of the lower limb questionnaire was the same 
as above. A total Feinberg score was also calculated by adding the two 
scores. 
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2.5. Neuropsychological assessment 
Besides AHP assessments, all patients also underwent a series of 
neuropsychological assessments, chosen to be suitable for bedside admin-
istration. Also, demographic information (e.g. years of education) and medi-
cal history were obtained from all patients (see Appendix D). Additional in-
formation (e.g. date of onset, date of birth) were obtained from the patients 
medical folder. Due to the recruiting and assessment issues described 
above, such as early discharge or fatigue, not every patient participated in all 
neuropsychological assessments and consequently the amount of data 
gathered for each neuropsychological test varied between experimental 
tasks. Therefore, between-groups comparisons on the neuropsychological 
data were performed separately for each experimental task, and reported in 
the corresponding chapter. However, data for a neuropsychological test were 
reported only if at least 40% of the study sample size had taken part in it. 
Motor strength assessment 
The Medical Research Council Scale (MRC; Guarantors of Brain, 
1986) was used to assess motor strength of the upper and lower limbs. 
Classification ranged from no contraction (score = 0), flicker or trance of con-
traction (score = 1), movement with gravity eliminated (score = 2), movement 
against gravity (score = 3), movement against gravity and resistance (score 
= 4), normal power (score = 5).  
Neglect assessment 
The standardised Behavioural Inattention Test (BIT; Wilson, Cock-
born, & Halligan, 1987) was used to assess unilateral visuo-spatial neglect in 
this study. Five subtests were administered: line crossing, star cancellation, 
copy, representational drawing and line bisection conventional subtests were 
used.  
Personal neglect was assessed using the “One item test” (Bisiach, 
Vallar, Perani, Papani, & Berti, 1986), a standard clinical test during which 
the patient is asked to use their ipsilateral (right) arm to touch their contrala-
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teral (left) hand. The movement is rated as good (score = 0), done but with 
small error or latency (score = 1), the search is interrupted before it is com-
pleted (score = 2), or no movement towards the opposite arm is performed 
(score = 3). The “comb/razor” test (McIntosh, Brodie, Beschin, & Robertson, 
2000) was also used to assess the patient’s personal neglect by assessing 
their performance during two activities. The patient is asked to pretend 
combing their hair, and put on make up or shave (according to gender), while 
the experimenter notes how much of the action is performed on the left, right 
and middle part of the face. The percentage bias score is calculated as fol-
lows: %bias = (left – right strokes) / (left + right + ambiguous strokes)*100. 
The %bias creates a score from -1 (total left neglect) to +1 (total right ne-
glect), with a cut-off score of < -0.11 for left personal neglect. 
Assessment of general cognitive functioning  
Orientation to time, place and person was assessed using the Mon-
treal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine, 2005). The MoCA was used 
to assess domains such as orientation to time and place, memory, neglect, 
attention, dysphasia, apraxia and executive function. This tool was used to 
exclude patients in a confusional state and with generalised cognitive im-
pairments.  
Assessment of executive functioning  
The Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB; Dubois, et al., 2000) was used 
to assess executive and reasoning abilities. It consists of six subtests: Simi-
larities and Abstract reasoning; Mental Flexibility; Motor programming and 
Executive Control; Conflicting instructions; Inhibitory Control (go-no-go test); 
Precision Behaviour. In each subtest, the maximum (and better) score is 
three, and a total score of 18 for the whole test is calculated. The Cognitive 
Estimates test was also used (Shallice, & Evans, 1978), which was used to 
assess the patients’ ability to make complex mental estimations.  
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Memory assessment 
The digit span task, forwards and backwards, from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale III (WAIS III; Wechsler, 1997) was used to assess working 
memory. Long-term verbal recall was also assessed using the five-item test 
from the MoCA. In this task, patients are presented with five items they are 
required to immediately recall, and the procedure is repeated twice. The five 
items are then repeated and delayed recall is tested. Category clues and 
multiple-choice options are provided, but points are only given for spontane-
ously recalled items. 
Emotion assessment 
The Hopsital Depression and Anxiety Scale (HADS; Zigmond, & 
Smaith, 1983) was used to establish the anxiety and depression levels of the 
patients. The scale is a self-rating tool, designed for use with patients with 
physical difficulties, so that symptoms such as fatigue to not increase the de-
pression score. In this scale, a score of eight or higher in the depression 
and/or anxiety questions, indicated the presence of clinical depression and/or 
anxiety. 
Clinical assessments 
 In the early recruitment stages of this thesis, proprioception was as-
sessed using a clinical protocol based on Vocat et al.’s (2010) procedure. 
According to this protocol, the patient’s eyes were closed throughout the as-
sessment, and small, vertical movements were applied to three joints (middle 
finger, wrist and elbow), at three time intervals. Correct responses were rated 
as zero, and incorrect ones as one. Also in the early stages of recruitment, in 
order to test visual fields and tactile extinction, the customary ‘confrontation’ 
assessment was used (Bisiach, et al., 1986).  
Progressively, the Nottingham Sensory Assessment was used to as-
sess sensory extinction and proprioception, replacing the respective as-
sessments by Bisiach et al. (1986) and Vocat et al. (2010). The Nottingham 
Sensory Assessment examines different tactile sensations (light touch, pres-
 42 
sure, pinprick, temperature, tactile localisation, and bilateral simultaneous 
touch), kinaesthetic sensations (proprioception) and stereognosis. Tactile 
stimuli are applied three times on different (specified) body locations on the 
affected and non-affected side, and the average score for each body part in-
dicates absent, impaired or normal sensation, or inability to test the specific 
part. Two subtests (tactile localisation and bilateral simultaneous touch) re-
quire intact sensations on the pressure subtest, in order to be performed. 
However, it should be noted that due to the length of the task and the usually 
limited time of assessment with each patient, most of the times it was not 
possible to perform the full task with patients. It was therefore decided that 
temperature and stereognosis would not be tested, and stimuli would be ap-
plied only once, instead of three times, on each body side. It is understood 
that in this way, the test results would no longer be standardised. However, 
given the fact that the test does not provide cut-off scores, it was believed 
that the data would be sufficient to identify differences in deficits between the 
AHP and HP groups. The body areas of interest for the present thesis were 
elbow, wrist and hand. Therefore only data for the affected side of these 
body areas will be presented in the following chapters, since, as mentioned 
above, no overall cut-off score or normative scores for individual body parts 
are provided. Data analysis for the other (affected) body parts can be found 
in Appendix E.  
Ideomotor Apraxia was also assessed, with the task consisting of two 
meaningful gestures, two meaningless and three mimed- verbal command, 
copy gesture and use of object (Butler, 2002). Lastly, Left-Right disorienta-
tion was tested using a tool developed by Gerstmann (1940). According to 
this protocol, the patient is asked to identify their own right and left arm and 
leg, and use either the right or left arm to identify various body parts (e.g. 
right ear; left shoulder), their own or the experimenter’s. 
2.6. Experimental methodology 
The specific design, methods and procedures used in each study are 
described in the following chapters. 
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2.7. Summary and conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the general, 
common methodology used in all the experimental studies of the present 
thesis, in order to avoid repetition in the following chapters. The subsequent 
chapters will provide detailed methods of the number of participants includ-
ed, specifications of the design and methodology, information about the spe-
cific neuropsychological tests used and comparison of performance between 
groups. As discussed above, the present thesis will employ a combination of 
neuropsychological assessments and experimental protocols. 
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3. The Effect of Affective, Self and Other 
Touch in Body Ownership and Motor Aware-
ness 
3.1. Introduction 
Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) has been more often associated 
with right perisylvian lesions (Cocchini, et al., 2009) and such lesions can not 
only cause disruptions in one’s awareness of deficits (e.g. in AHP), but also 
disrupt one’s sense of ownership of their limbs (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). In-
deed, AHP is often accompanied by asomatognosia, lack of recognition of 
the existence or ownership of one’s limbs. Asomatognosia can also manifest 
in a more ‘productive’ way, accompanied by delusional beliefs about one’s 
hemiplegic limbs, such as the belief that the limb belongs to another person, 
a condition called somatoparaphrenia (Gerstmann, 1942) (see Vallar, & 
Ronchi, 2009 for review). Asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia can take 
several clinical forms and the use of these terms has been debated in the 
bibliography, therefore in the present study all abnormal beliefs and feelings 
of ownership towards one’s limbs were classified as “disturbed sensation of 
limb ownership (DSO)”, according to Baier and Karnath’s example (2008). 
Both AHP and DSO are examples of selective disruption of body awareness 
(or self-awareness) (see also Chapter 1), which will be explained below (de 
Vignemont, 2010). 
Body awareness can be described as the feeling most of us have of 
the “same old body always there” (James, 1890, p. 242). We are aware of 
the fact that our body belongs to us, that it is omnipresent in our physical and 
mental lives, and we can distinguish our own body from that of others (Gal-
lagher, 2000). Evidence suggests that body awareness is constructed by the 
processing, integration and re-representation of sensorimotor states, 
achieved via a dynamic integration of information originating from two or 
more, different sensory modalities (i.e. multisensory integration; see 
Maravita, Spence, & Driver, 2003; Stein, & Stanford, 2008 for reviews). The-
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se modalities can be either exteroceptive (e.g. vision, olfaction) or interocep-
tive (affective feelings from within the body representing its physiological 
condition, e.g. pain, hunger; Craig, 2002) (Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2005). Body 
awareness, effortless as it may seem, is a complex and vulnerable process, 
and disturbances caused by neurological incidents (e.g. brain damage), such 
as AHP and DSO described above, or intentionally in the context of experi-
mental studies (see below) can lead to its accidental or intentional disruption, 
or manipulation (de Vignemont, 2010).  
A sensory domain that appears to significantly contribute to multisen-
sory integration and affect body ownership is touch. Tactile afferent signals 
have been found to reciprocally interact with body representation (see Se-
rino, & Haggard, 2010 for review) and one of the best-known examples for 
the impact of tactile information on body awareness is the rubber hand illu-
sion (Botvinick, & Cohen, 1998). In this paradigm, synchronous stroke of the 
participant’s (hidden) hand and of a (visible) prosthetic hand elicits the illu-
sion that the prosthetic hand is one’s actual hand. The effect of this original 
version of the paradigm, measured as the difference between the actual and 
the perceived location of the participant’s hand (proprioceptive drift), appears 
to be driven by multisensory integration and specifically by the three-way in-
teraction of tactile, proprioceptive and visual inputs. It is suggested that (syn-
chronous) bottom-up visuo-tactile stimulation and top-down influences based 
on one’s representation about their own body, create the illusion of the arm’s 
mislocation (Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2005), and highlight the role of touch as an 
important component in the multisensory integration process. Based on this 
notion, the present study will focus on touch and its effects on body aware-
ness, specifically when two of its main domains are disrupted: awareness for 
(motor) deficits (in AHP), and awareness of body ownership (in DSO). To this 
end, two properties of touch, agency (self- or other-generated) and pleasant-
ness, bearing different characteristics (see below), will be examined on pa-
tients with AHP and HP controls, with and without DSO.  
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3.1.1. Self-touch on touch perception and body awareness  
Traditionally, self-generated touch has been associated with attenua-
tion of the resulting tactile stimulation. Perhaps the best-known example for 
this is the fact that we cannot tickle ourselves, and studies on this field have 
suggested that self-generated action diminishes the intensity of the stimula-
tion resulting from the action (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Weiskrantz, 
Elliott, & Darlington, 1971). The suggested mechanism behind this process 
relies on forward models of action, according to which, an efference copy of 
the motor command is used to create predictions about the sensory conse-
quences of the motor act (Miall, & Wolpert, 1996). These predictions are then 
compared to the actual sensations and, because self-generated actions are 
usually correctly predicted, there is little or no discrepancy between the pre-
dicted and experienced sensations, allowing the attenuation of these sensa-
tions. This attenuation allows the enhancement of the sensory feedback re-
sulting from externally generated actions, whose consequences cannot be 
accurately predicted. Overall, it appears that sensory attenuation is related 
mostly to those sensory consequences that are irrelevant for behavior. On 
the other hand, self-touch has also been associated with enhanced sensory 
perception. Weiskrantz and Zhang (1987) were among the first to examine 
this relationship in a right-hemisphere stroke patient suffering from hemian-
aesthesia. The patient was reportedly able to feel tactile stimulation on the 
contralesional hand only when she delivered the touch and not otherwise. 
The patient was also able to discriminate whether her or someone else’s in-
terlocked left fingers were being touched, but, again, only when she deliv-
ered the touch, which suggested that the enhancement of touch could not be 
solely attributed to attention from her ipsilateral hand. The self-touch en-
hancement effect was replicated by Valentini, Kischka and Halligan (2008) in 
a large sample of patients with unilateral stroke and hemihypaesthesia (i.e. 
unilateral reduced sensory sensitivity). More than half of the sample, espe-
cially patients with right-sided lesions, showed significant somatosensory im-
provement when they delivered touch to their unaffected limb with their ipsi-
lateral arm. The results of these studies suggest that self-touch significantly 
improves tactile detection and sensory processing. The discrepancy between 
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the self-touch enhancement and self-touch attenuation effects have not yet 
been fully explained (Van Stralen, Zandvoort, & Dijkerman 2011). Evidence 
suggests that the enhancement effect is mostly associated with attention 
(Jackson, Parkinson, Pears, & Nam, 2011) and more specifically that the ef-
ferent signal generated by self-touch can be cancelled by top-down influ-
ences, such as increased attention towards the action (Ackerley, et al., 2012; 
Simoes-Franklin, Whitaker, & Newell, 2011). 
Several theories have been put forward regarding the self-touch en-
hancement effect. Firstly, it has been suggested that the effect is due to the 
use of proprioceptive information, in other words that the patient assesses 
the position of the active hand and infers whether and where they are being 
touched, in a process that relies more on inference than on feeling (White, 
Aimola Davies, Kischka, & Davies, 2010). Attentional modulation has also 
been a candidate theory, according to which the active hand acts as an “at-
tentional wand”, drawing attention to the affected side of the body during self-
touch (Coslett & Lie, 2004; Valentini, et al., 2008). However, studies manipu-
lating or eliminating one or both of these factors (Valentini, et al., 2008; 
Weiskrantz, & Zhang, 1987; White, et al., 2010) have indicated that these 
theories alone fail to explain the self-touch enhancement. Instead, White et 
al. (2010) suggested that temporal expectation appears to have an important 
role in the enhancement effect, that is, that the patient knows where and 
when stimulation will occur and directs their attention accordingly. Indeed, 
their study was able to disrupt the self-touch enhancement effect by experi-
mentally manipulating temporal expectation of touch. However, the authors 
also acknowledged that the attentional modulation theory proposed by Val-
entini et al (2008) could be an explanatory factor for some, but not for all 
cases of the enhancement effect (White, et al., 2010). 
Besides modulating tactile perception, there is converging evidence 
that self-touch also affects higher-order body representation. The relationship 
between touch, and specifically passive self-touch, and proprioception in af-
fecting body representation in healthy participants was investigated by Lack-
ner (1988). In his study, he vibrated the passive biceps tendon of participants 
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and created the illusion of elbow extension, while participants were holding 
the tip of their nose between their finger and thumb. This led to the illusion of 
their nose elongating, also known as the Pinocchio illusion. A similar finding 
was also reported in a study by De Vignemont, Ehrsson and Haggard (2005), 
in which participants held their left index finger with their right hand while re-
ceiving vibration of the right biceps. Participants experienced the illusion of 
their index finger elongating and it was also found that the subjective length-
ening of the finger lead to an overestimation of the distance between the tac-
tile stimuli that were delivered to the finger. These two studies provide evi-
dence that the interaction between self-touch and proprioception play an im-
portant role in constructing the body representation as a physical object. 
However, they only examined self-touch as part of a static body posture and 
not as active touch of one body part on another. This effect of active self-
touch on structural body representation was investigated by Schütz-Bosbach 
and colleagues (2009).  
In their study, Schütz-Bosbach et al. (2009) introduced a discrepancy 
between the active and passive hand of the participant, by interleaving the 
experimenter’s fingers with those of the participant’s passive hand. In this 
way, the active hand experienced touching more fingers than the passive 
hand felt being touched by. Participants then received a tap in two of their 
fingers and when asked to report the number of fingers between the tapped 
ones, they were found to underestimate the number of fingers, specifically in 
the self-touch conditions. The findings not only suggest that self-touch in-
deed influences body representation, but also that this influence is mostly 
based on the passive experience of touch (i.e. the somatic inputs), rather 
than on sensorimotor signals associated with the active component of touch. 
Another important study was conducted by Kammers, et al. (2010), who in-
vestigated the relationship between self-touch, body representation and 
emotion. They induced the ‘thermal grill illusion’, placing the participant’s 
middle finger in cold water, and the index and ring fingers in warm. This illu-
sion causes the cold water to feel paradoxically hot, and is explained by low-
level interactions between Aδ and C afferent pathways, signalling coolness 
from the middle finger and pain from the two other fingers, respectively. Dis-
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inhibition of the C fibres in the middle finger leads to perception of pain. The 
authors found that the perceived heat in the (target) right middle fingers was 
reduced when participants touched their three stimulated fingers of each 
hand with those of the opposite hand, directly after bilateral stimulation. This 
suggests that self-touch can increase the coherence of the mental represen-
tation of the body.  
Additional evidence suggests that self-touch does not only affect body 
representation in healthy participants, but also in clinical conditions where 
body awareness is disrupted. A study by Van Stralen, Zandvoort and Dijker-
man (2011) examined a right hemisphere stroke patient with AHP and relat-
ed ownership disorders, including DSO and misoplegia. The patient was 
asked to stroke several arms (her own left arm, the experimenter’s arm, a 
rubber hand, a right arm) for 3 minutes and it was found that she acquired 
ownership of all four arms. Notably, the time she needed to acquire owner-
ship of the arms depended on the similarity of the foreign arm with her own 
arm, suggesting that self-touch is influenced by higher-order body represen-
tations. Her attitudes towards her arm also changed, from initial dislike and 
rejection to more affective stroking. Interestingly, in a second experiment of 
this study, where the patient was asked to stroke a rubber hand, stroke her 
own left arm, or have her hand stroked by the experimenter, it was found that 
when stroking the rubber hand, the patient not only claimed ownership of this 
hand, but also denied ownership of her own left hand. This did not occur 
when she or the experimenter stroked her left arm. 
In summary, self-touch has been found to play an important role in in-
fluencing sensory perception, most possibly via increased temporal attention 
and expectation towards the self-applied stimuli. Moreover, there is converg-
ing evidence from healthy participants and clinical populations, that self-
touch also affects the structural representation of the body, improving its co-
herence.  
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3.1.2. Body awareness and interoception: the role of affective touch 
As discussed above, body awareness is believed to be constructed 
from the dynamic integration of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals (e.g. 
Maravita, et al., 2003). This section will focus on the latter, and more specifi-
cally on affective touch. What exactly is affective touch? This modality, to-
gether with other key sensations from the body such as pain, hunger and 
temperature, has been recently re-classified as ‘interoceptive’, clearly sepa-
rated from other discriminatory exteroceptive sensations (Craig, 2002; 2009). 
Indeed, concerning touch, evidence suggests the existence of a dual touch 
system, consisting of two neural pathways. The first mediates purely sensory 
touch and is composed of skin mechanoreceptors, projecting to the primary 
somatosensory cortex and the thalamus (Johnson & Hsiao, 1992). The se-
cond pathway, specialised in conveying affective touch, is increasingly be-
lieved to rely on a distinct type of mechanoreceptors, the tactile C-fibres (Lö-
ken, Wessberg, McGlone, & Olausson, 2009; Olausson, et al., 2002; Vallbo, 
Olausson, & Wessberg, 1999). These fibres, located on hairy skin, seem to 
respond only to slow, caress-like touch, at a velocity of between 1-10cm/s, 
with a pleasantness peak at the speed of 3cm/s (Löken, et al., 2009).  
Given the specificity and peculiarity of the physiological characteristics 
of the affective touch system, it has been suggested that is relies on a spe-
cialised peripheral and central physiological system, different from the path-
way mediating discriminatory and emotionally neutral touch (Olausson, et al., 
2002; but see Gazzola, et al., 2012). Functional imaging studies suggest that 
the posterior insular cortex is the primary cortical target for C fibres (Olaus-
son, et al., 2002), an area with strong connections with the amygdala and 
hypothalamus. The posterior insula is believed to be a primary area for con-
vergence of affective and sensory signals, which then follow a posterior to 
anterior pattern in the insula, progressively integrating interoceptive infor-
mation with exteroceptive, cognitive and social inputs (Craig, & Craig, 2009).  
Despite the importance of interoceptive signals for body awareness, 
their role in body representation processes had long been neglected, and on-
ly recently have studies begun to examine the contribution of interoceptive, 
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emotional and social factors in constructing body awareness. Suzuki and col-
leagues (2013) examined the contribution of interoceptive and exteroceptive 
signals in body ownership by presenting cardio-visual feedback synchro-
nously with the participant’s heartbeat. The feedback increased the owner-
ship of a virtual hand, suggesting that the sense of body ownership can be 
modulated by the integration of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals 
online. Tsakiris and colleagues (2011) reported that healthy participants 
scoring lower on the heartbeat detection task, a classic Interoception meas-
ure, experienced a stronger rubber hand illusion compared to participants 
scoring high on the same task, suggesting an over-reliance on exteroceptive 
signals in the former group. This finding was not replicated in a more recent 
study (Crucianelli, Krahe, Jenkinson, & Fotopoulou, 2017), which however 
additionally found that affective touch enhanced the rubber hand illusion in 
the subjective measure (embodiment questionnaire) but not in the behav-
ioural (proprioceptive drift), confirming the facilitatory role of self-touch in 
ownership that previous studies had suggested (Crucianelli, Metcalf, 
Fotopoulou, & Jenkinson, 2013; Lloyd, Gillis, Lewis, & Farrell, 2013; Van 
Stralen, van Zandvoort, Hoppenbrouwers, Vissers, Kappelle, & Dijkerman, 
2014). In fact, the study by Crucianelli and colleagues (2013), which used 
pleasant and neutral touch during the rubber hand illusion procedure, was 
the first to demonstrate that pleasant touch leads to higher levels of subjec-
tive body ownership. The authors also found that slow touch on hairy skin is 
perceived as more pleasant, compared to neutral touch. Similarly, Lloyd et 
al. (2013) also found that caress-like, slow touch affected the subjective re-
port of body ownership and pleasantness during the rubber hand illusion. 
Moreover, they found that stroking the palm of the hand, an area that con-
tains no CT afferents, also led to increased embodiment and feelings of 
pleasantness. This led to the suggestion that pleasantness associated with 
affective touch, and its effect on ownership and embodiment cannot be sole-
ly explained by activation of skin fibres, and may instead be mediated by the 
interplay of neural and psychological mechanisms. Van Stralen at al. (2014), 
contrary to previous studies (Crucianelli, et al., 2017; Crucianelli, et al., 2013; 
Lloyd, et al., 2013) found that pleasant touch affected the proprioceptive drift, 
but no the subjective measure (embodiment questionnaire) during the rubber 
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hand illusion. Also, unlike Lloyd et al. (2013) finding, this effect was specific 
to the activation of CT fibres, leading the authors to suggest that these fibres 
affect body representation via multisensory integration and not via conscious 
experience of body ownership.  
Overall, affective touch, as an interoceptive modality, seems to have a 
significant contribution in multisensory integration, which in turn is considered 
to be the core of the sense of body ownership.  
3.1.3. Present study 
As discussed above, previous research has confirmed the role of self-
generated touch and of affective touch in influencing body representations 
and affecting ownership, via (possibly) temporal attention and expectation, 
and interoceptive inputs, respectively. In addition, self-touch has been found 
to increase sensory perception for the self-applied stimulation, also via tem-
poral expectation. So far, however, studies have examined the effect of each 
of the two types of touch on body ownership, but the individual contribution 
and reciprocal modulation of exteroceptive (in the form of temporal attention) 
and interoceptive (in the form of self-touch) signals in disrupted body owner-
ship is yet to be investigated. Moreover, no study has examined their effect 
on the other important domain of body awareness that is motor awareness. 
The present study aims to investigate the contribution of affective- and self-
touch in disorders of motor awareness and ownership, and specifically in 
AHP and DSO patients.  
To this end a novel task was designed, in which patients will receive 
touch by their own opposite hand (self-touch) or by the experimenter (other-
touch), at a velocity of 3cm/s (pleasant touch), or 12cm/s (neutral touch), on 
their left or right forearm. The subjective intensity and pleasantness of touch, 
as well as and the improvement in ownership and motor awareness were 
measured. In order to ensure that any improvement in ownership and motor 
awareness were specific for these domains and not part of a general im-
provement in the patient’s neurological condition, self-reported awareness 
scores of extrapersonal and personal neglect were also measured as control 
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conditions. Touch was applied with a cosmetic brush, in order to reduce pro-
prioceptive information (Valentini, et al., 2008). Due to patients’ motor deficits 
on the left hand and in order to apply the correct speed and reduce proprio-
ceptive information from the active hand (left and right), the experimenter 
guided the patient’s active hand to touch the opposite one. Based on the de-
sign of the task, five main hypotheses were developed. Firstly, based on the 
literature, the self-enhancement effect was expected, and specifically self-
touch was expected to be perceived as more intense than ‘other’ touch, on 
both arms. Moreover, according to previous studies, the effect of affective 
touch was expected, with pleasant touch being expected to have higher 
pleasantness scores, compared to neutral one, especially in the ‘other’ touch 
condition (Ackerley, Saar, McGlone, Backlund Wasling, 2014). Specifically to 
the present study, it was hypothesised that the combination of pleasant self-
touch on the left arm would lead to the greatest improvement in ownership 
and motor awareness, in comparison to the other conditions. This effect was 
not expected in the right arm control condition. Lastly, no effect of self- and 
pleasant touch was expected on personal and extrapersonal neglect scores.  
3.2. Materials and methods 
3.2.1. Participants 
Twenty-nine adult neurological patients with right-hemisphere lesions 
and contralateral hemiplegia were recruited for the study, using the process 
and inclusion criteria described in Chapter 2. Four of those patients were ex-
cluded for only completing one block, or less, of the task, due to being dis-
charged or becoming medically unwell. The remaining 25 patients were di-
vided into two groups, based on their clinical diagnosis of AHP, according to 
Bisiach (Bisiach, et al., 1986) interview, and in all cases confirmed by Fein-
berg et al. (2000) questionnaire (see Chapter 2). Sixteen patients were clas-
sified as AHP (7 females; mean age = 69.37 years, SD = 13.92, age range = 
46 to 88 years) and nine as HP controls (3 females, mean age = 57.22 
years, SD = 17.11, age range = 38 to 80 years).  
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3.2.2. Neuropsychological assessment  
In addition to the AHP assessment above, all participants underwent a 
standard neuropsychological assessment, described in detail in Chapter 2. 
Tests included assessments for motor strength (for upper and lower limb); 
personal and extrapersonal neglect; general cognitive functioning; sensory 
examination; mood; orientation; and working and long-term memory. 
3.2.3. Experimental study design 
 The main experimental aim was to investigate the effect of self- and 
pleasant touch on motor awareness and ownership in patients with AHP and 
in HP controls. The experiment had a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Instructed 
Agency: self vs. other) x 2 (Velocity: pleasant vs. neutral) x 2 (Laterality: left 
arm vs. right arm) mixed factorial design. Regarding the Instructed Agency 
variable, in the “self” condition patients were required to hold a brush with the 
indicated hand and apply touch to the opposite forearm. In the “other” condi-
tion, patients were stroked on the indicated forearm by the experimenter. The 
Laterality variable dictated which arm would be stroked in each block, either 
by the experimenter or by the opposite arm. Velocity was manipulated by 
applying touch at either 3cm/s or 12cm/sec. Since the right arm condition 
was used as control condition, right and left arm data were analysed sepa-
rately. In the left arm condition, all independent variables were manipulated, 
making it a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Instructed Agency: self vs. other) x 2 
(Velocity: pleasant vs. neutral) mixed factorial design. In the right arm condi-
tion, only agency was manipulated, with velocity always being applied at 
3cm/sec (i.e. pleasant), therefore it was a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (In-
structed Agency: self vs. other) design. 
The task was divided into six blocks, according to conditions (self-
pleasant; other-pleasant; self-neutral; other-neutral; Right arm self-pleasant; 
Right arm other-pleasant). Each block consisted of three parts: the pre-touch 
questionnaire, the touch part, and the post-touch questionnaire. The pre- and 
post – touch questionnaires were based on pre-existing validated measures 
(e.g. Berti, et al., 1996) and consisted of three Ownership questions (e.g. “Is 
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this your own arm?”) and three Motor Awareness questions (e.g. “Do you 
have any problems moving your arms currently?”). Questions were scored as 
0 = correct, 0.5 = partially correct, or 1 = incorrect. Previous studies have 
suggested that anosognosic patients are able to learn the correct (i.e. ex-
pected) responses to such awareness questions when repeatedly adminis-
tered (Marcel, et al., 2004). To control for this, two different versions of the 
questionnaires were developed. In the self-pleasant and other-pleasant con-
ditions only, the Ownership and Motor Awareness questionnaire also includ-
ed one extrapersonal and one personal neglect question (to copy either the 
daisy or the star from the BIT Copy subtest, and to perform the One Item 
test, respectively), and the patient was asked to rate their performance (0 not 
at all good – 10 very good). The touch part of each block consisted of four 
active – touch trials and one sham. Touch was applied on the left or right 
forearm, according to instructions, on the area from the wrist to the elbow 
(approximately 20 cm), and each touch trial consisted of four strokes: from 
the elbow towards the wrist and backwards, twice, with 1sec pause between 
each stroke. In the sham trials the same procedure was followed, but the 
brush was held approximately 1cm above the skin without touching it. The 
order of the touch trials and the order of the blocks were randomised. 
3.2.4. Measures  
The main dependent variables in this study were: (1) Motor Aware-
ness, calculated as the difference between the score of the three pre-touch 
awareness questions and the score of the post-touch awareness questions. 
A negative score indicated improvement in Motor Awareness (i.e. less ano-
sognosia); (2) Ownership, calculated as the difference between the score of 
the three pre-touch ownership questions, and the score of the post-touch 
ownership questions. A negative score indicated improvement in Ownership 
(i.e. less DSO); (3) A subjective Intensity of touch rating, (a 10 point scale, 
with vertical configuration to control for extrapersonal neglect in patients; 0-
not at all; 10-very well). One intensity rating was obtained after each touch 
trial, and the average intensity of touch score for the four active touch trials in 
each block was calculated and used in the analyses; (4) A subjective pleas-
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antness of touch rating (a 5-point Likert-type scale; not at all pleasant, to ex-
tremely pleasant, with a vertical configuration to control for extrapersonal ne-
glect in patients). The pleasantness rating was obtained after each active tri-
al, but only for those trials in which intensity of touch was reported to be 
higher than zero. If the patient reported feeling no touch during one trial, 
pleasantness was not asked and consequently the pleasantness average 
was calculated for the rest of the trials; (5) Personal neglect awareness, cal-
culated as the difference between the pre-touch and post-touch self-reported 
score in One item test. A negative score indicated improvement in personal 
neglect awareness; and (6) Extrapersonal neglect awareness, calculated as 
the difference between the pre-touch and post-touch self-reported score in 
the BIT copy task. A negative score indicated improvement in extrapersonal 
neglect.  
3.2.5. Materials and Procedures 
For the purposes of the experiment a cosmetic brush was used to ap-
ply touch. Additionally, two vertical scales were used, to minimise the effect 
of left-sided neglect, namely one ‘Intensity of touch’ scale (from bottom: 0-
Not at all to 10-Very well) measuring how well the patient felt the touch, and 
a ‘Pleasantness of touch’ scale (from bottom: Not at all pleasant; Slightly 
pleasant; A little bit pleasant; Quite pleasant; Very pleasant; Extremely 
pleasant), measuring how pleasant the touch felt. Two different scales were 
used, instead of a single one, to reduce perseveration and repetition, and 
clearly differentiate between the two variables (i.e. Intensity of touch and 
Pleasantness). The one item test and BIT copy test (specifically, the flower 
and star figures) were also used, to assess awareness of drawing neglect 
used as control condition. 
Each patient was tested individually. As mentioned above, the task 
was organised into six blocks, with intervals between each block. Patients 
were required to sit upright on their bed, or on a chair. At the beginning of the 
task, the experimenter read the instructions, and asked six control questions 
about the pleasantness of hypothetical touch from different items (e.g. “How 
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pleasant would it be to be touched by cotton on your skin?”) and different 
personal scenarios (e.g. “How pleasant would it be to lose your keys?”), to 
familiarise patients with the scales and to ensure they could respond properly 
to pleasant and unpleasant scenarios. During the main part, the pre-touch 
questionnaire was administered and the patients’ responses were reported 
verbatim. This was followed by the touch part. In the self-touch conditions 
where the right arm applied touch, despite the patient’s ability to move the 
right arm and in order to ensure the correct velocity is applied, and to control 
for attention, and proprioceptive information in comparison to the ‘self’ condi-
tion of the left arm, the experimenter supported the grip and moved the arm 
to stroke the opposite forearm. In the self-touch conditions where the left arm 
was the active arm, the grip of the hand holding the brush and the left arm 
itself were respectively supported and moved by the experimenter, in order 
to apply touch on the right forearm. In the other-touch conditions for both 
arms, the experimenter placed the “inactive” arm (i.e. the one that would not 
be touched) in the opposite hemispace to control for attention, and applied 
touch to the indicated forearm.  
After each touch trial, patients were asked to open their eyes and re-
port how well they felt the touch, using the Intensity of touch scale, and how 
pleasant the touch felt, using the Pleasantness of touch scale. If a patient re-
ported feeling no touch (i.e. scored 0 in the Intensity of touch scale), they 
were not asked about pleasantness. After completing all touch trials in each 
block, the experimenter administered the post-touch questionnaire. All ques-
tions were asked in relation to the (passive) arm that received touch. After a 
short break, the experiment would continue with the next block. At the end of 
the task patients were debriefed and had the opportunity to ask questions. 
3.2.6. Statistical analyses 
All analyses were conducted in SPSS Version 23 and using non-
parametric tests, as data were not normally distributed. Figures were pre-
sented using parametric data (means and standard errors) for illustrative 
reasons. The equivalent non-parametric figures can be found in Appendix F. 
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Control analyses for randomisation 
Due to lack of proper randomisation of the conditions (blocks) in the 
task, the first analysis examined whether this (partially randomised) order of 
conditions had an effect on Ownership and Motor Awareness scores. Partici-
pants were separated into two groups: those who did the left self-pleasant 
condition as first left-arm condition (N = 15, 5 HP patients), and those who 
did any other left condition as first left arm condition (N = 10, 4 HP patients). 
In case a patient had started the task with a right-arm block, they were clas-
sified according to the first left-arm block they had done, and this was fol-
lowed in the next three conditions as well. Based on this organisation, two 2 
(Order: ‘self-pleasant left’ condition vs. ‘any other left’ condition) x 4 (Left arm 
conditions: 1st Left block vs. 2nd Left block vs. 3rd Left block vs. 4th Left block) 
analyses were performed. Order was the between-subjects variable. De-
pendent variable for each analysis was the differential score between post- 
and pre-touch (Update) scores for: (1) Ownership; and (2) Motor Awareness 
respectively.  
The same two analyses were also conducted for data of left and right 
arm together (see Appendix F). In this case, patients were classified into two 
groups: those who did the left self-pleasant condition as first condition overall 
(N = 13, 5 HP patients), and those who did any other condition (including 
right arm conditions) as first, overall (N = 12, 4 HP patients). Two 2 (Order: 
‘self pleasant’ vs. ‘any other’) x 6 (All Conditions: 1st block vs. 2nd block vs. 
3rd block vs. 4th block vs. 5th block vs. 6th block) analyses were performed. 
Order was the between-subjects variable. Dependent variable for each anal-
ysis was the differential score between post- and pre-touch (update) scores 
for: (1) Ownership; and (2) Motor Awareness respectively.  
Control analyses on baseline scores 
The (1) Ownership, and (2) Motor Awareness pre-touch (baseline) 
scores of each patient’s first left-arm block were compared, between AHP 
and HP groups, to examine if the groups differed significantly at the begin-
ning of the task. In case a patient had started the task with a right-arm block, 
the score of the first left-arm block they had done was used. 
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The same two analyses were also conducted for data from both arms 
(see Appendix E), by comparing (1) Ownership, and (2) Motor Awareness 
pre-touch scores of each patient, for the first block, regardless of arm laterali-
ty. 
Self-touch enhancement effect analysis  
This analysis examined whether self-touch was perceived as more in-
tense than other-touch. Two 2 (Group) x 2 (Instructed Agency: ‘self’ vs. ‘oth-
er’) x 2 (Velocity: ‘pleasant’ vs. ‘neutral’) design analysis were performed: (1) 
for the left; and (2) for the right arm separately. Dependent variable in each 
analysis was the Intensity of touch ratings. Any patient scoring > 0 in the 
sham trial of one block, and with an Intensity of touch score of 0 in two or 
more trials in the same block, would be excluded from the analysis, however 
no such patient was identified. 
Affective touch effect analysis 
This analysis examined whether pleasant touch was perceived as 
more pleasant than neutral touch. A 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Instructed 
Agency: ‘self’ vs. ‘other’) x 2 (Velocity: ‘pleasant’ vs. ‘neutral’) design analysis 
was performed. Dependent variable was Pleasantness of touch ratings.  
Main experimental analyses 
This analysis examined the effects of the different conditions on Own-
ership and Motor Awareness. Given that Motor Awareness and Ownership 
data for the right arm were expected to be almost at ceiling for both groups, 
analyses were conducted separately for left and right (control) arms. For the 
left arm, an analysis on a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Instructed Agency: 
‘self’ vs. ‘other’) x 2 (Velocity: ‘pleasant’ vs. ‘neutral’) design was performed 
on two dependent variables: (1) Ownership; and (2) Motor Awareness up-
date scores. 
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Additionally, a 2 (Group) x 2 (Instructed Agency: ‘self’ vs. ‘other’) anal-
ysis was performed on the right arm data, on (1) Ownership; and (2) Motor 
Awareness update scores. 
Control analyses on neglect 
The self-reported personal and extrapersonal neglect scores were an-
alysed. Two 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Instructed agency: ‘self’ vs. ‘other’) 
design analyses were performed, one for each type of neglect.  
3.3. Results  
3.3.1. Demographic and neuropsychological results 
Patients’ demographic characteristics and performance on the stand-
ardised neuropsychological tests are summarised in Table 3.1. To control for 
multiple comparisons, the significance level was set to p < 0.01. The AHP 
and HP groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, years of education, 
days of onset before first assessment, or motor deficits. As expected, AHP 
patients scored significantly higher (i.e. were more anosognosic) in Bisiach 
(Z = -4.441, p < .000) and Feinberg (Z = -3.708, p < .000) assessments. 
Moreover, no difference was found between groups regarding cognitive func-
tion, memory, apraxia, left/right disorientation, mood or neglect, with the ex-
ception of the line cancellation (right), were AHP patients performed worse 
than HP. Proprioception (Vocat, et al., 2010) and executive function (FAB 
test) assessments were not included in the analyses, as less than 40% of 
study participants were assessed, however comparisons between groups 
were not found to be significant (p > 0.1).  
Furthermore, no differences in tactile perception were found between 
the two groups using the Nottingham Sensory Assessment (see Table 3.2). 
However, tactile localisation and bilateral simultaneous touch subtests were 
not included, as the cut-off of 40% of sample size was not met. As described 
in Chapter 2, completion of these subtests required intact performance on 
the pressure subtest, on which both groups were found to have deficits and 
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consequently too few data were gathered for bilateral simultaneous touch 
and tactile localisation. Proprioception was also not included, as too few par-
ticipants had competed the subtest. 
Table 3.1: Groups’ demographic characteristics and neuropsychological pro-
file 
  AHP    HP   Mann-Whitney    
  Median IQR   Median IQR   Z p   
Age (years) 72.00 25.25  49.00 35.00  -1.702 0.089  
Education (years) 10.00 9.00  16.00 4.00  -1.411 0.158  
Days from onset 8.50 38.00  21.00 41.50  -0.539 0.590  
MRC left upper 
limb 0.00 1.00 
 0.00 1.00  -0.675 0.499  
MRC left lower limb 0.00 2.00  0.50 1.75  -0.323 0.747  
Bisiach awareness 
interview 3.00 1.13 
 0.00 0.00  -4.441 0.000*  
Feinberg aware-
ness interview 6.50 4.00 
 1.50 1.00  -3.708 0.000*  
Orientation 3.00 1.00  3.00 0.00  -1.811 0.070  
Digit span forwards 9.00 2.50  11.00 2.00  -2.005 0.045*  
Digit span back-
wards 3.00 4.50 
 6.00 5.00  -0.962 0.336  
MOCA memory 2.00 4.00  3.00 4.25  -0.829 0.407  
MOCA (Total) 19.40 9.68  23.00 2.75  -1.952 0.051  
Comb/razor test 
(percent bias) -22.22 58.82 
 -14.29 13.38  -0.408 0.683  
Bisiach one item 
test 0.00 0.50 
 0.00 0.50  -0.271 0.786  
Line cancellation 
right 10.00 14.50 
 18.00 1.75  -2.476 0.013*  
Line cancellation 
left 0.00 2.50 
 18.00 13.75  -2.238 0.025*  
Star cancellation 
right (cancella-
tions) 
9.50 12.50 
 
27.00 6.25 
 
-2.163 0.031* 
 
Star cancellation 
left (cancellations) 0.00 6.00 
 27.00 16.00  -2.021 0.043*  
Representational 
drawing 0.00 1.50 
 1.00 2.50  -0.890 0.374  
Line bisection right 2.00 3.00  3.00 3.00  -0.977 0.329  
Line bisection cen-
tre 0.00 3.00 
 3.00 1.00  -1.355 0.175  
Line bisection left 0.00 3.00  2.00 3.00  -1.049 0.294  
HADS depression 4.00 5.00  5.50 8.25  -0.934 0.350  
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  AHP    HP   Mann-Whitney    
  Median IQR   Median IQR   Z p   
HADS anxiety 7.00 5.00  6.00 8.75  -0.289 0.773  
Apraxia total score 7.00 0.00  7.00 0.13  -0.199 0.842  
R/L disorientation 11.60 5.15  13.00 2.60  -1.015 0.310  
                 
MRC = Medical Research Council (Guarantors of Brain, 1986); MOCA = The Montreal Cog-
nitive Assessment (Nasreddine, 2005); Comb/razor test = assessment of personal neglect; 
line crossing, star cancellation, copy & representational drawing = conventional subtests of 
Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson, et al., 1987); FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (Du-
bois, et al., 2000); HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983). The number of participants in each test varies, but is always equal or more than 40% 
of the sample size.  
* Significant difference between groups, p < 0.01. 
Table 3.2: Groups’ Nottingham Sensory Assessment scores 
  AHP  HP  Mann-Whitney 
  Median IQR  Median IQR  Z p 
ELBOW 
Light Touch 0.00 0.50  0.00 0.50  -0.160 0.873 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.791 0.429 
Pressure 0.00 2.00  0.00 2.00  -0.135 0.893 
          
WRIST 
Light Touch 0.00 1.25  0.00 0.50  -0.066 0.947 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.845 0.398 
Pressure 0.00 1.00  0.00 2.00  -0.255 0.799 
          
HAND 
Light Touch 0.00 1.25  0.00 2.00  0.000 1.000 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.845 0.398 
Pressure 0.00 1.25  0.00 0.50  -0.501 0.616 
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3.3.2. Main experimental results 
Control analyses for randomisation 
The possible effect of lack of proper randomisation of the task blocks 
was examined, by performing a two 2 (Order: ‘self-pleasant left’ condition vs. 
‘any other left’ condition) x 4 (Left arm conditions: 1st Left block vs. 2nd Left 
block vs. 3rd Left block vs. 4th Left block): (1) Ownership; and (2) Motor 
Awareness update scores.  
Ownership scores 
A Mann-Whitney test found no main effect of Order (Z = -0.039, p = 
0.969) and a Friedman test found no main effect of Left arm conditions (χ2(3) 
= 2.347, p = 0.504) was found. The lack of main effects suggests that im-
proper randomisation of bocks during the task did not have an effect on 
Ownership data.  
Motor Awareness scores 
A Mann-Whitney U test found no main effect of Order (Z = -0.577, p = 
0.564). A Friedman test found no main effect of Left arm conditions (χ2(3) = 
2.717, p = 0.437). The lack of main effects suggests that improper randomi-
sation of bocks during the task did not have an effect on Motor Awareness 
data.  
Control analyses on baseline scores 
Pre-touch Ownership and Motor Awareness scores of each patient’s 
first left-arm block were compared between AHP and HP groups, to examine 
if the groups differed significantly at the beginning of the task. 
Ownership scores 
A Mann-Whitney U test found no significant difference (Z = -0.203, p = 
0.839) between AHP and HP groups. 
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Motor Awareness scores  
A Mann-Whitney U test found a significant difference (Z = -3.188, p = 
0.001) between groups, with the AHP group starting at a higher level (Mdn = 
0.67) (i.e. answering more incorrectly) than the HP group (Mdn = 0).  
Overall, the two analyses showed that patients in AHP and HP groups 
did not differ significantly in Ownership scores, showing comparable levels of 
DSO. However, the AHP group was found to be significantly more unaware 
than the HP group. 
Self-touch enhancement effect analysis 
Two 2 (Group) x 2 (Instructed Agency: ‘self’ vs. ‘other’) x 2 (Velocity: 
‘pleasant’ vs. ‘neutral’) analyses were performed for the left and right arm, on 
Intensity of touch ratings, to examine whether self-touch was perceived as 
more intense than other-touch. 
Left arm scores 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test found a significant main effect of Instruct-
ed Agency (Z = -4.052, p < .001), with ‘self’ touch being scored as more in-
tense (Mdn = 3.87), compared to ‘other’ touch (Mdn = 2) (see Figure 3.1). No 
significant main effects were found for Group (Z = -1.125, p = 0.26), or, Ve-
locity (Z = -1.125, p = 0.26). The interaction between Velocity and Instructed 
Agency was analysed by comparing the differential scores of each of the two 
variables. A Wilcoxon signed rank test found a significant interaction (Z = -
2.569, p = 0.01). Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) post-hoc analyses showed 
that, in the neutral velocity, patients reported significantly more intense touch 
for ‘self’ (Mdn = 3.75) than for ‘other’ touch (Mdn = 2) (Z = -3.027, p = 0.002). 
Similarly, in the pleasant velocity, patients reported significantly higher inten-
sity of touch for ‘self’ (Mdn = 4) than for ‘other’ touch (Mdn = 2) (Z = -2.851, p 
= 0.004). No significant interaction between Group and Instructed agency (Z 
= -1.024, p = 0.306), or Group and Velocity (Z = -0.113, p = 0.91) was found. 
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 Figure 3.1: Means and standard errors of Intensity of touch scores for left 
arm: the Self-touch enhancement effect 
Right arm scores 
A main effect of Group was found (Z = -3.075, p = 0.002), with AHP 
having higher intensity scores (Mdn = 8.93), than HP (Mdn = 5.50). No signif-
icant effect of Instructed agency (Z = -0.261, p = 0.794) was found. Also, no 
significant interaction was found between Group and Instructed agency (Z = -
0.094, p = 0.964).  
Affective touch effect analysis 
This was a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Instructed Agency: ‘self’ vs. 
‘other’) x 2 (Velocity: ‘pleasant’ vs. ‘neutral’) design on Pleasantness of touch 
ratings, to examine if pleasant touch was indeed perceived as more pleas-
ant. 
A Mann-Whitney U test found a main effect of Group that approached 
statistical significance (Z = 1.947, p = 0.052), according to which the AHP 
group had the tendency to report higher pleasantness scores, compared to 
HP (Figure 3.2). No significant main effects of Velocity (Z = -0.601, p = 
0.548), or Instructed agency (Z = -0.959, p = 0.338) were found. No signifi-
cant interaction between Group and Velocity (Z = -0.086, p = 0.932), Group 
and Instructed agency (Z = -0.507, p = 0.612), or Velocity and Instructed 
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agency (Z = -0.506, p = 0.613) was found. In addition, no significant interac-
tion between Group, Velocity and Instructed agency was found (Z = -0.506, p 
= 0.617). 
 
 Figure 3.2: Means and standard errors of Pleasantness of touch scores for 
left arm 
Main experimental analyses 
This section investigated the effects of agency and velocity on Owner-
ship and Motor Awareness, for left and right arms separately.  
Left arm Ownership scores  
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a trend main effect of Group (Z = -
1.843, p = 0.065), indicating that the AHP group (Mdn = 0) had the tendency 
to improve more on Ownership, compared to the HP group (Mdn = 0). No 
main effects of Instructed agency (Z = -0.486, p = 0.627) and Velocity (Z = -
1.048, p = 0.295) were found. 
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The interaction between Group and Velocity was analysed by calculat-
ing the differential score between ‘pleasant’ and ‘neutral’ scores, and com-
paring it between groups. A Mann-Whitney U test found a significant interac-
tion (Z = -2.098, p = 0.036). Subsequent Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) 
pairwise comparisons found that in the AHP group, the pleasant velocity had 
the tendency to lead to more improvement in Ownership (Mdn = 0), com-
pared to neutral velocity (Mdn = 0), although the result was not significant (Z 
= -1.708, p = 0.088). No significant result was found comparing pleasant and 
neutral velocities in HP group (Z = -0.935, p = 0.35) (see Figure 3.3).  
Also, no significant interactions were found between Group and In-
structed Agency (Z = -0.673, p = 0.501), or Velocity and Instructed agency (Z 
= -0.939, p = 0.348).  
The interaction between Group, Velocity and Instructed agency was 
analysed by calculating the differential scores of Instructed agency and Ve-
locity, and comparing the difference of these differential scores between 
groups. A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant interaction Z = -2.611, 
p = 0.009). Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) post-hoc comparisons found no 
significant differences of the Velocity differential score between ‘self’ and 
‘other’ conditions in the AHP group (Z = -0.870, p = 0.384). Similarly, no dif-
ference was found in the Velocity differential score between ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
in the AHP group (Z = -1.192, p = 0.233).  
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 Figure 3.3: Means and standard errors of Ownership updates (post – pre-
touch) of AHP and HP in the different touch conditions 
 
Left arm Motor Awareness scores 
No significant main effects of Group (Z = -0.786, p = 0.432), Instructed 
Agency (Z = -0.888, p = 0.374) or Velocity (Z = -0.682, p = 0.495) were 
found. The interaction between Group and Velocity was investigated by cal-
culating the differential score for ‘pleasant’ and ‘neutral’ scores and compar-
ing them between groups. A Mann-Whitney test revealed a significant inter-
action (Z = -1.966, p = 0.049) (Figure 3.4). Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) 
post-hoc comparisons found no significant differences between AHP pleas-
ant and HP pleasant (Z = -1.446, p = 0.148), or AHP neutral and HP neutral 
(Z = -0.296, p = 0.767) conditions. No significant interactions between Group 
and Instructed Agency (Z = -0.193, p = 0.847), and Instructed agency and 
Velocity (Z = -0.193, p = 0.847) were found. No interaction between Group, 
Velocity and Instructed agency was found (Z = -1.103, p = 0.27). 
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 Figure 3.4: Means and standard errors of Motor Awareness update scores 
(post – pre touch) of AHP and HP in the different touch conditions 
Right arm Ownership scores 
A non-significant trend main effect of Instructed agency (Z = -1.633, p 
= 0.102), or Group (Z = -0.059, p = 0.953) was found. Also, no significant in-
teraction between Group and Instructed agency (Z = 0, p = 1). 
Right arm Motor Awareness scores  
No significant main effects of Group (Z = -1.121, p = 0.262), or In-
structed agency (Z = -1.218, p = 0.223) were found. Also, no significant in-
teraction between Group and Instructed agency was found (Z = -1.006, p = 
0.314). 
Control analyses on neglect 
Two 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Instructed agency: ‘self’ vs. ‘other’) 
analyses were performed, on extrapersonal and personal neglect self-
reported scores, to ensure that any effects by self- and affective touch were 
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specific for Ownership and Motor Awareness, and not generally on the pa-
tient’s awareness for their neurological condition. 
Extrapersonal neglect 
No significant main effects of Group (Z = -0.999, p = 0.318) or In-
structed Agency (Z = -0.761, p = 0.446) were found. Also, no significant in-
teraction between Group and Instructed Agency was found (Z = -4.75, p 
=0.659). 
Personal neglect 
No significant main effects of Group (Z = -0.33, p = 0.974), or Instruct-
ed agency (Z = -0.33, p = 0.974) were found. Also, no significant interaction 
between Group and Instructed Agency was found (Z = -1.613, p = 0.107). 
The lack of findings in the neglect conditions confirms that the velocity 
and agency of touch only affected Ownership and Motor Awareness, and did 
not have a more general effect, such as on awareness of drawing neglect. 
3.4. Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate how exteroceptive 
and interoceptive signals, individually or in combination, influence body 
awareness. More specifically, the study examined the effect of self-touch and 
affective touch on disorders of body ownership and motor awareness, as 
presented in DSO and AHP conditions respectively. To this end, a novel task 
was designed, in which touch was applied on the patient’s left or right fore-
arm, either by the experimenter (“other” touch), or by the patient themselves, 
with the guidance of the experimenter (“self” touch). The stroking velocity 
was either slow, at 3cm/s (pleasant touch), or fast, at 12cm/s (neutral touch). 
Patients were asked to report the subjective intensity and pleasantness of 
the touch. Before and after each block of touch, patients were also asked 
three Ownership and three Motor Awareness questions. For some conditions 
only, they were also asked to give ratings reflecting their awareness of ex-
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trapersonal and personal neglect, which were used as control questions. For 
these three variables, the update score (post – pre-touch scores) was calcu-
lated. Five hypotheses were formulated for this study. The first, predicted 
that the self-enhancement effect would be found, that is, self-touch would be 
perceived as more intense. Similarly, the affective touch effect was expected 
to be found, according to which pleasant touch (applied at 3 cm/s) would be 
perceived as more pleasant than neutral touch. Moreover, the study-specific 
hypothesis predicted that self- and pleasant touch would lead to the greatest 
improvement in Ownership and Motor Awareness, compared to other condi-
tions, for the left but not for the right arm. Lastly, no effects of velocity, in-
structed agency or group on personal and extrapersonal neglect were ex-
pected. The hypotheses were partially supported. 
Due to lack of proper randomisation in the order of the conditions 
throughout the task, most of the patients started the task with the self-
pleasant condition, followed by an almost identical order in the following 
blocks, so the first step in the analysis was to ensure that this lack of proper 
randomisation did not affect Ownership and Motor Awareness scores 
throughout the task. Indeed, comparing participants that began the task with 
the self-pleasant condition on the left arm, to those who started with any oth-
er left arm condition, it was found that the lack of randomisation did not, in 
fact, affect Ownership and Motor Awareness performance in the rest of the 
task. In addition, the pre-touch (baseline) Ownership and Motor Awareness 
performance for AHP and HP groups was established, to identify differences 
between the two groups that would allow for better interpretations of the main 
results. It was found that, on average, patients in both groups had similar de-
gree of DSO, but the Motor Awareness scores, as expected, were signifi-
cantly higher in the AHP group, indicating more anosognosia. These findings 
also justify the organisation of patients into two groups for this study, based 
on AHP presence, and not further classification according to the presence or 
not of DSO.  
The study also replicated the self-touch enhancement effect, which is 
in line with previous studies (Valentini, et al., 2008; Weiskrantz and Zhang, 
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1987). More specifically, it was found that the self-generated touch was per-
ceived as more intense than the externally generated touch, both in the 
pleasant and in the neutral conditions. Interestingly, the effect was not repli-
cated for the right arm, but it was instead found that the AHP group rated the 
touch as more intense, compared to the HP group. Previous studies sug-
gested that the enhancement of sensory perception following self-touch is 
influenced by temporal expectation, although the authors acknowledged that 
attentional modulation (Valentini, et al., 2008) could contribute to the effect  
(e.g. White, et al., 2010). Specifically, according to the temporal expectation 
account, the intention to act creates an efference copy of the sensory feed-
back of the action, while temporal expectation of this feedback increases at-
tention towards the stimulation and does not allow the attenuation of the bot-
tom-up inputs (Ackerley, et al., 2012; Simoes-Franklin, Whitaker, & Newell, 
2011).  
Regarding pleasant touch ratings, it was found that only the AHP 
group had the tendency to perceive pleasant touch as indeed more pleasant 
than neutral touch. This fact was an interesting finding, which could be linked 
to the top-down influences of affective touch. Pleasant touch has been found 
to be heavily affected by higher-order (top-down) influences (e.g. Ackerley, et 
al., 2014), such as emotional expectations. It has also long been established 
that AHP patients show deficits in emotion regulation, as they rarely display 
depressive feelings or catastrophic reactions, while negative feelings usually 
emerge as AHP subsides (Kaplan-Solms, & Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou, et al., 
2009). It could, consequently, be speculatively argued that the emotion regu-
lation impairment resulted in more positive top-down expectations about the 
affective touch, ultimately resulting in AHP group perceiving it as more 
pleasant. The correlation between affective touch and emotion, although to-
wards the opposite direction, has been previously observed in patients with 
anorexia nervosa (Crucianelli, Cardi, Treasure, Jenkinson, & Fotopoulou, 
2016). These patients typically present with reduced subjective pleasant feel-
ings and anhedonia, and experimental studies demonstrated that they also 
perceive affective touch as less pleasant than healthy controls.  
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The finding did not confirm the initial hypothesis that both groups 
would perceive slow-velocity touch as more pleasant, especially in the ‘other’ 
condition. Moreover, this result is not in line with the literature, as previous 
studies have shown that CT afferents respond to slow-velocity touch of 1-10, 
with a peak in pleasantness at 3cm/sec (Löken, et al. 2009), which is the ve-
locity we used in this study, and that participants do perceive touch applied 
within this range as more pleasant (Crucianelli, et al., 2013). One possible 
explanation for this lack of finding could be fatigue of the CT afferents due to 
repeated stroking (McGlone, Wessberg, & Olausson, 2014), as touch in our 
task was administered by four strokes for each trial, and each block consist-
ed of four active touch trials.  
The left arm Ownership scores analysis found that the AHP group had 
the tendency to improve more on Ownership, compared to the HP group. 
Additionally, within the AHP group, it was found that pleasant (affective) 
touch had the tendency to lead to more Ownership improvement, compared 
to neutral touch. No such difference was found for the HP group. Moreover, 
the results showed a significant interaction between Group, Velocity and In-
structed Agency, but no further significant comparisons were found. It was 
expected that pleasant self-touch condition would have the greatest im-
provement on Ownership, compared to the other experimental conditions. 
The lack of clear findings, in combination with the existence of mainly trends, 
suggests that the small sample size of the study possibly did not allow signif-
icant results to be found. As can be understood from the error bars in Figure 
3.2, there was also significant variability in performance between patients. 
Given that DSO scores were found to be similar for the two groups at the on-
set of the task, it can be suggested that this variability can be attributed to 
the co-existence of AHP. It is possible that different subtypes of AHP, such 
as implicit or explicit unawareness, which this study did not formally assess, 
affected the improvement of DSO. Despite the lack of significance, the direc-
tion of the results is nevertheless consistent with the findings of previous 
studies (e.g. Crucianelli, et al., 2013; Crucianelli, et al., 2017; Van Stralen, et 
al., 2014, who demonstrated that slow, affective touch results in increased 
feelings of embodiment during the rubber hand paradigm. Indeed, the pre-
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sent study seems to support the role of affective touch in constructing body 
awareness, and specifically body ownership. Body awareness, the sense of 
self, emerges from the constellation of exteroceptive and interoceptive infor-
mation, the multisensory integration procedure that is believed to be in the 
center of body awareness (Tsakiris, et al., 2011). Pleasant touch has been 
found to provide information both about the location of the touch and about 
the inner state of the body (e.g. “this feels good”), and as a recently re-
classified interoceptive modality (Craig, 2003), it was expected to be able to 
modify body awareness. 
The left arm Motor Awareness analysis revealed a significant interac-
tion of Group and Velocity, without, however, any significant further compari-
sons. This was the first study to examine the effects of agency and intero-
ception on Motor Awareness and the initial prediction that pleasant self-
touch, compared to the other conditions, would significantly improve this var-
iable, was not confirmed. A possible confounder for the lack of further signifi-
cant findings, despite the existence of trend, is the small sample size. More-
over, as discussed above, patients were not screened for the various fea-
tures of AHP (e.g. implicit awareness) and consequently no conclusions can 
be drawn about the effect of pleasant self-touch on the different categories of 
Motor Awareness.  
Conducting the same two analyses on Ownership and Motor Aware-
ness on right arm as control conditions, no significant results were found, as 
expected, as patients were not anosognosic or had any DSO symptoms 
about their right arm. The two additional control analyses on personal and 
extrapersonal neglect were also not significant. The lack of findings in these 
control conditions increases the confidence that any effects observed due to 
the different types of touch in this study, are specific to the left arm perfor-
mance, and regarding Ownership and Motor Awareness. It can therefore be 
excluded that the above results are due to patients randomly reporting touch, 
or that the effects affected performance on a more general, neurological lev-
el. 
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This study was not without limitations. Firstly, due to administration er-
rors, the order of the blocks was not properly randomised for all participants 
and as a result many patients did the task with the same order of condition, 
and the majority of participants did the self-touch condition of the left arm as 
first condition. Although this fact was taken into account in the analysis by 
investigating the order effect, it cannot be excluded that the lack of randomi-
sation did influence the results. Another limitation in the design was the fact 
that the experimenter guided the patient’s arm to apply the ‘self’ touch. Alt-
hough this was the self-touch condition and participants were explicitly in-
structed to perform the action themselves, with only guidance from the ex-
perimenter, it cannot be excluded that perhaps the movement of their arm by 
the experimenter reduced the sense of agency of the action. This could re-
sult in reduced self-touch effects. In addition, the fact that the experimenter 
touched the participant’s arm during self-touch, but not during other-touch, 
could result in sensory cues interfering with agency and confounding the ef-
fects. Recruiting participants from different cultural backgrounds and also 
from a different country (Italy), with different expectations about touch could 
also have influenced the results. Specifically, it has been found that people 
from the United Kingdom, some parts of Northern Europe and Asia touch 
each other less than, for example people in Italy (Jourard, 1966). Despite the 
fact that in this study touch was applied using a brush and not directly, skin-
to-skin, such cultural effects cannot be excluded. Lastly, the neutral velocity 
was applied at 12cm/sec, in comparison to 18cm/sec, which is the typical in 
studies of affective touch. Despite being well outside the limits of what is 
considered to be affective touch, that is 1-10cm/s, with a pleasantness peak 
at the speed of 3cm/s (Löken, et al., 2009), this velocity has not been sys-
tematically investigated in the literature and it cannot be confirmed that its 
effects would be the same as of 18cm/sec touch. At this point is should be 
mentioned that initial pilot studies of the experimental touch, indeed used 18 
cm/sec touch. However, since the experimenter manipulates the patient’s left 
and right arm multiple times during the task, it was reported by patients that 
the velocity of movement (and not the touch itself) felt quite unpleasant. It 
was therefore decided to lower the velocity to the lower acceptable speed.  
 77 
In summary, this study showed that self-generated affective touch im-
proved Ownership, at least in the AHP group, more than it improved Motor 
Awareness, and that the effects were specific for these two measures and 
did not extend to the healthy arm or other neurological domains. The results 
confirmed previous studies but were also the first to examine Motor Aware-
ness, therefore more studies are needed on the topic, also improving on this 
study’s limitations. An interesting further investigation would be on the effects 
of affective self-touch on the different subtypes of anosognosia, as, given its 
effects, touch could become an important part of rehabilitation of patients 
with DSO or AHP.  
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4. Belief Updating processes in AHP 
4.1. Introduction 
One of the most evident yet puzzling characteristics of Anosognosia 
for Hemiplegia (AHP) is the apparent inability of patients to learn from their 
experiences. These patients hold the belief that they can move their hemi-
plegic limbs despite the wealth of evidence to the contrary, while it is not un-
common to even believe they have moved their limbs (illusory movement), 
despite sensory feedback to the contrary (Feinberg, et al., 2000; Fotopoulou, 
Tsakiris, Haggard, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2008). This evident inability of pa-
tients to adjust to reality has been extensively examined. 
 One such study on the topic was conducted by Marcel et al. (2004), 
in which AHP patients were asked to give an estimate of how well they would 
be able to perform 13 tasks, bimanual and bipedal. If a patient overestimated 
their ability, they were asked to describe the strategy they would follow. Pa-
tients were then asked to perform the task, and assess their performance. 
AHP patients, compared to left hemisphere damaged controls, were found to 
overestimate their ability to perform the tasks and only a percentage of them 
appeared to have ‘learned’, that is to have adjusted their pre-execution over-
estimates into post-execution non-overestimates. Similar findings were re-
ported in the study by Cocchini et al. (2010), in which AHP patients were 
asked to perform eight tasks, three consecutive times each, and the strategy 
they employed each time was observed. It was found that only five out of 
seven patients modified their strategy sufficiently enough to perform within 
normal limits in the second and third attempt, and from those only three per-
formed within normal range after three days. In a study by Moro et al. (2011), 
patients were asked to perform five bimanual tasks and to judge their per-
formance before, during and after each task execution. According to their 
judgments, patients were classified as having a correct judgment about their 
ability to perform the task before being asked to execute it, on initiating exe-
cution, after failing to execute it, or remaining unaware after failure to exe-
cute it. Three out of 12 patients did not show any awareness of motor defi-
 80 
cits, in relation to intention or attempt of execution. Three patients were able 
to identify their deficits for at least three different actions before or during ex-
ecution, while the rest showed awareness in one or two tasks only. These 
experimental findings demonstrated that, although for some AHP patients the 
opportunity to observe themselves attempt to and fail to execute an action 
improves awareness, for others such opportunities have either just transient, 
or no effect. Further evidence about this notion, this time not related to motor 
awareness, comes from a study by Vocat et al. (2013). AHP and control pa-
tients were asked to solve a riddle by correctly guessing 10 words, and they 
were provided with five consecutive verbal cues about each word. After each 
cue, patients were asked to provide a word corresponding to the cue(s) so 
far and to assess how confident they were in their answer. AHP patients 
were found to be overconfident in their responses from the first cue. They 
were also abnormally persistent in their choice of words, as not only did they 
not modify their answers even when presented with further, contradicting 
cues, but they also justified their choice by finding bizarre connections be-
tween their answer and the cues. Together, experimental evidence demon-
strated a non-uniform performance of AHP patients, with some indeed pre-
senting with persistent inability to use information to modify their behavior, 
while others succeeded in this with more, or less effort.  
Over the years, many theoretical accounts for AHP have been put 
forward (see Chapter 1), including many that specifically addressed the delu-
sion-like element of it. One such theory proposed by Davies, et al. (2005) 
suggested that AHP resembles the development of delusions and is caused 
by an impairment generating delusional beliefs in combination with a second 
one affecting the belief evaluation system, which would otherwise reject the 
delusional beliefs. Similarly, according to Vuilleumier’s (2004) “ABC model”, 
AHP is caused by deficits in Appreciation, Belief and Check operations. Dif-
ferent combinations of deficits on those domains were thought to be ac-
countable for the various presentations of AHP. Both theories attempted to 
provide explanations for belief updating deficits on the cognitive level, while 
others grounded this delusional element on the motor level, based on mod-
els of motor control (Miall, & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert, 1997). Specifically, it 
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has been proposed that AHP patients have intact motor planning, but fail to 
correct the predictions arising from their motor intentions, despite mismatch-
ing visual and tactile feedback (Fotopoulou, et al., 2008; Frith, et al., 2000; 
Heilman, et al., 1998). So far, theories addressing the inability of AHP pa-
tients to adequately update their beliefs have focused on a single domain, 
cognitive or motor, and have therefore not been able to provide a sufficient 
explanation for the clinical variability of AHP. Improving on these shortcom-
ings, Fotopoulou (2014; 2015) recently proposed a more unified theory for 
AHP, based on predictive coding and Bayesian principles (Friston, 2010) 
(see Chapter 1). According to this theory, AHP results from the disruption in 
the dynamic relationship between expectation (prior beliefs) and experience 
(prediction errors), caused by deficits in processing of interoceptive and ex-
teroceptive signals. Such deficits could include the failure to update the rep-
resentation of the paralysed limb due to the inability of patients to sample the 
environment (active inference), or strong individual prior beliefs. These two 
candidates could play an important role, although it is unlikely that they alone 
can cause the disruption. Another potential source of disruption are deficits in 
organisation and representation on different hierarchical levels of the extero-
ceptive and interoceptive signals about the hemiplegic part of the body could 
lead to weak (or absent) prediction errors. Brain damage to brain areas re-
sponsible for learning could also be accountable, leading to a fixation to pre-
vious bodily states and beliefs, while dopamine-depleting lesions could also 
affect the strength of prediction errors. Although still on a speculative level, 
this theory can account for the range of AHP presentations, including its 
spontaneous (Vocat, et al., 2010) and intervention-based recovery (Fotopou-
lou, et al., 2009), explained as the strengthening of prediction errors by ac-
cumulating or alternative signals (e.g. 3rd person perspective feedback).  
The aim of the present study was to investigate the belief updating 
process of AHP patients, focusing on several of the disruptions proposed by 
the theory by Fotopoulou (2014; 2015). As described above, evidence sug-
gests that anosognosic patients have intact prior beliefs (e.g. “I can walk”) 
but deficient prediction errors, not salient enough to properly update those 
prior beliefs into corrected posterior beliefs (e.g. “I can no longer walk”) due 
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to aberrant perceptual inference. Lack of active inference, possibly in combi-
nation with strong prior beliefs, is also believed to contribute to lack of opti-
mal updating. To experimentally investigate these factors, a novel task was 
designed. Patients were initially required to indicate how important a certain 
action is for them, and then give their estimates about their performance in 
this action, before, during and after its execution. The post-execution esti-
mate of ability reflected the posterior belief (i.e. how patients infer their ability 
to perform the task, based on their experience of having tried it). Importantly, 
with each performance estimate patients were also required to report their 
confidence (i.e. subjective certainty, or, technically, ‘precision’) level in their 
answer, to assess the strength of their beliefs. Additionally, the execution of 
the action was positioned either on the right side of the patient (i.e. less af-
fected by neglect), or on the center or left (i.e. affected by neglect), to exam-
ine the effect of lack of active inference. The design of this task will allow the 
examination of the process of belief updating in AHP patients, pre-, during- 
and after performance execution attempts. Previous studies have assessed 
belief updating in AHP by measuring differences in pre-, during- and post-
execution estimates. They have also separately examined whether updated 
post-execution estimates (i.e. ‘I could not/did not perform the action’) are sa-
lient enough to become long-term knowledge (e.g. when requested to per-
form the action again) (Cocchini, et al., 2010; Marcel, et al., 2004; Moro, et 
al., 2011), while only one study has examined confidence responses and 
prediction errors (Vocat, et al., 2013). To the investigator’s knowledge, no 
study so far has simultaneously measured how prior beliefs are updated into 
posterior beliefs based on newly available evidence, and the role of different 
levels of confidence in the prior beliefs in this process. It was hypothesised 
that AHP patients would have higher confidence levels and performance es-
timates pre-, during- and post-execution, compared to HP controls, and more 
for the positions affected by neglect (i.e. center and left). 
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4.2. Pilot study: Optimism bias and AHP 
4.2.1. Introduction 
As described elsewhere in this chapter, the predictive coding frame-
work suggests that, in order to minimise surprise, the human brain constantly 
makes inferences about the world by ascribing probabilities to the possible 
causes of its inputs, and these probabilities are constantly updated according 
to prediction errors (Friston, 2009). Like all human cognition, however, this 
procedure is susceptible to systematic errors (Tversky, & Kahneman, 1974). 
The present study will focus on one such error named optimism bias, or un-
realistic optimism, which describes the systematic tendency of individuals to 
overestimate the likelihood of future positive events happening to them, and 
to underestimate the likelihood of negative events (Weinstein, 1980). This 
phenomenon seems not to be influenced by gender, nationality or race 
(Weinstein, 1987). Age, on the other hand, seems to be an important factor, 
as older adults have been found to be more susceptible to optimism bias and 
to update their beliefs less when confronted with undesirable information 
(Chowdhury, Sharot, Wolfe, Düzel, & Dolan, 2014). In contrast, depressed 
adults do not display this bias, with mildly depressed patients being more re-
alistic and accurate in their predictions, and severely depressed patients be-
ing on the pessimistic end of the spectrum (Garrett, Sharot, Faulkner, Korn, 
Roiser, & Dolan, 2014; Korn, Sharot, Heekeren, & Dolan, 2014). 
Studies investigating the mechanism of this bias revealed a differential 
updating process. Sharot, Korn and Dolan (2011) devised a task in which 
each participant in the first session was presented with a negative event 
each time (e.g. cancer) and were asked to assess the likelihood of this hap-
pening to them. They were then presented with the average probability of 
this event happening to a person of the same socio-cultural environment. 
The second session was the same as the first. Given that all events were 
negative, the difference between the participant’s first estimate and the actu-
al average probability classified the information as desirable or undesirable 
(e.g. if the first estimate for cancer was 5% and the actual average probabil-
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ity was 30% it would be undesirable information). The difference between the 
participant’s estimate in the first and second session was the update. Results 
showed a reduced coding of undesirable information about the future, espe-
cially in participants scoring high in trait optimism. This asymmetric updating 
is attributed solely on the valence (desirability) of the information, and cannot 
be explained by differential memory for the information, familiarity with the 
events, emotional arousal or how common or uncommon the event was. 
Similar results were observed by Eli and Rao (2011). In their study partici-
pants were allocated into one of two groups, receiving information about their 
beauty or IQ score. In parallel, as control condition, they were allocated one 
number from 1-10. For each of the two tasks (either beauty or IQ, and con-
trol), participants performed an information-processing task. At the beginning 
of the task, each participant revealed to the experimenter the distribution of 
their prior beliefs, that is how high they believed they ranked compared to the 
other participants in the same group. Then, each participant received three 
signals and each signal was a truthful pairwise comparison with another, 
anonymous participant of the group, which informed them that they either 
scored higher (desirable information) or lower (undesirable) than the other 
participant. Participants were asked to update their beliefs in both tasks, ac-
cording to the information they received. The results indicated that when re-
ceiving desirable information, participants’ update process adhered closely to 
the Bayesian theorem (described elsewhere in this chapter), although still 
influenced by optimism bias. On the contrary, participants discounted unde-
sirable news, resulting in an updating process nearly uncorrelated with 
Bayesian inference. This asymmetry was not observed in the control condi-
tion.  
So far evidence has shown that individuals update their beliefs more 
in response to information that allows them to retain, or enhance their opti-
mistic outlook, and this asymmetry has been attributed solely to the valence 
of the information presented. Returning to AHP, as described elsewhere in 
this chapter, AHP patients seem to learn very little from their constant motor 
failures, remaining almost fixated to their belief that they are not paralysed. 
Then, the question arises whether this presentation could be an extreme 
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manifestation of optimism bias. However, suffering from left total hemiplegia 
resulting from a right hemisphere stroke is not a very common event and 
studies on optimism bias have only focused on events in the middle range of 
probabilities (20-80%). Therefore, before studying belief updating in AHP 
population, it was necessary to conduct a study with healthy participants to 
examine optimism bias for events in the extreme ends of probabilities: very 
probable and very improbable. It was hypothesised that participants will up-
date their beliefs for both very probable and improbable events, and that the 
asymmetric updating pattern, described above, in both high and low probabil-
ity events would be observed. 
4.2.2. Materials and methods 
Participants 
A total of 50 participants (29 females, age range 19 – 24 years, mean 
age = 22 years) were recruited, all students, or recent graduates of King’s 
College London. Participants were excluded if they had a history of mental 
health or neurological problems, and if they were not living in London at the 
time of participation. Written informed consent was obtained from each par-
ticipant. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of King’s College 
London.  
Experimental study design 
 
This was a 2 (Valence: Desirable vs. Undesirable) x 2 (Probability: 
High vs. Low) repeated measures design. We used a modified version of the 
task used by Sharot et al. (2011). In the present study, a total of 24 negative 
life events was presented to participants (See Appendix G). Of these events, 
12 were in the lower end of probabilities (0-20%) and 12 in the higher end 
(80-100%). To acquire probabilities for these events that were as close to 
actual likelihood of these events, the websites named in the study by Sharot 
and colleagues (2011) were used. All events were relevant to the socioeco-
nomic group that the participants belonged to (average adult living in Lon-
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don). They were classified as illness-related (14 items), crime-related (4), 
monetary (2), transport-related (1) and personal (3). The description of items 
was controlled so that it contained no more than four words and no repetition 
of words between different items, to minimise memory effect (e.g. ‘witnessing 
extreme violence’). In order to account for individual differences in updating 
low and high probabilities, all items were separated (using a random number 
generator, www.random.com) into “likelihood of happening” or “likelihood of 
not happening”. For each participant, each trial was classified as ‘desirable’ 
or ‘undesirable’, depending on the prediction error, that is the difference be-
tween the original prediction and the actual statistic. A positive prediction er-
ror meant the participant had overestimated the probability of the negative 
event happening to them and the actual probability was lower than their orig-
inal estimate (desirable information). The opposite would happen for nega-
tive prediction errors. If the prediction error of a trial was zero, meaning the 
participant accurately predicted the likelihood, the trial could not be classified 
as “desirable” or “undesirable”, and was not included in the analysis. 
Measures 
 
 The main dependent variable was the Update score of each partici-
pant for each trial. It was calculated as the difference between the secondary 
and the original prediction. In “desirable” and “low probability” trials, where 
the participant had to update to lower probabilities, the Update score was 
negative. In “undesirable” and “high probability” trials, where the participant 
had to update to higher probabilities, the score was positive.  
Data were not normally distributed and therefore all analyses were 
preformed using non-parametric tests. 
Materials and procedures 
 
For this study a 13-inch laptop was used. The task consisted of three 
parts, all conducted in a single, one-hour long session (See Figure 4.1). In 
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negative event in words presented on a computer screen, for two seconds. 
They were asked to imagine this event happening to them in the future, or, if 
it has already happened to them, to imagine it happening again. Next, the 
participant was presented for another two seconds with a screen reading ei-
ther “likelihood of happening” or “likelihood of not happening” and had six 
seconds to give their estimate (Original prediction; OP). A fixation-cross then 
appeared for two seconds, followed by the average probability of the event 
happening to a person in the same socio-cultural environment (Actual statis-
tic; AS) (2 sec), and then another fixation cross (2 sec). This procedure was 
followed for all 24 items. In the second part, (“Update Phase”) the same pro-
cedure was followed, but after giving their estimate of the event (Secondary 
prediction; SP), participants were not presented with the actual probability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3. Results 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed a significant main effect of 
Probability (Z = -10.941, p < .000), with low probability events having a lower 
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Figure 4.1: Pilot study task outline 
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median (Mdn = -4) than higher probability events (Mdn = 3). Similarly, a main 
effect of Valence was found (Z= -13.105, p < .000), with desirable items hav-
ing a lower median (Mdn = -3), than undesirable items (Mdn = 5). 
The 2-way interaction between Valence and Probability could not be 
performed, as no differential score could be computed between Valence or 
Probability. More specifically, in the low probability evens, most trials were 
classified as desirable (i.e. the participants had initially overestimated the 
probability of the event happening to them), while the opposite was true for 
high probability events, resulting in unequal numbers of desirable and unde-
sirable events in low and high probabilities. 
4.2.4. Discussion 
The aim of the pilot study was to investigate if updating information 
about desirable and undesirable events in the extreme ends of probabilities 
(very probable or improbable) would follow the same pattern as the updating 
of similar events falling in the middle range of probabilities. According to the 
hypothesis, both groups were expected to update equally for high and low 
probability events, but more for desirable than for undesirable as suggested 
by previous studies (Sharot, et al., 2011; Chowdhury, et al., 2014).  
It was found that participants updated optimally and equally for high 
and low probability and desirability events, by correctly adjusted their predic-
tions based on the actual event probability given to them. The results, how-
ever, did not fully support the hypothesis and were also not fully in line with 
the results found by Sharot and colleagues (2011), according to which desir-
able information leads to more update, compared to undesirable. The inter-
action between Valence and Probability could not be investigated (see 
above) and therefore we cannot assess how the combination of the two fac-
tors affects update, e.g. if a low desirability and probability event, such as 
hemiplegia following a stroke, is harder to update than a high desirability and 
low probability one. Nevertheless, the observed pattern of results provides 
sufficient evidence that AHP patients should, in theory, be able to update in-
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formation about themselves and their current condition, despite the fact that 
suffering from a stroke and subsequent hemiplegia is a relatively rare event. 
 
4.3. Clinical study 
4.3.1. Methods 
Participants 
17 adult neurological patients (mean age = 65.75 years, SD = 13.59, 9 
women) with unilateral right-hemisphere lesions and contralateral hemiplegia 
were included in the study. Patients were recruited from acute and hyper-
acute National Health Service (NHS) stroke wards in London, following the 
recruiting methods described in Chapter 2. One patient was excluded, as he 
was transferred to another hospital before completing the task. 
The remaining 16 patients were divided into two groups, according to 
their clinical diagnosis of AHP, using the Bisiach assessment as a means of 
primary diagnosis, and the Feinberg questionnaire as a secondary measure, 
as described in details in Chapter 2. Based on the Bisiach assessment and 
confirmed by the Feinberg assessment, nine patients were classified as AHP 
(6 females, group mean age = 69.78 years, SD = 11.39, age range = 51-81 
years). Similarly, seven patients were classified as HP (3 females, group 
mean age = 60.57 years, SD = 15.27, age range = 42-82 years).  
Neuropsychological and neurological assessment 
In addition to the AHP assessment specified above, all participants 
underwent a standard neuropsychological assessment (see also Chapter 2). 
Assessments included tests for motor strength (for upper and lower limb); 
personal and extrapersonal neglect; general cognitive functioning; sensory 
examination and proprioception; mood; and working and long-term memory. 
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Experimental study design 
This was a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Position: Left vs. right) x 3 
(Item type: cutlery vs. shirt vs. gloves) design. The Item type variable was 
manipulated by presenting the patients with either a plastic fork and knife, 
with a shirt, or with a pair of gloves, and asking them to perform the action 
corresponding to those items. The Position variable was manipulated by 
placing the item either to the patient’s right (‘right’ position), to their left or di-
rectly in front of them, in the center. The latter two positions were subse-
quently averaged into a single score, constituting the ‘Left’ position.  
Dependent variables were (1) Importance score; (2) Performance 
Prediction Error, calculated as the difference between the prior performance 
estimate and the post-execution performance estimate; (3) Performance Up-
date, calculated as the difference between the prior performance estimate 
and the updated performance estimate; (4) Confidence Prediction Error, cal-
culated as the difference between the prior confidence estimate and the 
post-execution confidence estimate and; and (5) Confidence Update, calcu-
lated as the difference between the prior confidence estimate and the updat-
ed confidence estimate. Given that our scales had a lowest point of zero, and 
to facilitate calculations of differentials, we transformed all scales by adding 
one point (e.g. a previously 0-10 scale was transformed into 1-11 scale). 
Materials and procedures 
For the main experiment a white, plastic fork and knife, a pair of white 
cotton gloves, and a white cotton shirt were used to mimic the actions of eat-
ing, putting on gloves and buttoning up the shirt. Additionally, a vertical, to 
minimise the impact of left-sided neglect, ‘Confidence’ scale with qualitative 
verbal labels was used (from bottom: Not at all confident; Slightly confident; 
Somewhat confident; Quite confident; Very confident; Extremely confident.), 
a vertical ‘Importance’ scale with qualitative verbal labels similar to the ‘Con-
fidence’ scale (i.e. Not at all important, etc.) and a vertical ‘Performance’ 
scale with numbers from 0 (at the bottom) to 10. The scales were used by 
the participants to provide estimates about the respective values.  
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Each patient was either sitting on the bed or on a wheelchair, and was 
tested individually. The experimenter read the instructions and asked control 
questions to ensure proper vision and use of the scales and comprehension 
of the task. The main part of the task was divided in three blocks and in each 
block, one of the three objects (cutlery, gloves, shirt) was used. The order of 
the blocks was randomised. At the beginning of each block, the item was 
presented to the patient and they were requested to identify it and, using the 
‘Importance’ scale, to rate how important it is for them to be able to use this 
item on their own (e.g. to use the cutlery with both hands, to cut and eat their 
food; to be able to wear gloves on both hands to keep warm on a cold day; 
to be able to button up their shirt to get dressed) (Importance estimate). The 
patient was then asked to use the ‘Performance’ scale to give an estimate of 
how well, in their current condition, they can use the object (Prior perfor-
mance estimate) and to indicate, using the ‘Confidence’ scale, how confident 
they are in their response (Prior confidence estimate). The experimenter 
would then place the object directly in the center in front of the patient, to 
their right or to their left. This position was randomised between the three 
blocks. The patient was subsequently asked to perform the action (i.e. use 
the cutlery to pretend they are cutting the food and eating; put on both 
gloves; button up the shirt), using the ‘Performance’ scale, to rate their per-
formance (post-execution performance estimate) and using the ‘Confidence’ 
scale, to estimate their confidence in their response (post-execution confi-
dence estimate). The experimenter noted the execution strategy of the pa-
tient, and would also secretly rate the patient’s performance. Lastly, the ex-
perimenter would ask the patient to give their estimate again, using the ‘Per-
formance’ scale, about how well in their current condition they believe they 
can use the object (Updated performance estimate), and report how confi-
dent they are with their answer, using the ‘Confidence’ scale (Updated confi-
dence estimate). The procedure was repeated for the next two blocks.  
Statistical analyses 
The following analyses were performed: (1) A baseline 2 (Group: AHP 
vs. HP) x 3 (Item type: cutlery vs. gloves vs. shirt) on Importance scores, to 
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establish that the usage of all three Items was of similar importance, for both 
groups to begin with. (2) In the main experimental analysis, having averaged 
‘center’ and ‘left’ conditions into a single score as described above, there 
was a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Position: Left vs. right) design, on Perfor-
mance prediction error, calculated as the difference between the prior per-
formance estimate and the post-execution performance estimate. (3) The 
same 2 x 2 analysis was performed for Performance update, (4) Confidence 
prediction error and (5) Confidence update. All data were not normally dis-
tributed, so non-parametric tests were used. Graphs were presented using 
parametric data (means and standard errors) for illustrative reasons. The 
equivalent non-parametric graphs can be found in Appendix H. 
4.3.2. Results 
Demographics and neuropsychological results 
Patients’ demographic characteristics and performance on the stand-
ardised neuropsychological tests is summarised in Table 4.1. To control for 
multiple comparisons, the significance level was set to p < 0.01. The groups 
did not differ significantly in terms of age, years of education, days of onset 
to assessment and motor deficits. As expected, AHP and HP groups differed 
significantly in relation to Bisiach (Z = -3.13, p = 0.02) and Feinberg aware-
ness scores (Z = -2.743, p = 0.006). Moreover, no difference was found be-
tween groups regarding cognitive function, memory, apraxia, left/right disori-
entation, mood or neglect. Executive function was not assessed, as too few 
patients completed the FAB test.  
In addition, no differences in tactile perception were found between 
the two groups using the Nottingham Sensory Assessment (see Table 4.2). 
However, tactile localisation and bilateral simultaneous touch subtests were 
not included, as the cutoff of 40% of sample size included in the task was not 
met. Completion of these two subtests required intact performance on the 
pressure subtest (see Chapter 2), on which both groups had deficits, and 
therefore insufficient data were gathered. The proprioception subtest was al-
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so not included in the analyses, as too few participants had completed the 
subtest. 
Table 4.1: Groups’ demographic characteristics and neuropsychological pro-
file 
  AHP    HP    Mann-Whitney    
  Median IQR   Median IQR   Z p   
Age (years) 75.00 18.50  57.00 30.00  -1.012 0.312  
Education (years) 16.00 3.00  16.00 5.00  -0.177 0.860  
Days from onset 3.00 3.00  7.00 19.00  -1.710 0.087  
MRC left upper 
limb 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.184 0.854  
MRC left lower limb 0.00 1.50  0.00 1.00  -0.129 0.897  
Bisiach awareness 
interview 
3.00 0.50  0.00 0.00  -3.130 0.002*  
Feinberg aware-
ness interview 
6.50 6.75  0.75 2.50  -2.743 0.006*  
Digit span forwards 11.00 3.50  9.00 5.25  -0.238 0.812  
Digit span back-
wards 
5.00 3.50  5.00 5.00  -0.239 0.811  
MOCA memory 0.00 3.00  3.00 3.00  -1.157 0.247  
MOCA (Total) 14.00 10.38  22.00 6.81  -1.834 0.067  
Comb/razor test 
(percent bias) 
-7.69 64.95  -15.32 21.01  -0.388 0.698  
Bisiach one item 
test 
0.00 1.00  0.00 2.00  -0.423 0.673  
Line cancellation 
right 
16.00 4.50  18.00 0.75  -1.344 0.179  
Line cancellation 
right 
10.00 14.50  18.00 1.75  -2.476 0.013*  
Line cancellation 
left 
4.00 18.00  9.00 18.00  0.000 1.000  
Star cancel3ation 
right (cancella-
tions) 
23.00 8.25  27.00 4.00  -1.336 0.181  
Star cancellation 
left (cancellations) 
6.00 16.75  5.00 27.00  0.263 0.793  
HADS depression 6.00 5.25  8.00 6.00  -0.915 0.360  
HADS anxiety 7.50 2.50  7.00 7.00  -0.271 0.786  
                 
MRC = Medical Research Council (Guarantors of Brain, 1986); MOCA = The Montreal Cog-
nitive Assessment (Nasreddine, 2005); Comb/razor test = assessment of personal neglect; 
line crossing, star cancellation, copy & representational drawing = conventional subtests of 
Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson, et al., 1987); FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (Du-
bois, et al., 2000); HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983). The number of participants in each test varies, but is always equal or more than 40% 
of the sample size. 
*Significant difference between groups, p < 0.01.  
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Table 4.2: Groups’ Nottingham Sensory Assessment scores 
  AHP  HP  Mann-Whitney 
  Median IQR  Median IQR  Z p 
ELBOW 
Light Touch 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.655 0.513 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.000 1.000 
Pressure 0.00 0.50 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.707 0.480 
          
WRIST 
Light Touch 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.488 0.626 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.000 1.000 
Pressure 0.00 2.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.982 0.326 
          
HAND 
Light Touch 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.655 0.513 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.000 1.000 
Pressure 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.655 0.513 
          
Main experimental results 
Baseline analysis on Importance scores 
A Mann-Whitney U test found no main effect of Group (Z = -1.366, p = 
0.172) and a Friedman test found no main effect of Item (χ2(2) = 1.368, p = 
0.504). In order to investigate the 2 x 3 interaction, the difference in Im-
portance scores in pairs between the three items (i.e. difference between 
cutlery and gloves, and between gloves and shirt) was calculated. A Mann-
Whitney U test found no significant difference between groups neither for the 
Cutlery-Gloves Importance differential (Z = -0.31, p = 0.757), nor for the 
Gloves-Shirt differential (Z = -0.466, p = 0.641).  
Having performed this baseline analysis and finding no significant dif-
ferences, it was concluded that both groups found the three actions in this 
task of similar importance on average and consequently it is expected that 
they will invest similar attention to the performance of each of them. Thus, 
this measure was not included in further analyses.  
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Analysis on Performance prediction error (difference between the prior 
performance estimate and the post-execution performance estimate) 
A Mann-Whitney U test showed no main effect of Group (Z = -1.259, p 
= 0.208) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test found no main effect of Position (Z 
= 0, p = 1) (Figure 4.2). 
The Performance Prediction error differential score between right and 
Left conditions was calculated and compared between groups. A Mann-
Whitney U test found no significant difference (Z = -0.213, p = 0.837). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Means and standard errors of Prediction Errors and Update Es-
timates for Left and right Position 
 
Analysis on Performance update (difference between the prior perfor-
mance estimate and updated performance estimate) 
A Mann-Whitney U test found no main effect of Group (Z = -1.121, p = 
0.262). Also, a Wilcoxon signed rank test found no main effect of Position (Z 
= -0.978, p = 0.328) (Figure 4.2). 
Similarly, the analysis for the second dependent variable (Perfor-
mance Update) will be a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Position: Left vs. right) 
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design. The differential score between right and Left position was calculated 
and compared between groups for the two-way effect. A Mann-Whitney U 
test found no significant difference (Z = -0.906, p = 0.408). 
Analysis on Confidence prediction error (difference between the prior 
confidence estimate and the post-execution confidence estimate) 
A Mann-Whitney U test found no main effect of Group (Z = -1.658, p = 
0.097). Similarly, a Wilcoxon signed rank test found no significant main effect 
of Position (Z = -0.421, p = 0.674) (Figure 4.3). 
 The differential score between right and Left position was calculated 
and compared between groups, however a Mann-Whitney U test found no 
significant interaction (Z = -0.692, p = 0.489). 
 
Figure 4.3: Means and standard errors of Prediction Errors and Confidence 
Updates for Left and right Position 
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Analysis on Confidence update (difference between the prior confi-
dence estimate and the updated confidence estimate) 
A Mann-Whitney U test found no significant main effect of Group (Z = 
-0.617, p = 0.537), and a Wilcoxon signed rank test found no main effect of 
Position (Z = -1.155, p = 0.248) (Figure 4.3). 
The differential score between right and Left position was calculated 
and compared between groups. A Mann- Whitney U test found no significant 
difference (Z = -0.958, p = 0.338). 
4.4. Discussion 
One striking and well-documented finding of AHP is the inability of pa-
tients to optimally update their beliefs and behavior in response to feedback 
(Cocchini, et al., 2010; Marcel, et al., 2004; Moro, et al., 2011) and the over-
confidence they show in their (usually evidently erroneous) answers (Vocat, 
et al., 2013), suggesting an inability to adjust their expectations according to 
experience. The aim of the present study was to investigate the belief updat-
ing processes in AHP, based on a newly proposed theory by Fotopoulou 
(2014; 2015).  
Before proceeding with the clinical study, a pilot study with healthy 
participants was conducted, to ensure that the aberrant updating observed in 
AHP is not the updating expected when a person is confronted with undesir-
able events as low on the probability range, as having a right hemisphere 
stroke with resulting hemiplegia. The study demonstrated that low desirability 
and probability events are updated adequately, although undesirable events 
were updated similarly and not less than desirable ones, as predicted 
(Chowdhury, et al., 2014; Sharot, et al., 2011).  
Having established this, the clinical study was conducted, investigat-
ing several of the updating deficits in AHP as proposed in the theory by 
Fotopoulou (2014; 2015). Specifically, the role of neglect and paralysis on 
active inference, the strength and precision (confidence) of prior and of up-
dated (posterior) beliefs, as well as the salience of prediction errors were ex-
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amined. It was hypothesised that AHP patients would overestimate their per-
formance pre-, during- and post-execution compared to HP controls, while 
their confidence ratings would also be higher. It was also hypothesised that 
this pattern of findings would be more prominent in the positions affected by 
neglect (i.e. mixed position). Firstly, the results established that the average 
importance of the three actions that participants were asked to mimic (eating 
with cutlery, putting on gloves, and buttoning up a shirt) did not differ be-
tween groups. Hence, it was assumed that both groups would be equally ea-
ger to perform the actions and any differences in the updating patterns could 
not be attributed to motivational factors. The main experimental results, how-
ever, showed that AHP and HP groups did not differ in any of their confi-
dence and performance estimate comparisons, which did not support the 
study hypothesis. These results are also in contrast with those of previous 
studies that have clearly demonstrated the inability of AHP to adjust and up-
date their behaviours and beliefs, motor or otherwise, according to feedback 
(Cocchini, et al., 2010; Marcel, et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2011; Vocat, et al., 
2013).  
A possible explanation for the findings could be related to the type of 
actions patients were required to perform in this, compared to the previous 
studies. It is likely that the actions used here (being able to eat, get dressed 
and put on gloves) are closer associated with a person’s independent living 
and quality of life than actions used in previous studies, which have either 
been simple motor tasks, such as lifting a large object (Moro, et al., 2011), or 
bilateral actions that in their majority were not important for a person’s every-
day living (Cocchini, et al., 2010; Marcel, et al., 2004). This difference in sub-
jective meaning of the actions, in combination with the fact that patients’ at-
tention was explicitly drawn towards the subjective importance of the action, 
could have progressively increased the salience of the prediction errors, re-
sulting in better updating in the AHP group. Nevertheless, this possibility 
does not explain the inability of AHP patients to use their attention similarly in 
their everyday life, when attempting and failing to perform subjectively im-
portant actions.  
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A number of limitations should also be considered when trying to in-
terpret the results. Firstly, the study’s small sample size could be an im-
portant confounder, not allowing differences to show. Moreover, the averag-
ing of the left and center position of the arm to a single Left one could have 
further reduced the power of the study. Overall, the study did not succeed in 
identifying the role of the suggested deficits in the updating process in AHP, 
for reasons possibly involving the task design and the small sample size. It 
would be important for future studies to improve on these shortcomings and 
recruit larger sample sizes, while also testing for implicit and explicit aware-
ness to correlate with findings. It would also be interesting to further investi-
gate whether including actions more emotionally neutral (e.g. unscrew bottle 
instead of eating on one’s own) would elicit different results. 
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5. Spontaneous perspective taking in AHP 
5.1. Introduction 
In order to successfully interact with other people we must be able to 
take their perspective and put ourselves in their spatial and mental position. 
This ability can be unconscious or conscious, intentional or spontaneous, 
and is normally present from an early age (Schwartzkopf, Schilbach, Vo-
geley, & Timmermans, 2014). Our mind, however, is constantly restricted in 
and shaped by our body, which has specific properties (e.g. two hands) and 
a specific orientation, and which provides a basis for an embodied cognition, 
as it becomes a point of reference for orientation (e.g. to define right, left, 
front, back, etc.). We would then intuitively expect that the egocentric spatial 
perspective (1st person perspective) is immediate and effortless, whereas 
taking the perspective of another person (allocentric or 3rd person perspec-
tive) requires considerable effort (Tversky, & Hard, 2009). Several studies, 
however, have provided robust evidence that people often take another per-
son’s perspective, even without being instructed to do so, in several experi-
mental settings (Cole, Atkinson, Le, & Smith, 2016; Freundlieb, Kovács, & 
Sebanz, 2016; Furlanetto, Cavallo, Manera, Tversky, & Becchio, 2013; Sur-
tees, Apperly, & Samson, 2016; Tversky, & Hard, 2009).  
The circumstances under which spontaneous perspective taking oc-
curs have been extensively studied. In one such study, Tversky and Hard 
(2009) examined whether the mere presence of another person, or the antic-
ipation of another’s action could elicit this response. In their first experiment, 
participants were presented with three pictures of a book and a bottle on a 
table, with or without a person behind the table, either reaching towards or 
simply looking at the book. After seeing each picture, participants were 
asked “In relation to the bottle, where is the book?”. Results showed that 
when there was a person in the picture, about 25% of participants took the 
other person’s perspective, approximately 30% answered from an egocentric 
perspective, and the remaining took a neural perspective, answering without 
left/right indications. In their second experiment, participants only saw the 
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pictures of the person looking at and reaching towards the book, and where 
asked again about the spatial relationship of the two items with one of the 
four questions, either implying action or not. Action questions, compared to 
static ones, resulted in more participants spontaneously adopting the other 
person’s perspective. Referring to the person in the scene, on the other 
hand, did not have any effect. In another, similar study, experimenters inves-
tigated the role of gaze as a means of action prediction in spontaneous per-
spective taking (Furlanetto, et al., 2013). In the first experiment, participants 
were presented with one of four videos. Each video showed a milk carton 
and a glass full of milk on a table. However, the videos differed in that the 
actor was either: (1) looking constantly down, (2) turned his head to look at 
the object, (3) looked at the object and then reached for it, or (4) there was 
no actor at all. After watching the video, participants were asked: “In relation 
to the glass, where is the milk carton?”. Spontaneous perspective taking oc-
curred most often in the gaze with action video, followed by the gaze only 
video, and by the actor video. Only one participant took the other person’s 
perspective in the no-actor video. In the second experiment, the authors in-
vestigated the effects of ambiguity of gaze with regards to the action, on per-
spective taking. Participants in this experiment watched one of three videos 
with a similar setting as the first experiment. In one video the actor looked 
towards and reached for the glass, in the second he reached for the glass 
without looking it (ambiguous gaze), and in the last his face was blurred. The 
analysis showed that the ambiguous gaze condition led to increased sponta-
neous perspective taking for more than half of the participants, followed by 
the congruent gaze and the blurred gaze conditions. Taken together the re-
sults of the studies suggest that spontaneous perspective taking occurs in an 
unconscious attempt to understand other people’s behaviour. Therefore, so-
cial cues such as gaze, or even the mere presence of another person in-
creases perspective taking, while any ambiguity in the aforementioned social 
cues leads to greater effort to understand the person’s behavior and conse-
quently to more spontaneous perspective taking.  
Perspective taking has been found to play an interesting role in AHP. 
In a study by Fotopoulou, et al. (2009), an AHP patient was asked to watch a 
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video of themselves during a previous motor awareness assessment, from a 
third person perspective. The effect of the video was dramatic, as the patient 
immediately and permanently regained awareness about her motor deficits. 
Similarly, other studies in patients with associated disorders of body owner-
ship used a mirror to provide self-observation from a third person perspective 
(Fotopoulou et al., 2011; Jenkinson, Haggard, Ferreira, & Fotopoulou, 2013). 
The results were equally striking, with the majority of patients regaining own-
ership of their limbs. In addition, some AHP patients are able to recognise 
and correctly identify similar motor deficits in another person (Ramachan-
dran, & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996). These findings suggest that AHP pa-
tients have retained the ability to take a third person perspective, and some-
times are even able to use the third-person perspective information of them-
selves to update their representation of their body with their current condi-
tion. An interesting question arising is why this perspective taking does not 
occur spontaneously, not even as a result of the constant feedback these pa-
tients receive about their disability from their carers, but occurs when in-
structed or encouraged to do so through the video or mirror perspective.  
A theory attempting to explain this seemingly paradoxical observation 
has been proposed by Turnbull, Fotopoulou and Solms (2014). Given the 
role of the right hemisphere in emotion (see Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 
2004; Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009), it was proposed that the neu-
rocognitive processes controlling the higher-order mechanism for emotion 
regulation are compromised in AHP. As a consequence, AHP patients might 
perceive the reality not as it objectively is (allocentrically from a 3rd person 
perspective), but as they want it to be (egocentrically from a 1st person per-
spective) and not adjust their emotional responses accordingly (Turnbull, et 
al., 2009). This suggestion implies that AHP patients also have compromised 
Theory of Mind (ToM), as the relationship between emotion regulation and 
ToM is well-documented (e.g. Frith, & Happé 1999). Indeed, mentalisation 
and ToM in AHP were recently investigated by Besharati et al. (2016), by 
testing visuo-spatial and mental perspective taking in AHP patients. More 
specifically, visuo-spatial perspective taking was examined by asking the pa-
tient to report the position of certain objects as perceived by different per-
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spectives (their own first person perspective, the experimenter’s at 180o as 
third person, and of a photo-camera at 90o as inanimate third person). Men-
tal perspective taking was investigated by administering short ToM story-
based tests. The study found that AHP patients, relative to HP and healthy 
controls, showed differential deficits in third person mental perspective (i.e. in 
the ToM task), compared to first person perspective. AHP patients were also 
found to have deficits in visuospatial perspective taking, but those deficits 
were not found to be specific to AHP, compared to HP controls. Overall, the 
findings seem to suggest that AHP patients are only able to correctly repre-
sent themselves, including their deficits, from a 3rd person perspective, when 
experimentally ‘facilitated’ to do so, as they seem to have lost the ability to 
spontaneously shift from a 1st to a 3rd person perspective.  
So far, perspective taking in studies has only been ‘facilitated’, that is, 
it resulted from following specific instructions, or created by a video or mirror. 
The present study aimed to take these findings a step further and address 
the question: given their egocentric tendencies, as well as their ToM and 
visuospatial deficits, can AHP patients spontaneously take another person’s 
perspective and use social cues towards this direction? To examine this, a 
task was devised, based on the study design of Furlanetto, et al. (2013). As 
in their study, gaze was manipulated as congruent, incongruent or static, in 
order to examine whether patients would be influenced by social cues in the 
same manner as healthy controls. Participants in the present study were re-
quired to judge the spatial relationship of two objects on a table (see Figure 
5.1), indicating 1st or 3rd person perspective. It was hypothesised that AHP 
patients would not be able to spontaneously take the 3rd person perspective, 
even following social cues. HP controls were expected to demonstrate the 
same pattern of results as healthy controls, taking the other person’s per-
spective more in ambiguous circumstances. 
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5.2. Pilot study 
5.3. Aim and hypotheses 
The aim of this study was to establish that the task used to examine 
spontaneous perspective taking could indeed elicit this effect. Previous stud-
ies that used a similar task had focused exclusively on a younger population, 
specifically in undergraduate students. These results, however, cannot be 
used as healthy comparison group, as the clinical study was performed on a 
stroke population, typically of older age, and their performance was expected 
to differ. Therefore, healthy participants of a similar (older) age were recruit-
ed to participate in the pilot study. Additionally, younger adults were also re-
cruited, to examine and compare their performance in the task. The pilot 
study was conducted before and in parallel with the clinical study. It was hy-
pothesised that spontaneous 3rd-person perspective taking would occur more 
in the incongruent condition, followed by the congruent and static ones. No 
specific predictions about the performance of older compared to young par-
ticipants could be made, as the literature has been inconsistent on this topic 
(e.g. Bernstein, Thornton, & Sommerville, 2011; Happé, F.G., Winner, & 
Brownell, 1998). 
5.3.1. Methods 
Participants 
A total of 100 participants were recruited. Of these, 52 belonged to the 
younger healthy controls (YHC) group (22 males; group age range = 18-29 
years old, mean age = 23.5 years, SD= 2.89), and 48 participants belonged 
to the older healthy controls (OHC) group (18 males; group age range = 60-
90 years, mean age = 71.58 years, SD= 9.47). 11 young and seven older 
participants did not finish the task, as they did not complete the control ques-
tions at the end of the procedure (see Materials and procedure section be-
low). Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis, via advertisement 
posters in the University of Hertfordshire, the local voluntary women’s organ-
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isation (Women’s Institute) and staff facilities of a UK-based retailer (Marks & 
Spencer). Exclusion criteria included (1) history of psychiatric or neurological 
illness; (2) minimum of seven years of education, (3) age (18-30 years old, or 
60+ years old). All participants provided written informed consent for their 
participation. The study was approved by the ethics committee of University 
of Hertfordshire. 
Experimental study design 
The main experimental aim of the study was to investigate how differ-
ent social cues influence spontaneous perspective taking in young and older 
adults. This was a 2 (Group: young vs. older) x 3 (Gaze congruency: congru-
ent vs. incongruent vs. static) x Perspective taking (front vs. back) design. 
Gaze was manipulated by means of the videos (gaze-congruent, gaze-
incongruent and static, see Materials and procedure).  
A control analysis (see Materials and procedures section below) using 
a 2 (Group: young vs. older) x 2 Instruction (spontaneous vs. directed) x 3 
Gaze identification (correct vs. partially correct vs. wrong) was performed. 
Twelve young and seven older participants did not complete this analysis, 
and since the number of participants in the spontaneous and directed in-
structions conditions became unequal, percentages were used for the statis-
tical analysis. 
Materials and procedures 
For this study a 13-inch laptop and eight videos, duration five seconds 
each, were used. The videos were filmed using a handy-cam and were cate-
gorised as male version (three videos), female version (three videos), or con-
trol (two videos). Videos were gender-specific to control for attention and fa-
miliarity with the actor that could possibly affect perspective taking. In the 
male and female versions, the person in the video was sitting behind a table 
in front of a white wall. The film was recorded in a way that the viewer ap-
peared to be sitting on the other side of the table, directly opposite the per-
son in the video. The actors wore neutral-coloured clothes and no glasses. 
On the table in front of the female person in the video was a white bottle of 
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milk and in front of it was a white mug. Similarly, on the table in front of the 
male person in the video was a book and in front of the book was a white 
pen. Items were placed slightly to the left of the actor, to control for left-sided 
neglect in AHP patients. Videos were categorised into three conditions, ac-
cording to the actor’s gaze. In the (gaze) congruent condition, male and fe-
male videos started with the actor looking down for 2 seconds, then looking 
at the item and, while still looking at it, the actor reached and touched the 
item closest to them (i.e. the book for male version and the milk for the fe-
male one) with the right hand. The incongruent condition videos started with 
the actor looking down for 2 seconds, then looking to their right (i.e. away 
from the object) and then, while still looking away, the actor reached and 
touched the object closest to them with their right hand. In the static condition 
videos, the actor was looking down throughout the video and did not move. 
Lastly, two additional videos were used, one corresponding to the male and 
the other to the female version, showing exactly the same setting as the vid-
eos described above, but without the actors. These were used as controls at 
the beginning of the study, to ensure that participants could correctly identify 
the objects in the videos. 
At the beginning of the task, the experimenter placed the laptop on a 
table in front of the participant and ensured that participants could properly 
see the screen. The experimenter then read the instructions and prepared 
the gender-specific videos. The control video (showing the items without the 
actors) was played first and the participant was asked to name the two items 
shown in the video. In case of gross misidentification or total failure to recog-
nise the items, the experimenter would name them and ask the participant to 
identify them again. No gross misidentification occurred in this study. The 
participant was then presented with each of the three gender-specific videos 
in a pseudo-randomised order, according to which the static video was al-
ways shown last. After each video, the participant was asked about the rela-
tive position of one item in relation to the other (i.e. “Where is the mug in re-
lation to the milk carton?” for females, or “Where is the pen in relation to the 
book?” for males). If the participant asked for clarifications (e.g. “where is it 
for me, or for the person in the video?”), or described both perspectives, the 
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experimenter would encourage them to decide on their own. If the participant 
gave an answer different than ‘front’ or ‘back’, the experimenter would explic-
itly ask for an answer in terms of one of these two options. After seeing all 
three videos a manipulation check was performed. Participants view the 
three videos again and afterwards they were asked to report if they noticed 
any change in the actor’s gaze and their answer was noted. Regardless of 
their answer, they were asked to see the videos again in a fully randomised 
order, and this time they were explicitly asked to report any changes in the 
actor’s gaze in each of the videos. All answers were recorded verbatim. 
Statistical analyses 
Data were not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk p < .000). Since the 
data used were binary, a Pearson’s chi-square test was used to examine (1) 
the interaction between Group and Perspective taking; and (2) the interaction 
of Gaze congruency and Perspective taking within each group.  
Additionally, control analysis using a Peasron’s chi-square test was 
used to examine (1) the interaction between Group and Gaze Identification; 
and (2) the interaction between Instruction and Gaze identification, within 
each group. 
Figure A: Male video Figure B: Female video 
Figure 5.1: Setting and actors used in the videos for the spontaneous 
perspective task 
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1.  Group and Perspective taking interaction  
In the young participants group, overall 89.74% of participants an-
swered “front” (i.e. took the 1st person perspective) and 10.2% “back” (i.e. 
took the 3rd person perspective). In the older participants group, the percent-
ages were 87.5% and 12.5% respectively. A chi-square test of independence 
found no significant relation between Group and Perspective taking (χ2 (1, Ν 
= 300) = 0.375, p = 0.54).  
5.4.2. Gaze congruency and Perspective taking interaction 
Within the young group, in the Congruent condition, 88% of partici-
pants answered ‘front’ (i.e. took the 1PP), and 12% answered ‘back’ (i.e. took 
the 3rd person perspective). In the Incongruent and Static conditions, 90% of 
participants answered ‘front’ and 10% answered ‘back’. A chi-square test of 
independence found no significant relation between Condition and Perspec-
tive taking in the AHP group (χ2 (1, Ν = 156) = 0.139, p = 0.933). 
Within the older group, in the Congruent condition, 85% of participants 
answered ‘front’, and 15% ‘back’. In the Incongruent condition, 88% an-
swered ‘front’ and 13% ‘back’, while in the Static conditions, the respective 
percentages were 90% and 10% respectively. A chi-square test of independ-
ence found no significant relation between Condition and Perspective taking 
in the HP group (χ2 (1, Ν = 144) = 0.381, p = 0.827). 
5.4.3. Control analysis  
12 young and 7 older participants did not complete the control condi-
tion and therefore their data were removed from the control analysis. 
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 Within the young group, in the spontaneous instruction condition, 8% 
of participants answered correct, 50% partially correct and 42% wrong. In the 
directed instruction condition, 90% answered correct, 30% partially correct, 
and 0% wrong. A chi-square test of independence found no significant rela-
tion between Instruction and Gaze identification in the young participants’ 
group (χ2 (2, Ν = 200) = 137. 279, p < .000). Regarding the older group, in 
the spontaneous instruction condition, 6% of participants answered correct, 
46% partially correct, and 48% wrong. In the direct instruction condition, 83% 
answered correct, 17% partially correct and 0% wrong. A chi-square test of 
independence found no significant relation between Instruction and Gaze 
identification in the older participants’ group (χ2 (2, Ν = 200) = 127. 967, p < 
.000). 
Overall, the results showed no significant differences in perspective 
taking between groups or between conditions. However, a difference was 
found in the control condition, where the majority of participants in the spon-
taneous condition answered either partially correct, or incorrectly, while in the 
directed condition, the majority answered correctly.  
5.5. Clinical study 
5.5.1. Methodology 
Participants  
 Seven patients (2 females, age range 54 to 85 years, mean age 
67.71 years, SD = 17.64) were recruited from admissions in acute and hy-
per-acute National Health Service (NHS) stroke wards in London, based on 
the procedures and the inclusion criteria described in Chapter 2. Patients 
were then divided into two groups, according to their clinical diagnosis of 
AHP based on Bisiach, 1986 interview, and using Feinberg et al. (2000) 
questionnaire as a secondary measure, as described in Chapter 2. Due to 
limited time of assessment, the Feinberg score of one patient was missing.  
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Based on the Bisiach interview and confirmed in all cases by the 
Feinberg interview, two patients were classified as AHP (one female, age 
range 54 to 81 years, mean age 67.5 years, SD = 19.09) and five as HP (one 
female, age range 35 to 85 years, mean age 67.8 years, SD = 19.38). 
Neuropsychological and neurological assessment  
Besides the aforementioned AHP assessments, participants also un-
derwent a number of standard neuropsychological tests and assessments 
(see Chapter 2). Specifically, they were tested for motor strength of left upper 
and lower limb; personal and extrapersonal neglect; executive and cognitive 
functioning; mood; orientation; and long term and working memory.  
Experimental study design 
The design of this study was identical to the pilot one, although the 
Group variable was divided into AHP and HP patients, making this a 2 
(Group: AHP vs. HP) x 3 (Gaze congruency: congruent vs. incongruent vs. 
static) design. 
Materials and procedures 
For the clinical study, the same materials and procedure as for the pi-
lot were used. However, the task was administered at bedside and that at the 
beginning of the task when the experimenter ensured that patients could 
properly see the screen and the videos, they also adjusted for neglect as 
needed, by positioning the laptop more to the right side of the patient. 
5.5.2. Results 
Neuropsychological results  
As mentioned above, only 2 AHP and 5 HP patients were recruited in 
this study, and, due to time restrictions, one AHP patient was assessed only 
for AHP and motor deficits. Therefore, no proper comparisons between the 
two groups’ neuropsychological scores can be performed, however the 
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score(s) of the AHP patient(s) and the median scores and IQR for the HP 
group are provided below (see Table 5.1) for information. 
Table 5.1: Groups’ demographic characteristics and neuropsychological pro-
file 
 AHP    HP  
  Median IQR   Median IQR 
Age (years) 67.50 n/a  76.00 34.50 
Education (years) 13.00 n/a  12.00 5.00 
Days from onset 2.00 n/a  12.00 23.00 
MRC left upper limb 0.50 n/a  0.00 0.50 
MRC left lower limb 1.00 n/a  0.00 1.50 
Bisiach awareness interview 3.00 n/a  0.00 0.00 
Feinberg awareness interview 7.10 n/a  0.75 0.88 
      
 AHP    HP  
 Median IQR   Median IQR 
Orientation 3.00 n/a  3.00 n/a 
Digit span forwards 9.00 n/a  9.00 6.00 
Digit span backwards 5.00 n/a  3.00 3.50 
MOCA memory 0.00 n/a  2.00 2.50 
MOCA (Total) 14.00 n/a  20.00 4.85 
Comb/razor test neglect -58.82 n/a  -14.29 9.03 
Bisiach one item test 0.00 n/a  0.00 0.00 
Line cancellation right 12.00 n/a  17.00 n/a 
Line cancellation left 1.00 n/a  18.00 n/a 
Star cancellation right (cancellations) 19.00 n/a  26.50 n/a 
Star cancellation left (cancellations) 2.00 n/a  24.00 n/a 
Representational drawing 0.00 n/a  1.50 n/a 
Line bisection right 3.00 n/a  3.00 2.00 
Line bisection centre 0.00 n/a  2.00 2.00 
Line bisection left 0.00 n/a  1.00 2.00 
FAB total score 10.00 n/a  12.00 n/a  
HADS depression 9.00 n/a  12.50 n/a 
HADS anxiety 8.00 n/a  10.00 n/a 
Apraxia total score 7.00 n/a  7.00 1.00 
           
MRC = Medical Research Council (Guarantors of Brain, 1986); MOCA = The Montreal Cogni-
tive Assessment (Nasreddine, 2005); Comb/razor test = assessment of personal neglect; line 
crossing, star cancellation, copy & representational drawing = conventional subtests of Behav-
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ioural Inattention Test (Wilson, et al., 1987); FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois, et al., 
2000); HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). 
 * Significant difference between groups, p < 0.01.  
Experimental results 
Both AHP patients answered “front” in all conditions. Of the five HP 
patients, four answered “front” in all conditions, while one answered “behind” 
in the Congruent condition only (Table 5.2). Given the small sample and 
since all participants gave the same answer, no statistical analysis was per-
formed.  
Table 5.2: Percentage of patients answering ‘back’ (i.e. 3rd person perspec-
tive) 
Group Gaze congruency 
Congruent Incongruent Static 
AHP group 0% 0% 0% 
HP group 20% 0% 0% 
    
 
5.6. Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate to what extent AHP 
patients can spontaneously adopt another person’s visuospatial perspective, 
when given different social cues via gaze. To do so, a task was designed, 
based on the task by Furlanetto, et al. (2013) in which participants were pre-
sented with videos of actors performing an action and their gaze being con-
gruent, incongruent or static, with respect to their movement. It was hypothe-
sised that AHP patients, in comparison to HP controls, would not be able to 
spontaneously disengage from the 1st to the 3rd person perspective, even in 
ambiguous situations were 3rd person perspective taking has been shown to 
prevail (e.g. Furlanetto, 2013). It was further hypothesised that HP controls 
would spontaneously adopt the 3rd person perspective more in the incongru-
ent condition. In addition to the clinical study, a pilot study with healthy young 
and older participants was also conducted, to assess the validity of the task 
and to obtain a baseline performance against which the performance of the 
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patients could be compared. It was hypothesised that their performance 
would be similar to the HP group. 
The results did not confirm any of the hypotheses. More specifically, in 
the pilot study young and older participants were not found to differ in the 
amount of perspective taking, which is not in line with some of the previous 
studies. Specifically, Happé, Winner, & Brownell (1998) found that perfor-
mance on ToM tasks in older age is intact and might even be improved, 
compared to younger adults. Later studies, however (Bernstein, Thornton, & 
Sommerville, 2011; Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & Taylor, 2002) did not repli-
cate this finding, instead suggesting that ToM abilities decline in older age, 
regardless of the decline in cognitive or executive functions.  
Results also found that healthy participants from both groups, as well 
as AHP and HP patients did not show any difference in perspective taking, 
regardless of the social cue shown in each video. Interestingly, although 
without statistical significance, the results of the pilot study seem to suggest 
that spontaneous perspective taking occurred more in the congruent condi-
tion, followed by the incongruent and static conditions. This, however, is op-
posite to what other studies have found, namely that participants spontane-
ously take another person’s perspective more when they perceive this per-
son’s behaviour as ambiguous (Furlanetto, Cavallo, Manera, Tversky, & 
Becchio, 2013; Tversky, & Hard 2009). A possible explanation for this incon-
sistency in findings could be the position of the objects in relation to the actor 
and the different perspective taking processes it requires. 
 More specifically, perspective taking has been found to involve two 
distinct systems (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986). The first, Level 1, reflects 
an understanding of what lies in another person’s line of sight and which ob-
jects are visible to them. It is mostly reliant on inter-objects relations, and 
more specifically it serves “in front” and “behind” judgments, which help 
compute another person’s line of sight and therefore is does not require sim-
ulation of body movement (i.e. mental rotation) (Kessler, & Rutherford, 
2010). On the other hand, Level 2 reflects the ability to adopt another per-
son’s visuospatial perspective and to represent the world from their point of 
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view. It involves more high-level cognitive processes than Level 1, as it re-
quires mental self-rotation, making it an embodied process, and ToM (Hamil-
ton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009), and consequently it subserves judgments about 
“left” and “right” (Kessler, & Rutherford, 2010). Having said that, in all previ-
ous studies that used a task similar to the present one (Furlanetto, et al. 
2013; Tversky, & Hard 2009), the objects were positioned to the right and left 
of the actor and participants were required to make a left/right judgment. 
Since this process would involve Level 2 perspective taking, it was expected 
to follow ToM principles about social cues and in particular gaze. In the pre-
sent study, however, objects were positioned one in front of the other, and 
both in front of the actor, in order to control for neglect in stroke patients that 
would hinder them from identifying objects on their left visual field. Therefore, 
it is possible that, instead of engaging of Level 2 as intended, the task only 
involved Level 1, which is heavily reliant on the line-of-sight. This would ex-
plain why more perspective taking occurred in the congruent condition, as 
participants were following the line of sight of the actor, and identified easier 
the first object the actor’s gaze encountered. Consequently, we cannot inter-
pret the results in the context of ToM. 
An interesting, yet puzzling for the validity of the task, finding comes 
from the control analysis of the pilot study. It was found that when partici-
pants were asked to spontaneously report any observed differences in the 
gaze of actors in the videos, the majority answered partially correct, almost 
half gave a wrong answer and only a small minority correctly identified the 
change in gaze. It could be assumed that this was a problem with the videos, 
where perhaps the gaze was not clearly shown; however in the directed con-
dition, where participants were instructed to watch the videos again and iden-
tify changes in gaze, there were no wrong answers and the vast majority of 
the participants from both groups answered correctly. Additionally, all seven 
participants that correctly identified the change in the actor’s gaze during the 
task took their own perspective in all three conditions, suggesting that, if due 
to design issues gaze was not clear enough in the video, this should not be a 
causing factor for the results. It is unclear why participants did not identify the 
change in gaze during the task, but this fact implies that the majority of the 
 116 
patients, i.e. those that could not identify any change in gaze, did not per-
ceive a social cue during the task, hence the manipulation did not have any 
effect on them. Therefore, no strong conclusions can be drawn from the re-
sults. 
Additional limitations of this study include power and participants. 
Firstly, in the studies by Furlanetto, et al. (2013) and Tversky and Hard 
(2009) each participant only completed one condition (e.g. congruent). In the 
present study, each participant participated in all conditions (congruent, in-
congruent and static), while each participant was also presented with a con-
trol video at the beginning of the task, in which the items were aligned in the 
same position as in the experimental part. It is, therefore, possible that, while 
observing the control video, the participant adopted the first person perspec-
tive, which they retained throughout the task. It is also possible that, even if 
the participant did not obtain first person perspective during by watching the 
control videos, they would nevertheless do so in the first experimental condi-
tion and, given that all videos had the same setting, participants would retain 
their own perspective throughout the conditions. In addition, lack of power in 
both pilot and clinical studies also had an important role. More specifically, it 
is possible that in the pilot study, each participant completed only one condi-
tion, as explained above, which would require more participants for the task, 
overall. Since the pilot study started before the clinical one and was conclud-
ed when only a few patients were recruited, there was an opportunity to see 
that the task did not elicit the expected results in healthy participants and, in 
combination with the total lack of spontaneous perspective taking in AHP and 
HP up to this point, led to the decision to stop the recruitment of patients for 
this study.  
Summing up, the study aimed to investigate whether AHP patients 
can spontaneously take another person’s perspective, using only social 
cues. Results were not in support of the hypothesis, mostly due to methodo-
logical issues with the task, which failed to elicit (and replicate) the expected 
results even in healthy participants. Investigating this topic, however, is still 
of great importance for advancing the understanding of AHP. It is therefore 
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suggested that future studies address this question, possibly by designing 
experimental tasks that will be suitable for patients suffering from neglect, 
while at the same time engaging the Level 2 perspective taking, as required. 
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6. Cognitive and emotion update in AHP, and 
the contribution of perspective taking 
6.1. Introduction 
6.1.1. Perspective taking in AHP: 1PP vs. 3PP 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, the clinical presentation of Ano-
sognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP) varies across patients, suggesting the possi-
ble existence of different subtypes of the disorder (Marcel, et al., 2004). In an 
interesting such presentation, unawareness of motor deficits in patients 
seems to be less than total, a feature known as partiality of AHP (Marcel, et 
al., 2004). In such cases, anosognosia can manifest differentially on the ver-
bal and non-verbal level (Cocchini, et al., 2009; Nardone, et al., 2008), or it 
can fluctuate depending on differences in mental perspective. This chapter 
will focus on the latter case. 
Typically, patients with AHP remain unaware of their paralysis when 
they perceive themselves from the 1st person perspective, for example when 
their affected limb is brought into the ipsilateral visual field and the hemiple-
gia is demonstrated by the experimenter (Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno, & 
Berti, 1986). By contrast, several studies have found that these patients can 
show dramatic improvement in awareness and body recognition when pre-
sented with a mirror, or video replay feedback of themselves from a 3rd per-
son perspective (Besharati, et al., 2014; Fotopoulou, Rudd, Holmes, & Ko-
pelman, 2009; Jenkinson, Haggard, Ferreira, & Fotopoulou, 2013). Addition-
ally, in other studies, when AHP patients were asked to make verbal judg-
ments about how well they could perform certain tasks (1st person perspec-
tive), compared to how well the experimenter would perform the tasks, were 
they in the patient’s position (3rd person perspective), they showed improved 
awareness of their condition from the experimenter’s viewpoint (Marcel, et 
al., 2004). Taken together, experimental and clinical evidence suggest that in 
AHP patients, visuospatial 3rd person perspective and representations of the 
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self are relatively intact, as they have the ability to accurately perceive their 
body from another person’s perspective (Besharati, Forkel, Kopelman, 
Solms, Jenkinson, & Fotopoulou, 2016). It is therefore striking that they do 
not systematically use this perspective to gain consciousness about their def-
icits and instead remain ‘fixated’ to the 1st person perspective. This was ad-
dressed in a study by Besharati and colleagues (2016) that investigated 
visuospatial, as well as mental perspective taking, the latter typically involv-
ing theory of mind (ToM) abilities, including the ability to understand mental 
states (e.g. beliefs and emotions) of other people. They found that regarding 
mental perspective taking, AHP patients presented differential deficits in the 
3rd compared to 1st person perspective taking, in relation to both healthy and 
HP controls. AHP patients were also found to have deficits in visuospatial 
perspective taking, which however were not clearly differentiated from those 
of HP controls. Hence, it appears that anosognosic patients have lost the 
ability to spontaneously disengage from the 1st person perspective and to 
acquire 3rd person perspective. Moreover, they are mostly able to so after 
explicit instructions, usually within an experimental setting (Fotopoulou, 
2015), although once they do acquire the allocentric perspective, they are 
able to better perceive their body and paralysis. 
6.1.2. AHP and the emotional factor 
Another facet of AHP, which has not received much attention, relates 
to the emotional factor, also described in Chapters 3 and 7. Specifically, on 
examination, patients’ emotional attitudes range from apparent blunt affect 
and indifference towards their paralysed limb (anosodiaphoria) (Babinski, 
1914), to hatred towards their limb (misoplegia) (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, 
Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; Vocat, et al., 2010), or shift of emotional distress 
from the neurological ailment to seemingly unrelated objects (e.g. the loss of 
a pair of glasses, or the quality of care in the ward) (Turnbull, Jones, & Reen-
Screen, 2002). In addition, with the exception of misoplegia, rarely do AHP 
patients show depressive feelings or catastrophic reactions, and these feel-
ings seem to emerge only when AHP subsides (Fotopoulou, et al., 2009; 
Kaplan-Solms, & Solms, 2000). The relationship between emotion and AHP 
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was investigated in a recent study, where AHP and HP control patients were 
asked to perform a Hayling test, to which they received purposely positive or 
negative feedback evoking positive or negative feelings respectively (Besha-
rati, Forkel, Kopelman, Solms, Jenkinson, & Fotopoulou, 2014). Awareness 
measurements were obtained before and after the test, and it was found that 
motor awareness improved after negative, but not positive emotion induction. 
It was also reported that both groups experienced negative and positive 
emotions following negative and positive feedback respectively, although 
AHP patients reported feeling overall more positive emotions. So far, findings 
suggest that AHP patients are able to experience a full range of emotions, 
from negative to positive, however, they seem to encounter difficulties in at-
tributing negative emotions to some of their higher-order representations 
(e.g. their body), and instead seem to direct those emotions to external ‘ob-
jects’ (Fotopoulou, 2010; Turnbull, et al., 2005). Evidence for this comes 
again from Besharati et al. (2014), who, performing a lesion analysis, found 
that less improvement in motor awareness following negative emotion induc-
tion was associated with lesions in the anterior insula, the putamen, the cap-
sules and the anterior periventricular white matter. Given the role of the insu-
la, especially of its anterior parts, in processing salience and conscious rep-
resentation of internal body signals (Craig, 2009; Critchley, et al., 2004), and 
the role of the basal ganglia in prediction error learning, it is possible that le-
sions on these sites disrupt the optimal learning of new information and up-
dating beliefs about self (Fotopoulou, 2014; 2015), as described below. 
6.1.3. Updating in AHP 
One of the most striking characteristics of AHP is the inability of pa-
tients to properly adjust and update their beliefs about themselves despite 
constant feedback. Vocat and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that ano-
sognosic patients, when asked to solve a riddle, tended to stick to their initial 
beliefs and not modify their answers in light of new evidence and cues. They 
were also abnormally overconfident in their responses, even when infor-
mation from the cues was insufficient, and they even justified their incorrect 
choice by finding strange connections between the cues and their answers. 
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In another study, patients were required to give an estimate about their per-
formance in bimanual and bipedal tasks, and in case of overestimation, they 
were asked to describe the strategy they would follow, before being asked to 
also perform the task. AHP patients were found to overestimate their ability 
to successfully perform the task, and only a small percentage appeared to be 
able to update their prior expectations based on performance feedback 
(Marcel, et al., 2004). Additionally, Cocchini and colleagues (2010) asked 
AHP patients to perform eight different tasks, three consecutive times each, 
and observed the strategy followed. They found that in the second and third 
attempt, five out of seven patients successfully modified their strategy to per-
form within normal range, and from those five patients only three sustained 
this normal performance after three days. Lastly, in a similar study patients 
were asked to judge their performance before, on initiating and after failing to 
execute five bimanual tasks. Patients were then classified according to the 
stage at which they correctly judged their performance, or on whether they 
remained unaware of their failure throughout the task. Results found that 
three out of 12 patients remained unaware, three patients correctly assessed 
their performance before or on initiation of performance in at least three 
tasks, while the rest of the patients only showed awareness in one or two 
tasks (Moro, et al., 2011). All of the above findings seem to confirm the ex-
istence of an update deficit in AHP, but what still remains unknown is why 
some AHP patients were able to use feedback to update their estimates, 
even temporarily, while others were resilient to change and remained almost 
fixated to their original positions. 
Evidence so far synthesises a picture, according to which AHP pa-
tients are egocentrically laden, encountering difficulties to switch from 1st to 
3rd person perspective, and once they are experimentally facilitated to do so, 
they perform better cognitively (e.g. understanding their deficits from another 
perspective) that emotionally (i.e. in tasks involving Theory of Mind). Moreo-
ver, anosognosic patients show aberrant emotional attitudes, as they rarely 
show negative feelings, and when they are guided to experience them, this is 
usually accompanied by improvement of motor awareness, especially in pa-
tients with lesions in brain areas linked with interoception and error-based 
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learning. What can be understood from this picture, is that emotion regula-
tion, interoception and updating in response to feedback seem to be related 
processes that in the case of AHP are, at some level, disrupted. 
As expected, several theories have attempted to provide explanation 
for the presentation of AHP (see Chapter 1 for more detailed review), with 
some of them focusing solely on the emotional component (e.g. Weinstein, & 
Kahn, 1955), some on computational models but mostly for motor control 
(e.g. Berti, et al., 2005; Frith, et al., 2000; Heilman, et al., 1998), and others 
attempting to explain the delusional part of the disorder from a more cogni-
tive viewpoint (e.g. Vuilleumier, 2004). These theories were able to account 
for many of the presentations of AHP, but not for the great variability of the 
syndrome. Recently, Fotopoulou (2014; 2015) proposed a comprehensive 
theory for AHP (see also Chapter 1), based on the notion that perception and 
action serve the purpose of reducing prediction error, that is, the mismatch 
between the expected and the experienced, by changing predictions or the 
signals being predicted. Another key notion for this theory is the hierarchical 
organisation of brain networks, transferring prediction errors in a bottom-up, 
feedforward fashion to optimise representations, but also transferring feed-
back connections in a top-down manner, suppressing prediction errors, with-
in but also between different hierarchical levels. According to the theory, dis-
ruptions in prediction errors can occur at any of those levels, lower and high-
er-order, and in different domains, cognitive and emotional, allowing a great 
variability in resulting deficits that could account for the different characteris-
tics of AHP. Specifically, five candidate disruptions have been proposed. 
Firstly, it was suggested that since the patient can no longer move their left 
arm, they cannot update representations about it by re-sampling the envi-
ronment (aberrant active inference). Secondly, weak or absent prediction er-
rors (aberrant perceptual inference) due to deficits, in the presence of intact 
prior beliefs, fail to trigger an update of motor awareness. Moreover, deficits 
directly to the limbic areas, responsible for learning and updating, might lead 
to a “fixation” to past experiences about the state of the body and related be-
liefs, and to inability to update awareness based on the new state. Dopa-
mine-depleting lesions might also result to less precise prediction errors, re-
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ducing their salience and eventually the long- and short-term learning. Lastly, 
strong individual priors are likely to be a contributing factor. 
Based on the aforementioned theory, the present study aimed to in-
vestigate updating in AHP patients, in the two main domains where deficits 
are observed: cognitive and emotion. Moreover, given that evidence sug-
gests that performance in these domains varies according to perspective 
(e.g. Besharati, et al., 2014; Besharati, et al., 2016; Fotopoulou, et al., 2009; 
Jenkinson, et al., 2013), this updating was examined from two points of view, 
1st and 3rd person perspective. Previous studies on updating have used a va-
riety of tasks and feedback, including verbal tasks with verbal feedback 
(Vocat, et al., 2013), or different unilateral and bilateral motor tasks, that en-
gaged several modalities (e.g. auditory, motor and visual in the case of ‘clap 
hands’ action) (Marcel, et. al., 2004; Cocchini, et al., 2010; Moro, et al., 
2011). As a result, prediction errors of different modalities with different sali-
ence could have affected the improvement of motor awareness in patients. 
To control for these issues a task was designed, in which the patient was re-
quired to perform a unimanual task (lift a tray), in two different conditions: 
first with the left (affected) arm and then separately with the right arm, while 
the examiner was observing. For each arm condition, before and after the 
execution of the task, the patient was asked to answer a set of questions, 
giving estimates about their performance, regarding cognitive and emotional 
aspects, with regards to either the patient (1st person perspective, 1PP) or 
the experimenter (3rd person perspective, 3PP). The same sets of questions 
were used for both arm conditions. This allowed the examination of how prior 
beliefs about cognition and emotion are shaped via feedback into post-
execution beliefs. It was hypothesised that AHP patients would update more 
on cognitive (e.g. Fotopoulou, et al., 2009) than emotion domain (e.g. Besha-
rati, et al., 2016). Additionally, it was predicted that more update would occur 
in the 3rd than 1st person perspective (e.g. Marcel, et al., 2004). Lastly, in 
terms of the relationship between perspective taking and domains, it was 
predicted that, as described above, in the cognitive domain, more update 
would be observed in the 3rd than in the 1st person perspective (e.g. Bisiach, 
et al., 1986; Marcel., et al., 2004; Fotopoulou, et al., 2009) Conversely, in the 
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emotion domain, more update is expected in the 1st than in the 3rd person 
perspective (Kaplan-Solms, & Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou, et al., 2009; Besha-
rati, et al., 2016).  
6.2. Methods 
6.2.1. Participants 
Thirty-seven adult neurological patients (20 females, mean age for N 
(36) = 69.72 years (SD) = 14.04; demographics for one female patient are 
missing) were recruited for the study, using the process and inclusion criteria 
described in Chapter 2. One AHP patient refused to complete the study and 
was excluded. The remaining thirty-six patients were divided into two groups, 
AHP and HP, according to their clinical diagnosis of AHP based on Bisiach 
interview, and in all cases confirmed by Feinberg et al. (2000) questionnaire 
(also see Chapter 2). Eighteen patients were classified as having AHP (13 
females, group mean age = 74.4 years, SD = 13.1, age range = 36 – 89 
years). Of these, 12 had pure AHP, that is AHP in absence of any other body 
ownership disturbances and somatic delusions (eight females, mean age = 
75.6 years, SD = 15.8, age range 36 – 89 years), and the remaining six had 
AHP and DSO diagnosis (five females, mean age = 72 years, SD = 4.9, age 
range 66 – 78 years). Similarly, 18 patients were classified as HP control 
subjects without AHP (7 females, mean age = 67.94 years, SD = 14.57, age 
range 47-97). Of these, three patients also had a diagnosis of pure DSO 
(body ownership disturbances in absence of AHP) (2 females, mean age = 
80.4 years, SD = 9.6, age range = 57 – 75 years). Due to early discharge 
from the ward, three of the 18 patients completed the left arm part of the task 
only (see below), but since the right arm condition was only used as control 
condition, their data were used in the analyses. 
6.2.2. Experimental study design 
This was a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Domain: Cognitive vs. Emo-
tion) x 2 (Perspective: 1PP vs. 3PP) x 2 (Arm laterality: left vs. right) mixed 
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design. Arm laterality was manipulated by asking patients to lift a tray using 
the left (affected), or right (unaffected) arm. Since the right arm was used as 
a control condition, this was ultimately a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Domain: 
Cognitive vs. Emotion) x 2 (Perspective: 1PP vs. 3PP) design, for left (affect-
ed) and for right (control) arms. Domain was manipulated by asking ques-
tions about the motor action, with different content, either about what the pa-
tients believed had taken place in the task (Cognitive questions), or about 
what they felt about what had taken place (Emotion questions) (see Materials 
and procedures section below for specific questions and response options). 
Similarly, Perspective taking was manipulated by asking the patient to give 
an answer from their perspective (1PP), or from the experimenter’s perspec-
tive (3PP). The questions asked before and after the performance of the mo-
tor action were the same, but the ones before referred to the forthcoming 
performance of the action, while the ones after referred to what had hap-
pened during the performance of the action. The order of the questions be-
fore and after the action was fixed, following a logical order, but the order of 
the arms conditions (affected / left; unaffected / right) was counterbalanced. 
For each question read to them, participants were presented with two 
possible answers and were required to select the correct response (see be-
low for more details), which was scored as ‘1’. Wrong answers were scored 
as ‘0’. Participants were asked to give their answers at two time points, be-
fore performing an action (prospective, baseline questions) and directly after 
(retrospective questions). The main dependent variable was left arm Update 
scores, calculated as the difference between the retrospective and prospec-
tive questions scores, for each condition. A positive score reflected im-
provement in motor awareness and a negative score the opposite. Prospec-
tive left and right arm data, as well as right arm Update scores were also 
used as dependent variables for the baseline and right arm analyses respec-
tively (see Statistical analysis section below). 
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6.2.3. Materials and procedures 
For this task, a plastic tray and five plastic cups were used. The pa-
tient was either sitting on the bed or on a chair, with the hospital table in front 
of them, about 30cm from their torso. The tray was on the table, in front of 
the patient, and the cups were aligned in two rows on the tray. The experi-
menter was sitting directly opposite to the patient (3PP) (Figure 6.1). 
Patients were tested individually in stroke wards, at the bedside. The 
experimenter presented the material to each patient, read out the task in-
structions and asked control questions to ensure proper attention and com-
prehension, and that patients could properly see the materials. Adjustments 
to the material’s position were made, if necessary (e.g. if the patient was un-
able to count the cups on the tray, the hospital desk would be moved more to 
the patient’s right side to correct for neglect). In this task, patients were 
asked to perform a motor task (lift a tray) and report on theirs and the exper-
imenter’s performance and feelings with regards to the outcome of the ac-
tion. The main part of the task began with the prospective condition, in which 
the patient was asked to imagine lifting the tray, with the arm indicated by the 
experimental protocol, and then the experimenter would ask questions about 
the patient’s (1) Beliefs: “What do you think would happen with the tray?” 
(Response options: “You would be able to lift it” or “You would not be able to 
lift it”) and (2) Emotions: “How would you feel about what would happen with 
the tray?” (Response options: “Happy” or “Frustrated”). Subsequently the pa-
tient was asked the same questions from the perspective of the experimenter 
(3rd person perspective). The procedure was then repeated for the opposite 
arm prospective condition. The task would then proceed to the ‘action per-
formance’ part, where the patient was required to try and lift the tray. If a pa-
tient refused to try to lift the try, or pretended they did, or became emotional 
or frustrated by their performance, the experimenter would remain supportive 
of their efforts, but neutral with regards to their performance, and kept notes 
of any strategies used to lift the tray (e.g. use of the right hand to assist the 
left hand). In the retrospective part of the task, performed after the patient 
had attempted to lift the tray, the experimenter would ask the corresponding 
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questions as in the first part, but in the past tense, referring to the patient’s 
attempt to lift the tray (e.g. “What happened with the tray?”, etc.). Lastly, the 
execution and retrospective parts were repeated for the other arm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.4. Neuropsychological and neurological assessment  
All patients underwent the AHP assessments specified above. In addi-
tions, they also underwent a standard neuropsychological assessment (see 
also Chapter 2), including assessments for motor strength (for upper and 
lower limb); personal and extrapersonal neglect; executive functioning; gen-
eral cognitive functioning; visual and sensory extinction, and proprioception; 
mood; orientation; and working and long-term memory.  
6.2.5. Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS, Version 24. All data 
were tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test, and were found to be 
non-normally distributed (p < 0.05). Subsequent Square root and Log trans-
formations did not correct the normality violations and therefore analyses 
were performed using the appropriate non-parametric tests, using the exact 
p value.  
As mentioned before, the right arm condition was used as a control 
condition for both groups, in which ceiling effects were expected, thus left 
and right arm data were analysed separately. The following analyses were 
performed: (1) in order to establish the starting point of the two groups in the 
task, a baseline 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Domain: Cognitive vs. Emotion) 
Figure 6.1: Experimental setting of the task 
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x 2 (Perspective: 1PP vs. 3PP) analysis on left arm prospective scores was 
performed; (2) a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Domain: Cognitive vs. Emotion) 
x 2 (Perspective: 1PP vs. 3PP) analysis was performed on left arm Update 
scores, to investigate the differences in updating patterns for the different 
variables, between groups. In addition, two control analyses were performed 
using responses to questions concerning the right, unaffected hand: (4) a 2 
(Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Domain: Cognitive vs. Emotion) x 2 (Perspective: 
1PP vs. 3PP) analysis on the right arm prospective scores, and the same 
analysis on the right hand Update scores.  
All figures were presented using parametric data (means and stand-
ard errors) for illustrative reasons. The equivalent non-parametric figures can 
be found in Appendix I. 
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Neuropsychological results 
Patients’ demographic characteristics and performance on the stand-
ardised neuropsychological tests is summarised in Table 6.1. Significance 
level was set to p < 0.01, to take into account multiple comparisons. The 
groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, years of education, or days 
of onset to assessment. As expected, there was a significant difference in 
awareness scores between groups, regarding both Bisiach (Z = -5.434, p < 
.000) and Feinberg (Z = -5.04, p < .000) assessments. Furthermore, the 
groups did not differ in terms of motor deficits, cognitive functioning, memory 
and most tests of extrapersonal neglect. However, significant differences 
were found in the copy (Z = -2.812, p = 0.005), representational drawing (Z = 
-2.789, p = 0.005) and Line bisection (center) (Z = -2.502, p = 0.012) tests, 
with AHP patients presenting with more neglect. Moreover, AHP patients 
were found to perform worse in the FAB test (Z = -2.787, p = 0.005) and in 
the proprioception test (Z = -2.983, p = 0.003).  
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Table 6.1: Groups’ demographic characteristics and neuropsychological pro-
file 
  AHP    HP    Mann-Whitney  
  Median IQR   Median IQR   Z p 
Age (years) 77.00 14.50  67.00 23.00  -1.836 0.066 
Education (years) 11.00 3.00  12.00 4.00  -1.546 0.122 
Days from onset 7.00 9.75  11.00 25.75  -1.347 0.178 
MRC left upper limb 0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00  -0.502 0.615 
MRC left lower limb 0.00 1.25  1.00 2.00  -1.346 0.178 
BERTI awareness in-
terview 
2.00 1.00  0.00 0.00  -5.434 0.000* 
Feinberg awareness 
interview 
6.25 3.63  0.00 1.00  -5.04 0.000* 
Orientation 3.00 0.00  3.00 0.00  -1.057 0.29 
Digit span forwards 6.00 1.25  6.00 1.75  -0.568 0.57 
Digit span backwards 2.00 1.25  3.50 2.75  -1.439 0.15 
MOCA memory 4.00 2.00  5.00 3.50  -0.994 0.32 
MOCA (Total) 23.00 6.00  23.50 6.25  -0.864 0.387 
Comb/razor test ne-
glect 
-0.43 0.28  -0.30 0.42  -1.139 0.255 
Bisiach one item test 1.00 0.50  0.50 1.00  -2.006 0.045* 
Line cancellation 
right 
13.00 9.50  18.00 4.25  -1.807 0.071 
Line cancellation left 0.00 11.00  17.00 15.75  -2.549 0.011* 
Star cancellation right 
(cancellations) 
11.00 8.50  21.50 14.50  -2.763 0.006* 
Star cancellation left 
(cancellations) 
1.00 4.50  4.50 21.75  -0.833 0.405 
Copy  0.00 0.25  1.00 3.00  -2.812 0.005* 
Representational 
drawing 
0.00 0.00  1.00 1.00  -2.789 0.005* 
Line bisection right 0.00 1.00  1.00 1.00  -0.983 0.326 
Line bisection centre 0.00 1.00  1.00 0.25  -2.502 0.012* 
Line bisection left 0.00 0.50  0.00 1.00  -1.284 0.199 
Cognitive estimates  9.00 8.00  8.00 11.00  -0.618 0.536 
FAB total score 9.50 5.50  14.00 4.25  -2.787 0.005* 
HADS depression 6.00 6.50  7.00 6.25  -1.76 0.078 
HADS anxiety 6.00 4.00  8.00 10.00  -0.976 0.329 
Proprioception (max 
9) (Vocat) 
3.00 3.00  7.50 1.00  -2.983 0.003* 
Visual fields 2.00 3.00  2.00 4.00  -0.545 0.586 
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  AHP    HP    Mann-Whitney  
  Median IQR   Median IQR   Z p 
Somatosensory (max 
6) 
2.00 2.00  2.00 2.50  -0.179 0.858 
                  
MRC = Medical Research Council (Guarantors of Brain, 1986); MOCA = The Montreal Cog-
nitive Assessment (Nasreddine, 2005); Comb/razor test = assessment of personal neglect; 
line crossing, star cancellation, copy & representational drawing = conventional subtests of 
Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson, et al., 1987); FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (Du-
bois, et al., 2000); HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983). The number of participants in each test varies, but is always equal or more than 40% 
of the sample size.  
* Significant difference between groups, p < 0.01. 
6.3.2. Experimental results 
Baseline analysis on left arm prospective scores 
In order to establish the performance of the two groups with regards to 
the left arm at the beginning of the task, a baseline analysis of left arm pro-
spective scores was conducted (Figure 6.2). A Mann-Whitney U test re-
vealed a significant main effect of Group (Z = -3.416, p < 0.001), with the HP 
group having significantly higher prospective scores (i.e. more correct 
scores, indicative of more realistic beliefs about their ability to perform the 
task) (Mdn = 1), compared to the AHP group (Mdn = 0.5). No significant main 
effects were found for Domain (Z = -0.827, p = 0.477) and Perspective (Z = 
0, p = 1). Additionally, no significant interactions were found between Group 
and Domain (Z = 0.959, p = 0.299), Group and Perspective (Z = -1.192, p = 
0.233), and Domain and Perspective (Z = -0.632, p = 0.754) and no signifi-
cant three-way interaction was found between Group, Perspective and Do-
main (Z = -0.644, p = 0.568). In summary, the results showed that the HP 
group was almost at ceiling performance at the beginning of the task, with 
little room for improvement, unlike the AHP group, which had significantly 
lower scores. 
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Figure 6.2: Means and standard errors of baseline scores for left arm 
Main experimental analysis on left arm update scores 
An analysis of Update scores for the left arm was conducted to exam-
ine the updating pattern of AHP and HP groups during the task. A Mann-
Whitney U test revealed a main effect of Group (Z = -3.528, p < 0.001) on 
updating, with the AHP group updating more (Mdn = 0.5) than the HP group 
(Mdn = 0). A trend main effect was found for Domain (Z = -1.722, p = 0.087), 
indicating a tendency to update more on the cognitive (Mdn = 0) than on the 
emotion domain (Mdn = 0). No main effect was found for Perspective (Z = -
1.29, p = 0.307) (Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.3: Means and standard errors of Update scores for left arm 
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The interaction between Group and Domain was analysed by calculat-
ing the difference between emotion update scores and cognitive update 
scores, and comparing this differential score between the AHP and HP 
groups. A Mann-Whitney U test found no significant result, but a trend was 
discovered (Z = -1.673, p = 0.094). Because the hypothesis of this study was 
directional (i.e. expecting AHP patients to update more in the cognitive do-
main), in addition to the exact 2-tailed p-value, the exact 1-tailed p-value was 
also examined, and it yielded a significant result (p = 0.047), allowing for fur-
ther, pairwise comparisons. As described at the baseline analysis above, the 
HP group performed almost at ceiling at the beginning of the task and there-
fore no major updates within the group were expected. On the contrary, the 
AHP group had started the task with significantly lower scores and therefore 
a clearer pattern of updates was expected. Hence, within-subjects Bonferro-
ni-corrected pairwise comparisons (α = 0.025) were performed that showed a 
non-significant trend, indicating that AHP patients showed a tendency to up-
date more in the cognitive (Mdn = 0.5) than in the emotion domain (Mdn = 0) 
(Z = -2.174, p = 0.034). HP patients were found to have no difference in their 
update in the cognitive and emotion domain (Z = -0.184, p = 1).  
The interaction between Perspective and Domain was analysed by 
comparing the differential scores of Perspective and Domain. A Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test found a significant interaction (Z = -2.183, p = 0.048). Sub-
sequent Bonferroni-corrected comparisons (α = 0.025) showed that in the 
cognitive domain, no difference was found in the update between 1PP and 
3PP (Z = -0.333, p = 1). In the emotion domain, a trend was found, according 
to which patients had the tendency to update more in the 1PP (Mdn = 0) than 
in the 3PP (Mdn = 0) (Z = -2.449. p = 0.031). No significant interaction was 
found between Group and Perspective (Z = -1.1, p = 0.32).  
The interaction between Group, Perspective and Domain was investi-
gated, by calculating the difference between emotion update scores and 
cognitive update scores (domain differential), the difference between 3PP 
and 1PP (perspective differential), and the difference between the perspec-
tive and the domain differential, and comparing this score between groups. 
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Although a Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the comparison was not sig-
nificant, a trend was found (Z = -1.79, p = 0.088). According to Cohen 
(1988), it is advisable to focus on the two-way interactions, even when the 
three-way interaction “falls somewhat short of significance” (p. 692), there-
fore subsequent Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons (α = 0.025). In 
the AHP group, comparing the perspective differential between emotion and 
cognitive domains, a Wilcoxon test found no significant difference (Z = -
1.732, p = 0.148. The same analysis for the HP group found no significant 
difference (Z = -0.577, p = 1).  
Single case analysis 
The AHP group showed a trend (although no significant) difference in 
the emotion in relation to the cognitive domain, compared to HP group. De-
spite the lack of significant findings, it was decided to perform single case 
analysis, to gain a better understanding of the results and potentially provide 
a possible direction for future research. It is understood that any findings 
should be interpreted as speculative, with the aforementioned lack of signifi-
cance in mind. In order to determine from the above analyses whether a ‘dif-
ferential deficit’ (i.e. a ‘classical dissociation’; see Crawford, Garthwaite, & 
Gray, 2003 for definitions) was present between cognitive and emotion do-
mains in the AHP, compared to HP group. Analyses at the individual level 
were performed, using the Revised Standardised Difference Test (RSDT) 
(Garthwaite, & Crawford, 2004; Crawford, & Garthwaite, 2005) to assess 
whether each patient with AHP showed a deficit in emotion but not in cogni-
tive domain, compared to performance of the HP group in emotion and cog-
nitive domains (see Appendix I). Only two out of 18 AHP patients showed 
‘differential deficits’ in emotion compared to cognitive domain, when com-
pared to HP performance. 
Control analyses on right arm data 
An analysis on right arm data Update scores was performed, as a 
control condition to assess whether any update deficits found on the left arm 
are specific to hemiplegia, or if they are general cognitive deficits including 
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the healthy right arm as well. There were no significant findings either for the 
prospective scores, or for the update scores analyses (all p > .05). 
6.4. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate updating in emotion and cog-
nition from a 1st and 3rd person perspective in AHP. The main hypothesis 
was that AHP patients, compared to HP controls, would update more in the 
1st person, than in the 3rd person perspective, and more in the cognitive than 
in the emotion domain. It was also predicted that in the cognitive domain, 
more update would occur in the 3rd than 1st person perspective, while in the 
emotion domain, the opposite was expected.  
The results of the study at baseline (i.e. before the action execution) 
showed that the AHP group was found to begin the task with significantly 
lower scores, compared to HP, indicating that their answers about what they 
thought would happen in the task were more incorrect (i.e. anosognosic) 
than those of hemiplegic controls. It was also found that the HP group per-
formed almost at ceiling, with little prospects for improvement. Examining the 
update scores in the main experimental analysis, it was found that, as ex-
pected, the AHP group updated overall more than the HP group, which, as 
mentioned above, was already almost at ceiling. It was also found that pa-
tients tended to update more in the cognitive, than in the emotion domain 
and this difference, given the ceiling performance of hemiplegic controls, 
could speculatively be mostly attributed to the AHP group. Indeed, further 
results showed that AHP patients tended to update more in response to cog-
nitive, than to emotion questions, partially confirming the initial prediction. 
However, further individual comparisons (which however were purely explor-
atory and based on a non-significant trend) showed that only two out of 18 
AHP patients presented with a differential deficit in emotion, in relation to 
cognitive domain, when compared to the HP group. No difference between 
the two domains was found for the HP group. Furthermore, it was also found 
that, on the emotion domain, all patients had the tendency to update more in 
the 1st, than in the 3rd person perspective. No difference between perspec-
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tives was found for the cognitive domain. Given the almost ceiling perfor-
mance of the HP group, it can be assumed that a large part of the difference 
in updating between 1st and 3rd person perspective in the emotion domain 
could be attributed to the AHP group, as it is also evident in Figure 6.3. Last-
ly, a trend interaction between Group, Domain and Perspective was found, 
with no further significant findings. Moreover, there were no significant find-
ings for the HP group. Regarding control analyses on the right arm data, 
there were no significant findings on the perspective or on the update scores, 
confirming that any differences found on the left arm performance are not 
due to generalised cognitive deficits in patients due to the right hemisphere 
stroke.  
Taken together, the results of the present study suggest that AHP pa-
tients updated more (although by no means optimally) cognitively than emo-
tionally, using feedback that was both visual (i.e. not seeing the tray being 
lifted) and motor. Thus, the first point of discussion is the fact that AHP pa-
tients were able to update more cognitively, which was not in line with some 
of the previous studies, although others reported similar findings. Vocat and 
colleagues (2012) found that anosognosic patients remained abnormally fix-
ated and overconfident in their answers from the beginning, when asked to 
solve a riddle task with increasing specificity in the helping cues. On the con-
trary, other studies that asked patients to perform specific motor tasks and 
either judge their own performance before-, during- and after execution (Mo-
ro, et al., 2011), or discuss motor failures with the neuropsychologist (Moro, 
Scandola, Bulgarelli, Avesani, & Fotopoulou, 2015), found that motor aware-
ness improved for most patients. This phenomenon was termed emergent 
awareness, as it resulted from failures in tasks. The authors also suggested 
that improved awareness was the result of the intention to act confronted by 
the failure to perform the action. In combination with the present findings, it 
can be understood that the salience of feedback (i.e. of the failure) is critical 
for the successful update of beliefs, as where verbal feedback failed, motor 
and perhaps also visual feedback, partially and temporarily seemed to suc-
ceed. This improvement, however, was asymmetrical for cognition and emo-
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tion, as the same feedback that was salient enough to update cognition, 
failed to also update emotion.  
A second finding of this study relates to updating in the emotion do-
main. It was found that AHP patients had the tendency to update less in the 
emotion than in the cognitive domain. Single case analyses found that two 
out of 18 patients showed differential deficits in emotion (i.e. a ‘classical dis-
sociation’; see Crawford, Garthwaite, & Gray, 2003), although as highlighted 
above, this analysis was exploratory, as it was based on a non-significant 
trend effect. It nevertheless indicates an important direction for future stud-
ies, and therefore this finding will be discussed below in the context of the 
literature. Moreover, the study also found that patients overall updated the 
least in the emotion 3rd person perspective. The aberrant emotion update is 
in line with the hypotheses of this study, and with existing literature. It has 
been systematically shown that anosognosic patients experience deficits in 
emotional responses, typically remaining overly optimistic and rarely exhibit-
ing negative or catastrophic reactions (Orfei, et al, 2007). Urging AHP pa-
tients to experience negative emotions form a 1st person perspective, for ex-
ample by discussing negative themes irrelevant to paralysis or illness, such 
as death or separation (Kaplan-Solms, & Solms, 2000), or experimentally in-
ducing negative feelings (Besharati, et al., 2014) has been found to improve 
awareness. On the other hand, when AHP patients were asked to take an-
other person’s emotional perspective, in the context of ToM tasks, besides 
the apparent difficulty they experienced in performing the task, no improve-
ment in motor awareness was noted (Besharati, et al., 2016). In the present 
experiment, AHP patients were found to be able to update cognitively about 
what happened in the motor task (i.e. that they did not lift the tray). Despite 
that, they reported that they and the experimenter felt “happy” rather than 
“frustrated”, even after the performance failure. This selective inability to up-
date emotions according to reality also supports the theory of emotion regu-
lation in AHP (Turnbull, et al., 2014), postulating that deficits in the neu-
rocognitive processes affecting emotion regulation in anosognosic patients, 
result in abnormal emotional responses to events.  
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This study is not without limitations and they should be taken into con-
sideration when interpreting the results. Firstly, the sample size of the study 
was relatively small and, as can be seen from the non-significant trends in 
the results, it is possible that there was not enough power to reveal signifi-
cant findings. Moreover, the study did not formally assess AHP patients for 
explicit and implicit awareness, and it is not unlikely that such differences in 
AHP presentation between patients affected the results. Another potential 
limitation could be the wording of the 3rd person perspective emotion ques-
tion (“how do you think I feel about what happened with the tray?”), which 
could have made this question more difficult to answer, compared to the oth-
ers. In addition, since hemiplegic controls performed almost at ceiling, there 
was no proper comparison group and therefore the interpretation of the AHP 
findings becomes more difficult and speculative. Lastly, the two experimental 
groups differed significantly in a number of neuropsychological tests, howev-
er these differences are not believed to have affected the results.  
Summing up, despite the various limitations, the present study was 
able to demonstrate that AHP patients are, in general, able to use feedback 
to update their cognitive beliefs (as also found in Chapter 4), but this update 
was not followed by the associated improvement in emotions. This finding 
highlights the difficulties in emotion regulation experienced by anosognosic 
patients and the possibly significant contribution of emotion to the presenta-
tion of AHP. This characteristic is also examined in the next chapter, where 
the role of motivation on memory is examined. Given the crucial role of emo-
tion in AHP and the fact that its contribution to the disorder had been ne-
glected for many years, more studies are needed to better understand its re-
lationship with AHP. Future studies, besides improving current limitations, 
could use precision estimates (as were used for cognition in Chapter 4), to 
allow a more in depth investigation into the updating process of emotion, and 
to also allow comparisons with the respective cognitive process. 
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7. The effect of motivated forgetting on 
memory in AHP 
7.1. Introduction  
As described in detail in Chapter 1, patients with Anosognosia for 
Hemiplegia (AHP) deny the existence of motor deficits that result from a cer-
ebrovascular event. However, despite this apparent unawareness, it is be-
lieved that AHP entails a motivational component and that some insight 
about the deficit is processed by the patients. Support about this notion 
comes from one of the most striking features of AHP, the dissociation be-
tween implicit and explicit awareness of motor deficits (for review see 
Mograbi & Morris, 2013). Often, AHP patients fail in motor tasks, but justify 
their failure by giving answers that suggest implicit knowledge (Marcel, et al., 
2004). Some AHP patients refuse to acknowledge their hemiplegia, but might 
nevertheless refrain from activities that require using both hands (Bisiach, & 
Geminiani, 1991), stay in bed or use a wheelchair (Bisiach, & Berti, 1995), 
and are even willing to stay in hospital to receive care (Prigatano, 1996). 
Nardone et al. (2008) were one of the first to conduct a study on this dissoci-
ation, assessing right hemisphere patients with various degrees of aware-
ness on a dot-probe attention paradigm. Using reaction times, they investi-
gated interference from emotionally negative, disability-related words and 
found that AHP patients were the group mostly affected by these words, alt-
hough these patients explicitly denied any disability. Similarly, Fotopoulou et 
al. (2010) used a verbal inhibition test on right-hemisphere patients with and 
without AHP. Patients were required to inhibit completing a sentence with an 
automatic response, and also completed a rating task, in which they were 
asked to rate the self-relevance of these sentences. AHP patients were 
found to be slower in the inhibition task with a deficit-related theme, than with 
other emotionally negative themes, although in the rating task, the same pa-
tients had explicitly denied any self-relevance of the deficit-related sentenc-
es. 
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Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that AHP patients 
display a differential processing for disability-related themes. More specifical-
ly, it appears that not only is the deficit-related information processed at 
some level by the patients, but that it is processed well enough to result in a 
modification of their behavior and to trigger repression as a coping mecha-
nism (Cocchini, et al., 2010). This behavior modification is limited to the mo-
tor deficits, as AHP patients are usually fully aware of other, chronic health 
problems they might have (e.g. diabetes) (Ramachandran, Blakeslee, & 
Shah, 1998, p. 142) and complain, even become hypochondriac, about mi-
nor ailments (e.g. difficulty in sleeping) (Kaplan-Solms, & Solms, 2000, p. 
163). A possible explanation about this selective denial is the subjective 
meaning of the hemiplegia for the patient, which, unlike the simpler ailments, 
poses a serious threat to body integrity (Ramachandran, Blakeslee & Shah, 
1998, p. 142), leading to devastating affective consequences (Turnbull, et 
al., 2002).  
The existence of such a motivational component is further supported 
by clinical observations and experimental studies. Ramachandran and col-
leagues (1998) used vestibular caloric stimulation on an anosognosic patient 
in an attempt to temporarily reverse AHP. The patient became fully aware of 
her deficits and was even able to remember that she had been paralysed for 
several days. Interestingly, when the effect of the stimulation wore off, the 
patient was still able to remember the caloric episode in great detail, but 
could not remember admitting her hemiplegia. The authors attributed this ep-
isode to repression (p. 320), implying that the patient unconsciously forgot 
the part of the episode that was subjectively frustrating for her. In another 
experimental task, the experimenters informed the patient that they would 
deliver an injection to her left, paralysed arm as part of a neurological exami-
nation (Ramachandran, & Blakeslee 1998). The patient was told that the only 
side effect of the injection would be that her (in reality already paralysed), 
arm would become paralysed for a few minutes. The injection was in reality 
saline, with no effect. After the injection, the patient acknowledged her paral-
ysis for the first time, possibly because the subjective meaning of her deficit 
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had now transformed from a stroke-induced hemiplegia causing her negative 
feelings, into a temporary side-effect, with no emotional consequences.  
The suggestion that AHP is associated with psychological and motiva-
tional factors dates back to the early theories of the syndrome (see also 
Chapter 1). Weinstein and colleagues (Weinstein, 1991; Weinstein, & Kahn, 
1955) were among the first to claim that AHP is the result of a motivated de-
fense mechanism and that AHP patients may be aware of their motor defi-
cits, but in denial about them due to a strong need for self-esteem. This ap-
proach, however, failed to take into account the dynamic and variable clinical 
presentation of AHP and does not provide sufficient explanation for the later-
ality and for some of the subtypes of the syndrome, such as explicit aware-
ness with implicit unawareness. More recently, Turnbull and colleagues 
(2014) proposed a new theory of AHP, based on imbalances between cogni-
tion and motivation and emotion. According to this theory, AHP patients, 
when confronted with a life-changing event like their paralysis, use denial as 
defence mechanism, which allows them to implicitly register, but explicitly 
repress memory representations of this event. Importantly, unlike Weinstein 
(1991), Turnbull et al. (2014) do not suggest that this defence mechanism is 
psychogenic, but rather that AHP reveals the neuropsychological pathway of 
this defence mechanism. Specifically, they claim that damage to the right 
hemisphere causes higher order cognitive deficits, which result in deficits in 
emotion regulation, causing wishful emotions to be stronger than reality. 
Evidence so far indeed suggests the existence of a motivated compo-
nent in AHP (e.g. Ramachandran, & Blakeslee 1998), possibly also involving 
repression mechanism, but to our knowledge no study has systematically in-
vestigated this element of repression in AHP. To this end, the directed forget-
ting (DF) paradigm was used, which is a common and popular method to 
study ‘forgetting’ (Bjork, LaBerge, & LeGrand, 1968; MacLeod, 1998). In this 
paradigm, participants are instructed to remember or forget specific, earlier 
studied items, presented to them either separately or in lists. In the present 
study the list method of the paradigm was used due to the memory process-
es it engages (see below). This method typically requires participants to 
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study two lists of items (MacLeod, 1998). After studying the first list, half of 
the participants are told to forget the list (F1) and are given an excuse (e.g. it 
was just for practice), and the other half is asked to remember it (R1). Both 
groups then proceed to study the second list (R2 and R3 for each group re-
spectively). At the end, both groups undergo a memory test and are asked to 
recall, and often to also recognise, all items, including the F items they were 
instructed to forget. The standard findings in this task are categorised as 
‘benefit’ and ‘cost’. Benefit refers to the enhanced recall of R3 items com-
pared to R2. Cost, on the other hand, refers to the decreased recall of the to-
be-forgotten (F1) items in the second list, compared to the to-be-
remembered (R1) items. In the case of recognition, no DF is expected. 
Although many theories have been suggested (e.g. Sahakyan, Wal-
dum, Benjamin, & Bickett, 2009), the dominant single-process theory behind 
the DF effects is retrieval inhibition (Bjork, 1970; 1989). According to this 
theory, the DF costs reflect the retrieval inhibition of the to-be-forgotten (TBF) 
items, while the benefits arise from reduced proactive interference following 
the inhibited TBF items. During the recognition phase, re-exposure to stimuli 
releases retrieval inhibition, hence the items can be successfully recognised 
and the DF cost effect is not present. Retrieval inhibition has also been as-
sociated with repression, the active suppression of distressing memories 
(Myers, Brewin, & Power, 1998; Myers, & Derakshan, 2004), and therefore 
the DF task (both in its list-type and item-type version) has been systemati-
cally used to examine individual differences in forgetting for repressors (My-
ers, Brewin, & Power, 1998), and repression in psychiatric conditions and 
trauma (e.g. Korfine, & Hooley, 2000; McNally, Clancy, & Schacter, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the DF paradigm per se can only investigate effortful, con-
scious forgetting in participants so in order to examine what the different clin-
ical populations forget, the aforementioned studies manipulated the emo-
tional content of the task, such as including positive or negative items 
(McNally, et al., 2001), or positive, neutral or trauma-related words (McNally, 
et al., 2001). Following the example of these studies, the content of the items 
presented to the participants was also manipulated. 
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As described above, the typical list method has a between-subjects 
design in which each participant either studies the R-R lists, or the F-R lists. 
In the present study, and in order to control for memory deficits in stroke 
population and to increase power, each participant studied all four lists (R1-
R2 in one session and F1-R3 in a different session) (see Figure 7.1 for the 
outline of the task). The items in the present study were action pictures with 
the corresponding action phrases, half of which the patient could theoretically 
perform (unilateral actions using the right upper or lower limb) and half the 
patient could not perform (bilateral actions using upper or lower limbs) (Fig-
ure 7.2). Importantly, in order to ensure that the both the action phrases and 
their corresponding pictures were presented in each trial, and patients were 
asked to imagine performing the specific action. Additionally, the picture en-
couraged the participants to imagine performing the action in a specific way, 
for example, not by some individual strategy but either unilaterally using their 
left limb or bilaterally, depending on the condition (e.g. jump up) (see Figure 
7.2). The aim of this study was to test unconscious forgetting mechanisms in 
AHP. It was hypothesised that AHP patients would suppress the items they 
cannot perform, thereby exhibiting larger DF effects for those (bimanual and 
bipedal) items, compared with (right unimanual and unipedal) items they can 
perform and are therefore not motivated to forget. Specifically, it was hypoth-
esised that the standard DF cost and benefit effects would be found, that is, 
participants would remember more items from the R1 condition, compared to 
F1 and from the R3 condition compared to R2, regardless of group, although 
we expected that overall recall will be slightly impaired due to age and to the 
recent stroke. 
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Figure 7.1: DF task outline 
7.2. Pilot studies 
For the purposes of the study a novel DF task was developed, using 
pictures and corresponding action phrases, presented according to the list-
method. Therefore, two pilot studies with healthy participants were conduct-
ed, to ensure the suitability of the task, as further explained below. The first 
pilot study was conducted first, while the second pilot study was conducted in 
parallel with the clinical study. 
7.2.1. Pilot study 1: Materials and Procedure development 
Aim 
For this version of the DF paradigm, a novel type of material was cre-
ated, that would be presented to the participants. This material consisted of 
action pictures, drawn with help from an artist, and the corresponding action 
phrase written next to each picture (see Figure 7.2). These pictures were or-
ganised into seven sets that were later going to be used as lists (e.g. R1, R2, 
etc.) in the main experiment. The aim of this pilot study was to ensure that, 
across all sets, the action phrases matched their corresponding pictures to a 
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similar degree. This would ensure that any differences in recall and recogni-
tion between conditions in the main experiment would not be attributable to 
difficulty difference in material between the different lists. 
Participants  
Six participants took part in this study. All participants were under-
graduate students recruited via university announcements at King’s College, 
University of London. Exclusion criteria included (1) history of psychiatric 
and/or neurological illness, (2) dyslexia, and (3) drug or alcohol abuse at the 
time of the study. All participants provided written consent for their participa-
tion, and ethic approval was obtained from King’s College University. 
Experimental study design 
For this task black and white pictures were used, corresponding to 54 
actions: bimanual, bipedal, unimanual (performed with the right arm) and 
unipedal (performed with the right leg), with the corresponding action phrase 
written next to them (see Figure 7.2). Twenty-three actions included another 
object (e.g. a ball in the “kick ball” action), and were classified as transitive, 
and the rest were classified as intransitive (i.e. no object was used, e.g. 
“jump up”). As mentioned above, pictures were divided into seven sets: an 
Example set (which included 2 unimanual, 1 bimanual, 1 unipedal and 2 bi-
pedal items), set A (which included eight actions, two of each category), set 
B (which included eight actions, two of each category), set C (included eight 
actions, two of each category), set D (included eight actions, two of each 
category), set E (included eight actions, two of each category), set F (includ-
ed eight actions, two of each category).  
The independent variable was Set type (Sets 1-7), and the dependent 
variable was the Match score (1-low to 5-high), For this part, the seven sets 
of pictures were compared on the average score for each participant. All data 
were not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk p < .000), therefore non-
parametric tests were used. 
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Materials and procedures 
For this pilot study black and white pictures were used, corresponding 
to 54 actions with action phrases written next to them. Participants were pre-
sented with the pictures and were asked to rate how well the picture matches 
the action phrase, from 1-low to 5-high.  
 
Figure 7.2: Example of DF task material 
Results 
A Friedman test was used to compare participant’s ratings for picture 
– action phrase match between the seven sets. No significant difference was 
found between the sets (χ2(6) = 3.84, p = 0.698).  
Discussion 
The aim of this pilot study was to establish the suitability of the mate-
rials developed for the DF paradigm. It was assessed whether the seven sets 
of pictures differed between them in how accurately the pictures described 
the action they intended, and no significant difference between the sets was 
found.  
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7.2.2. Pilot study 2: DF in young and older populations  
Aim 
As described above, this was a novel version of the classic DF para-
digm, which was used in the clinical study on stroke population. This popula-
tion was expected to not have optimal memory performance due to neurolog-
ical problems and is also expected to be on average of older age. Therefore, 
and because this is a new task without previously reported performance, a 
baseline performance from healthy participants was needed. For this, a se-
cond pilot study was performed, running in parallel with the clinical one, in 
which younger adults were recruited, which were expected to have the opti-
mal performance in this task. Older adults were also recruited, and were ex-
pected to have age-related memory decline similar to the stroke population, 
but excluding the brain damage, and therefore would be a control group for 
the right-hemisphere damaged patients. As dictated from the DF literature, it 
was hypothesised (1) that the DF cost effect would be found (i.e. more items 
recalled from R1 than from F1) in both groups, (2) that the DF benefit effect 
would be found, (i.e. more items recalled from R3 than from R2 condition) in 
both groups and (3) that no differences would be found in recognition. (4) It 
was also expected that young participants would recall overall more items, 
compared to the older ones, and (5) that all item types (e.g. bimanual) would 
be equally recalled and recognised. 
Participants 
A total of 101 participants were recruited. Of these, 52 belonged to the 
Young Healthy Controls (YHC) group (22 males; group age range = 18-29 
years old, mean age = 23.5 years, SD = 2.89), and 49 participants belonged 
to the Older Healthy Controls (OHC) group (19 males; group age range = 60-
90 years, mean age = 71.82 years, SD = 9.52). Participants were recruited 
on a voluntary basis, via advertisement posters in the University of Hertford-
shire, the local voluntary women’s organisation (Women’s Institute) and staff 
facilities of a UK retailer. Exclusion criteria included (1) history of psychiatric 
or neurological illness; (2) minimum of seven years of education, (3) age (18-
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30 years old, or 60+ years old). All participants provided written informed 
consent for their participation. The study was approved by the ethics commit-
tee of University of Hertfordshire. 
Experimental study design 
The task was organised into two parts: Session 1 and Session 2 (see 
Figure 7.1). Session 1 was divided into five parts, Example list, R1 list (the 
first list to be remembered), R2 list (the second list to be remembered), the 
Recall part and the Recognition part. Session 2 also consisted of five parts, 
F1 list (the one participants were instructed to forget), R3, Recall and 
Recognition. The lists were always presented in the same order. The effects 
of the DF paradigm on recall, between conditions R1 and F1 are the Costs of 
the task. The effects of the paradigm on recall between R2 and R3 condi-
tions are the task’s Benefits. This was a 2 (Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item 
type: unimanual vs. bimanual vs. unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 (Condition: R1 vs. 
F1 vs. R2 vs. R3) design and main dependent variables were (1) recall and 
(2) recognition scores. 
Materials 
For this task, a 54-paged booklet was used. On the left side of each 
page was the action phrase (e.g. ‘jump up’) (Figure 7.2), written in black, 
bold, capital letters. On the right side of each page was a square, black and 
white picture of a gender-neutral person executing the action phrase (e.g. 
walking). The items in the booklet were bimanual, bipedal, unimanual (per-
formed with the right arm) or unipedal (performed with the right leg). Twenty-
three actions included another object (e.g. a ball in the ‘kick ball’ action), and 
were classified as transitive, and the rest were classified as intransitive. 
The booklet followed the paradigm’s organisation and was divided into 
two main parts, Session 1 and Session 2 (see Figure 7.1). Each Session 
consisted of 4 sub-parts. Session 1 consisted of Example list, R1 list (first list 
to be remembered), R2 list, and Distractor list. Similarly, Session 2 consisted 
of Example list, F1 list (list to be forgotten), R3 list, Distractor list. In Session 
1, the Example list consisted of 6 items. Lists R1 and R2 consisted of eight 
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action phrases each, 2 bimanual, 2 bipedal, 2 unimanual and 2 unipedal. 
The Distractor list included all action phrases of lists R1 and R2, plus eight 
novel items (two of each category) to control for perseveration. In Session 2, 
the Example list was the same as in Session 1. Lists F1 and R3 consisted of 
8 action phrases each, two of each category. The Distractor list included all 
action phrases of lists F1 and R3, plus eight novel items, two of each catego-
ry. 
 
Procedures 
Each participant was tested individually in a quiet room. The experi-
mented read the instructions to each participant, explaining that this was a 
memory test. The experimenter explained to the participant that they would 
see a list of pictures, one at a time, each representing an action. On the left 
of the picture would be the corresponding action phrase, which the experi-
menter would read out loud. The participant was instructed to imagine they 
are performing the action shown in each picture, and to try and remember all 
the action phrases, in any order. To ensure proper comprehension and vi-
sion, the experimenter would start with the Example list. The participant was 
then told that the main part of the Session would begin and was instructed to 
remember as many items as possible from the list. The experimenter then 
presented the R1 list, showing each booklet page to the participant for 5 sec 
and reading aloud the action phrase. At the end of the list, the experimenter 
explained that there would now be another set of pictures that the participant 
had to remember. The experimenter then presented the R2 list, showing 
each booklet page for 5 seconds and reading aloud the action phrase. At the 
end of the list, the experimented asked the participant to remember as many 
actions as possible, from both lists. Finally, the participant was shown a last 
list, the Distractor, and was asked to identify which actions they had seen be-
fore in lists R1 and R2, and which actions were new. The participant then 
took a break of at least 15 minutes.  
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Session 2 was identical to Session 1, however after presenting the 
first list (F1) to the participant, the experimenter would pretend to be mildly 
distressed and apologised, saying they had accidentally shown the wrong 
list. The experimenter would ask the participant to forget the actions they 
saw, as they were the wrong actions, and focus on the next list (R3), which is 
the one they will have to remember. At the end of list R3, however, the par-
ticipants were asked to recall the items from both lists, including the one they 
were asked to forget. Each participant was informed that this was a contest 
and the participant recalling and recognizing the most items would win a 
prize, and was encouraged to remember as many items as possible.  
Statistical analysis 
The analysis of DF paradigms in the literature has been mostly con-
ducted separately for Cost (conditions R1 vs. F1) and for Benefits (conditions 
R2 vs. R3), and this example was followed in this study too. Therefore, two 
main analyses were planned to performed: (1) 2 (Group: young vs. older) x 2 
(Item type: unimanual vs. bimanual vs. unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 (Cost condi-
tions: R1 vs. F1), and (2) 2 (Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item type: uniman-
ual vs. bimanual vs. unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 (Benefit conditions: R2 vs. R3) 
on recall and on recognition scores. These two main analyses were also 
planned to be performed for recognition data.  
Before these analyses on recall data, however, it was important to en-
sure that the two main items categories, manual (i.e. unimanual and bimanu-
al) and pedal (i.e. unipedal and bipedal), were equally recalled and that there 
were no recall differences due to the nature of the actions presented, so that 
the sub-categories (e.g. unimanual) could be safely compared. For this, a 
preliminary 2 (Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item type: manual vs. pedal) 
analysis across all conditions was performed. Data were not normally distrib-
uted (Shapiro-Wilk p < .000), hence all analyses were non-parametric. All 
figures were presented using parametric data (means and standard errors) 
for illustrative reasons. The equivalent non-parametric figures can be found 
in Appendix K. 
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Results 
Preliminary analysis on recall data 
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant main effect of Group (Z 
= -5.672, p < .000), with younger participants recalling more items (Mdn = 9) 
than the older ones (Mdn = 6). A Wilcoxon signed rank test also found a sig-
nificant main effect of Item type (Z = -7.335, p < .000), with pedal items being 
recalled better (Mdn = 9), compared to manual items (Mdn = 6). 
The interaction between group and Item type was examined by calcu-
lating the difference between manual and pedal items, and comparing it be-
tween groups. A Mann-Whitney test found no significant interaction (Z = -
1.281, p = 0.2). 
The results show that manual and pedal items were significantly more 
recalled than manual ones. The lack of interaction between groups and item 
type suggests that this differential memory cannot be attributed to group dif-
ferences between old and young adults. The findings suggest that there is a 
possibility that pedal items are overall more memorable than manual ones, 
for reasons not controlled in this experiment. Hence, no direct comparisons 
between them could be made, and therefore separate pedal and manual 
analyses were performed. 
Cost analysis on manual recall data [(Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item type: 
unimanual vs. bimanual) x 2 (Condition: R1 vs. F1) design].  
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant main effect of Group (Z 
= -3.924, p < .000), with young participants recalling more items than older 
ones. A Wilcoxon signed rank test also found a significant main effect of item 
type (Z = -2.959, p = 0.003), with more bimanual (Mdn = 1) than unimanual 
(Mdn = 0) items being recalled. Lastly, a Wilcoxon signed rank test found a 
significant main effect of condition (i.e. DF cost) (Z = -6.374, p < .000), with 
more items from R1 condition (Mdn = 1) than from F1 condition (Mdn = 0) 
being recalled.  
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The interaction between Item type and condition was examined, by 
calculating the differential scores between R1 and F1 conditions, and be-
tween unimanual and bimanual items, and comparing the two differential 
scores between them. A Wilcoxon signed rank test found a significant inter-
action (Z = -5.389, p < .000). Subsequent Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) 
post-hoc analyses revealed that in the R1 condition, more bimanual (Mdn = 
1) than unimanual items were recalled (Mdn = 1) (Z = -2.861, p = 0.004). In 
the F1 condition, however, there was no significant difference between the 
number of unimanual and bimanual items recalled (Z = -1.194, p = 0.233). 
No significant interactions between group and item type (Z = -0.65, p = 
0.515), and group and condition (Z = -0.863, p = 0.388). Additionally, no sig-
nificant three-way interaction between group, item type and condition was 
found (Z = -0.973, p = 0.331) (Figure 7.3). 
 
Figure 7.3: Cost analysis on manual recall data (means and standard errors) 
 
Overall, main effects of Group, Item type and Conditions were found, 
with young participants recalling more items than the older ones, bimanual 
items being better recalled than unimanual ones and more items recalled 
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from the R1 than the F1 condition (i.e. cost effect of DF). Also, a significant 
interaction between item type and condition was found, with more bimanual 
than unimanual items recalled in R1 condition, but no difference in F1 condi-
tion. 
Benefit analysis on manual recall data [(Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item 
type: unimanual vs. bimanual) x 2 (Condition: R2 vs. R3)] 
A Mann-Whitney U test found a main effect of group (Z = -4.501, p < 
.000), with young participants recalling more items. A Wilcoxon test revealed 
a significant main effect of item type (Z = -4.126, p < .000), with more uni-
manual (Mdn = 1) than bimanual items (Mdn = 1) being recalled, while no 
main effect of condition was found (Z = -1.441, p = 0.149) (Figure 7.4). 
The interaction between item type and condition was analysed, by 
comparing the differential scores between item types and conditions. A Wil-
coxon signed rank test found a trend (Z = -1.917, p = 0.055). Bonferroni-
corrected (α = 0.025) post-hoc comparisons showed that in the R3 condition 
participants tended to recall significantly more unimanual items (Mdn = 1), 
than bimanual (Mdn = 0) (Z = -4.082, p < .000). No such tendency was found 
in the R2 condition (Z = -1.87, p = 0.063). 
No significant interactions were found between group and item type (Z 
= -0.280, p = 0.780), and group and condition (Z = -0.2, p = 0.842), or group, 
item type and condition (Z = -0.025, p = 0.98). 
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Figure 7.4: Benefit analysis on manual recall data (means and standard er-
rors) 
 
Overall, a main effect of Group was found, with young participants re-
calling more items than older ones. A main effect of item type was also 
found, with more unimanual than bimanual items recalled. Contrary to what 
was expected, no difference in recall was found between R3 and R3 condi-
tions, so the DF benefit effect was not present. A non-significant trend inter-
action was found between item type and condition, showing that in the R3 
condition participants tended to recall more unimanual than bimanual items. 
This tendency was not found in the R2 condition.  
Cost analysis on pedal recall data [(Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item type: 
unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 (Condition: R1 vs. F1)] 
A Mann-Whitney U test found a significant main effect of Group (Z = -
4.549, p = 0.000), with young participants recalling more items than the older 
ones. A Wilcoxon signed rank test also found a main effect of item type (Z = -
4.079, p < .000), with more bipedal (Mdn =1), than unipedal items (Mdn = 1) 
being recalled. A Wilcoxon signed rank test also found a main effect of condi-
tion (Z = -9.6, p < .000), with more items recalled in the R1 (Mdn = 2), than in 
the F1 condition (Mdn = 1) (Figure 7.5).  
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The interaction between item type and condition was examined by 
comparing the differential scores between item type and conditions. A Wil-
coxon signed rank test found a significant interaction (Z = -8.548, p < .000). 
Subsequent Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) post-hoc analyses revealed 
that in the R1 condition, participants recalled significantly more bipedal (Mdn 
= 2) than unipedal items (Mdn = 2) (Z = -2.685, p =0.007). Similarly, in the F1 
condition, participants were found to recall more bipedal (Mdn = 1) than 
unipedal items (Mdn = 0) (Z = -3.07, p =0.002). 
No significant interactions were found between group and item type (Z 
= -0.324, p = 0.746), group and condition (Z = -1.436, p = -.151), or group, 
item type and condition (Z = -0.894, p = 0.371) were found. 
 
Figure 7.5: Cost analysis on pedal recall data (means and standard errors) 
 
Overall, a main effect of group showed that young participants re-
called more items that the older ones. Additionally, a main effect of item type 
was found, with more bipedal than unipedal items recalled, and a main effect 
of condition confirmed the DF cost effect, with more items recalled in R1 than 
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in F1 condition. A significant interaction between item type and condition was 
found, with more bipedal than unipedal items recalled both in R1 and in F1 
conditions. 
Benefit analysis on pedal recall items [(Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item 
type: unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 (Condition: R2 vs. R3).  
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a main effect of group (Z = -4.449, p 
< .000), with young participants recalling more items than older ones. A Wil-
coxon signed rank test found a main effect of item type that approached sig-
nificance (Z = -1.917, p = 0.055), which showed that participants tended to 
recall more bipedal (Mdn = 1) than unipedal items (Mdn = 1). No main effect 
of condition was found (Z = -0.887, p = 0.375).  
The interaction between group and item type was analysed by com-
paring the differential scores of item type between groups. An interaction that 
approached significance was found (Z = -1.802, p = 0.072). Bonferroni-
corrected (α = 0.025) post-hoc analyses using a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
showed that young participants tended to recall more bipedal (Mdn = 2) than 
unipedal items (Mdn = 1) (Z = -2.586, p = 0.01). This was not found for older 
participants (Z = - 0.014, p = 0.989) No significant interactions between 
group and condition (Z = -0.901, p = 0.368), item type and condition (Z = -
0.949, p = 0.343), or between group, item type and condition (Z = -0.580, p = 
0.560) were found (Figure 7.6).  
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Figure 7.6: Benefit analysis on pedal recall data (means and standard er-
rors) 
 
A main effect of group was found, with young participants recalling 
more items than older participants. A non-significant, trend main effect of 
item type was also found, with participants tending to recall more bipedal 
than unipedal items. However, no main effect of condition was found, hence 
the DF benefit effect was not established. In addition, a non-significant trend 
interaction between group and item type was found, showing a tendency of 
young participants to recall more bipedal than unipedal items, and but no 
such tendency in older participants. 
Cost analysis on manual recognition data [(Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item 
type: unimanual vs. bimanual) x 2 (Condition: R1 vs. F1) design].  
 A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a main effect of group (Z = -2.307, p 
= 0.021), with young participants recognizing more items than the older 
ones. A Wilcoxon signed rank test found a main effect of item type (Z = -
5.780, p < .000), with more bimanual items being recognised (Mdn = 2), 
compared to unimanual (Mdn = 2). No main effect of condition was found (Z 
= -1.151, p = 0.25). 
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The interaction between group and item type was analysed by com-
paring the differential score between R1 and F1 conditions, and comparing it 
between groups. A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant interaction (Z 
= -2.680, p = 0.007). Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) post-hoc analyses us-
ing a Wilcoxon signed rank test showed that young participants recognised 
more bimanual (Mdn = 2), than unimanual items (Mdn = 2) (Z = -3.024, p = 
0.002). Similarly, older participants recognised more bimanual (Mdn = 2), 
than unimanual items (Mdn = 2) (Z = -4.883, p < .000). Additionally, the in-
teraction between item type and condition was examined, by comparing the 
item type and condition differential scores. A Wilcoxon signed rank test re-
vealed a significant interaction (Z = -2.853, p = 0.004). Bonferroni-corrected 
(α = 0.025) post-hoc analyses showed that in R1 condition, more bimanual 
(Mdn=2) than unimanual items (Mdn=2) were recognised (Z = -5.139, p < 
.000). It was also found that in F1 condition, more bimanual items (Mdn=2) 
than unimanual (Mdn=2) were recognised (Z = -3.136, p = 0.002). No signifi-
cant interaction between group and condition was found (Z = -0.309, p = 
0.758). 
The interaction between group, item type and condition was investi-
gated. A differential score between the item type differential and the condi-
tion differential was compared between groups. A Mann-Whitney U test re-
vealed an interaction that approached significance (Z = -1.741, p = 0.082). 
Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) post-hoc analyses were performed, compar-
ing the item type differential between conditions R1 and F1, in the AHP 
group. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test found no significant difference (Z = -1, p 
= 0.317). The same analysis for the HP group also found no significant result 
(Z = -0.333, p = 0.739).  
Although no findings were expected in the recognition analyses, a 
main effect of group was found, with young participants recognizing more 
items than the older ones, while also a main effect of item type was found, 
with more bimanual than unimanual items being recognised. A significant in-
teraction between group and item type was also found, with both groups rec-
ognizing more bimanual than unimanual items. The interaction between item 
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type and condition was also found to be significant, with more bimanual than 
unimanual items being recognised in both R1 and F1 conditions, but no sub-
sequent differences. Lastly, a non-significant trend three-way interaction was 
found. 
Benefit analysis on manual recognition data [(Group: young vs. older) x 2 
(Item type: unimanual vs. bimanual) x 2 (Condition: R2 vs. R3)] 
As expected, no main effect of group (Z = -1.619, p = 0.106), item 
type (Z = -1.357, p = 0.175), and condition (Z = -1.493, p = 0.135) was found. 
Also, no significant interactions between group and item type (Z = -1.384, p = 
0.166), group and condition (Z = -0.924, p = 0.356), item type and condition 
(Z = -1.614, p = 0.107), and group, item type and condition were found (Z = -
0.826, p = 0.409). 
Cost analysis on pedal recognition data [(Group: young vs. older) x 2 (Item 
type: unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 (Condition: R1 vs. F1)] 
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant effect of group (Z = -
3.232, p = 0.001), with young participants recognizing significantly more 
items, than the older ones. Also, a Wilcoxon signed rank test found a main 
effect of condition (Z = -1.982, p = 0.047), with more items being recognised 
in the R1 (Mdn = 2), than in F1 condition (Mdn = 2). No main effect of item 
type (Z = -1.005, p = 0.315) was found. 
The interaction between group and condition was analysed by com-
paring the condition differential score between groups. A Mann-Whitney U 
test revealed a significant interaction (Z = -2.069, p = 0.039). Bonferroni-
corrected (α = 0.025) post-hoc analyses showed no difference in the number 
of items that young participants recognised from the R1 and from the F1 
condition (Z = 0, p = 1). However, older participants recognised more data 
items from R1 (Mdn = 2) than from F1 condition (Mdn = 2) (Z = -2.263, p = 
0.024). No significant interaction between group and item type (Z = 1.585, p 
= 0.113), and item type and condition (Z = -1.625, p = 0.104) was found. A
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ditionally, no significant interaction between group, item type and condition 
was found (Z = -0.511, p = 0.609). 
Overall, a main effect of group was found, according to which young 
participants recognised more items than older ones, while a main effect of 
condition was also found, with more items being recognised in the R1 than in 
the F1 condition, suggesting the existence of a DF cost effect in recognition. 
A significant interaction between group and condition was found, revealing 
that in young participants, no difference was found in the number of items 
recalled between R1 and F1, whereas in older participants more items were 
recognised from the R1 than the F1 condition. 
Benefit analysis on pedal recognition items [(Group: young vs. older) x 2 
(Item type: unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 (Condition: R2 vs. R3).  
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a main effect of group that ap-
proached significance (Z = -1.818, p = 0.069), with young participants having 
the tendency to recognise more items, compared to older participants. In ad-
dition, a Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed a main effect of condition, that 
approached significance (Z = -1.893, p = 0.058), revealing the tendency of 
participants to recognise more items from R2 (Mdn = 2), than from R3 condi-
tion (Mdn=2). No main effect of item type was found (Z = -0.164, p = 0.869).  
No significant interaction between group and item type (Z = -0.357, p 
= 0.721), group and condition (Z = -1.609, p = 0.108), and item type and 
condition (Z = -1.209, p =0.227) was found. No significant interaction be-
tween group, item type and condition was found (Z = -0.781, p = 0.435). 
Overall, a non-significant trend main effect of group found that young-
er participants had the tendency to recognise more items than the older 
ones, and a non-significant trend main effect of condition showed that partic-
ipants tended to recognise more items from R2 than from R3 condition. 
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Discussion 
The aim of this pilot study was to investigate the performance of 
young and older adults in a novel version of the DF paradigm. Five main hy-
potheses were formulated. The two first hypotheses predicted that, for both 
groups, the DF cost and benefit effects would be found, according to which 
more items would be recalled from R1 compared to R2, and from R3 com-
pared to F1. It was also hypothesised that younger participants would recall 
more items compared to older participants, and that recall in both groups 
would not be affected by item type. Lastly, it was predicted that none of these 
effects would be found in the recognition parts of the task. The results con-
firm some, but not all of these hypotheses.  
To begin with, a preliminary analysis on the data revealed that overall 
more pedal than manual items were recalled in the task. This finding could 
be attributed to familiarity issues, as pedal items could possibly be more or 
less familiar in everyday life, and given the fact that participants were re-
quired to imagine themselves performing the action they saw, this could lead 
to differential recall. Regarding the first two hypotheses, results on the DF 
cost and benefit effects were conflicting. Although the cost effect was found 
in both manual and pedal analyses, no benefit effect was found in any of the 
analyses. Also, as expected in the second hypothesis, it was found that 
young participants recalled more items than older ones. However, the hy-
pothesis that all item types would be similarly recalled was not confirmed. In 
the cost analysis of manual items, more bimanual than unimanual items were 
found to be recalled, and item type was found to have an effect on condition. 
More specifically, it was found that more bimanual than unimanual items 
were recalled in the R1 condition, while no difference was found in the F1 
condition. This of course may be explained by the fact that only few items 
were recalled in the latter condition. On the contrary, in the benefit analysis 
of manual items, it was found that more unimanual than bimanual items were 
recalled, and a significant effect of item type on condition revealed that more 
unimanual items were recalled in R3 condition, but no difference in item type 
recalled was found in R2 condition, which however could be explained as 
above. Regarding pedal items, in the cost effect analysis it was found that 
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more bipedal than unipedal items were recalled, and a significant effect of 
item type on condition showed that more bipedal items were recalled in both 
R1 and F1 conditions. In the benefit analysis of pedal items, a non-significant 
trend was identified, indicating that more bipedal than unipedal items were 
recalled. An effect of group on the item type recalled was also found. Taken 
together, these results suggest a differential memory for item types, which, 
however, is not consistent throughout the task conditions; in other words, dif-
ferent item types are preferentially recalled in different conditions. As men-
tioned above, a possible explanation for this finding could be different famili-
arity levels of the items, both between manual and pedal categories, but also 
within the categories.  
Lastly, with regards to recognition scores, the results did not support 
the fifth hypothesis. Firstly, contrary to the literature (Sahakyan, et al., 2009) 
the DF cost effect was found in the cost pedal analysis, and a group effect on 
condition showed that this effect was only present in the older participants. 
No other DF effects were found. Additionally, young participants, in relation 
to older ones, were found to recognise more items in the cost effect analysis 
for manual and for pedal items. The same result was also found as a non-
significant trend in the benefit pedal analysis. Similar to the recall analyses, 
in the cost manual analysis more bimanual items were recognised, and an 
effect of item type on condition showed that this differential recognition was 
evident both in R1 and in F1 conditions. However, unlike in the recall analy-
sis, group was found to have an effect on item type recognition, with both 
young and older participants recognizing more bimanual than unimanual 
items. Lastly, in the benefit effect analysis for pedal items we found a non-
significant trend suggesting that more items were recognised from R2 than 
from R3 condition. 
Together, these results had important implications for the hypotheses 
and the predictions for the clinical study. Firstly, younger participants were 
found to systematically recall more items in comparison to older participants. 
Accordingly, it is expected that the stroke population, typically of similar age 
to the older participants of the pilot study and possibly with additional 
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memory deficits due to their neurological condition, would perform similarly 
or worse than the older participants. It is also probable that the performance 
of the stroke population will be low enough to make it difficult for any effects 
to reveal. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the pilot study found that 
healthy participants of both groups showed differential recall for the different 
item categories, both for the sub-categories (bimanual, bipedal, etc.), but al-
so for the two main categories of the study, manual and pedal items. The 
same differences should be expected in the clinical study and therefore the 
same exploratory analyses for the main items categories (manual, pedal) 
were performed, and any effects of item category on memory on the stroke 
population were interpreted with caution.  
7.3. Clinical study 
7.3.1. Participants 
Twenty-five adult neurological patients were recruited were recruited 
for the study, using the process and inclusion criteria described in Chapter 2.  
Patients were divided into two groups, AHP and HP, according to their 
clinical diagnosis of AHP based on Bisiach (1986) interview, and in all cases 
confirmed by Feinberg et al. (2000) questionnaire (see Chapter 2). Eight pa-
tients were classified as AHP (four females, mean age = 67.75 years, SD = 
14.04, age range 51 to 81 years) and 17 as HP controls (six females, mean 
age = 55.65 years, SD = 13.38, age range 44 to 81 years). 
7.3.2. Neuropsychological and neurological assessment  
In addition to the above AHP assessments, patients were also as-
sessed using the neuropsychological tests outlined in Chapter 2. Specifically, 
the following domains were assessed: motor strength of upper and lower 
limb; personal and extrapersonal neglect; mood; working and long term 
memory; general cognitive functioning; sensory examination; and orientation.  
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7.3.3. Experimental study design and statistical analyses 
The design of this study was identical to pilot study 2 (see above). As 
in pilot study 2, two main analyses were performed: (1) 2 (Group: AHP vs. 
HP) x 2 (Item type: unimanual vs. bimanual vs. unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 
(Costs: R1 vs. F1); and (2) 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Item type: unimanual 
vs. bimanual vs. unipedal vs. bipedal) x 2 (Benefits: R2 vs. R3) on recall and 
on recognition scores. Before conducting these analyses, however, a 2 
(Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Item type: manual vs. pedal) analysis across all 
conditions was performed, to ensure equal recall for manual and pedal items. 
In case of differential recall for the two categories, each of the two aforemen-
tioned main analyses would be performed separately for manual and for pe-
dal items. The same analyses were performed for recall data. Data were not 
normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk p < .000) therefore non-parametric anal-
yses were used. All figures were presented using parametric data (means 
and standard errors) for illustrative reasons. The equivalent non-parametric 
figures can be found in Appendix L. 
7.3.4. Materials and procedures 
For this task, the same materials and procedure (see Figure 7.1) as in 
the pilot study 2 were used. The procedure was also the same as in the pilot 
study 2 (see above). In this study, however, patients were tested at the bed-
side and at the beginning of the task, when presenting the Example list, the 
examiner ensured that the patient could properly see the items and, if neces-
sary, would move closer to the patient, or more into the patient’s right visual 
field to control for neglect. 
7.4. Results 
7.4.1. Demographics and neuropsychological results 
Patients’ demographic characteristics and performance on the stand-
ardised neuropsychological tests is summarised in Table 7.1. To control for 
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multiple comparisons, the significance level was set to p < 0.01. The AHP 
and HP groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, years of education, 
days of onset before first assessment, or motor deficits. As expected, AHP 
patients were found to have higher awareness scores in Bisiach (Z = -4.424, 
p < .000) and Feinberg assessments (Z = -3.844, p < .000). No difference 
was found in cognitive function, memory, mood or apraxia. The groups were 
found to have a trend difference in their performance in line cancellation (left) 
(Z = - 2.347, p = 0.019) and in line bisection (centre) (Z = -2.544, p = 0.011), 
with AHP patients having the tendency to perform worse than HP. Similarly, 
the two groups had significant difference in star cancellation (right) (Z = -
2.567, p = 0.01), and line bisection (left) (Z = -2.544, p = 0.004), with AHP 
patients performing worse. 
In addition, no differences in tactile perception were found between 
the two groups using the Nottingham Sensory Assessment (see Table 7.2). 
Tactile localisation and bilateral simultaneous touch subtests were not in-
cluded in the analysis, as the less than 40% of participants completed them. 
Completion of these two subtests required intact performance on the pres-
sure subtest (see Chapter 2), on which both groups had deficits, and there-
fore insufficient data were gathered. The proprioception subtest was also not 
included in the analyses, as too few participants had completed it.  
 
Table 7.1: Groups’ demographic characteristics and neuropsychological pro-
file 
 AHP   HP   Mann-Whitney   
  Median IQR   Median IQR   Z p   
Age (years) 74.00 22.25  53.00 18.00  -1.779 0.075  
Education (years) 16.00 4.00  16.00 3.00  0.000 1.000  
Days from onset 2.00 2.50  5.00 23.50  -1.384 0.166  
MRC left upper 
limb 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.462 0.644  
MRC left lower limb 0.00 1.50  0.00 2.00  -0.956 0.339  
Bisiach awareness 
interview 
3.00 0.75  0.00 0.00  -4.424 0.000*  
Feinberg aware-
ness interview 
7.25 7.25  1.00 2.00  -3.844 0.000*  
Orientation 3.00 1.00  3.00 0.00  -1.797 0.072  
Digit span forwards 11.00 1.75  10.00 3.50  -1.003 0.316  
Digit span back-
wards 
6.50 2.75  5.00 3.75  -0.989 0.323  
MOCA memory 3.00 2.50  3.50 3.00  -0.944 0.345  
MOCA (Total) 19.30 6.73  24.00 4.00  -2.240 0.025*  
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Comb/razor test 
neglect 
-30.68 51.30  -14.71 24.04  -1.014 0.311  
Bisiach one item 
test 
0.00 0.50  0.00 0.50  -0.271 0.786  
Bisiach one item 
test 
0.00 1.50  0.00 0.00  -1.590 0.112  
Line cancellation 
right 
16.50 7.50  18.00 1.00  -1.889 0.059  
Line cancellation 
left 
0.50 14.50  18.00 1.00  -2.347 0.019*  
Star cancellation 
right (cancella-
tions) 
21.00 11.75  27.00 0.00  -2.567 0.01*  
Star cancellation 
left (cancellations) 
5.00 10.75  27.00 26.00  -1.600 0.110  
Line bisection right 3.00 3.00  3.00 0.50  -1.279 0.201  
Line bisection cen-
tre 
0.00 2.00  3.00 1.00  -2.544 0.011*  
Line bisection left 0.00 0.00  3.00 1.50  -2.848 0.004*  
HADS depression 4.00 5.00  5.00 6.00  -1.509 0.131  
HADS anxiety 7.00 1.00  5.00 5.00  -0.534 0.593  
Apraxia total score 7.00 0.00  7.00 0.38  -1.164 0.245  
                 
MRC = Medical Research Council (Guarantors of Brain, 1986); MOCA = The Montreal Cog-
nitive Assessment (Nasreddine, 2005); Comb/razor test = assessment of personal neglect; 
line crossing, star cancellation, copy & representational drawing = conventional subtests of 
Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson, et al., 1987); FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (Du-
bois, et al., 2000); HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983). The number of participants in each test varies, but is always equal or more than 40% 
of the sample size. 
*Significant difference between groups, p < 0.01. 
Table 7.2: Groups’ Nottingham Sensory Assessment scores 
  AHP  HP  Mann-Whitney 
  Median IQR  Median IQR  Z p 
ELBOW 
Light Touch 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.980 0.922 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.866 0.386 
Pressure 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 2.00 
 
-0.628 0.530 
          
WRIST 
Light Touch 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 1.00 
 
-0.663 0.507 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.866 0.386 
Pressure 0.00 1.50 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.500 0.617 
          
HAND 
Light Touch 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 2.00 
 
-0.750 0.453 
Pinprick 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.866 0.386 
Pressure 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.980 0.922 
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7.4.2. Main experimental results 
Preliminary analysis 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed a main effect of item type (Z = -
2.040, p = 0.041), with more pedal items (Mdn = 3) being recalled, compared 
to manual items (Mdn=2). No main effect of group was found (Z = -1.508, p = 
0.131). No significant interaction between group and item type was found (Z 
= -1.253, p = 0.21). 
As in the pilot study, a preliminary analysis was conducted to establish 
that manual and pedal items were similarly recalled, so that they could be 
safely compared. However, again as in the pilot study, pedal items were 
found to be better recalled than manual ones, therefore separate analyses 
were performed for the two items categories. 
Cost analysis on manual recall data [2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (condition: 
R1 vs. F1) x 2 (Item type: Unimanual vs. Bimanual)] 
Contrary to what was expected, no main effects of group (Z = -0.389, 
p = 0.697), item type (Z = -1.233, p = 0.218) or condition (i.e. DF cost) (Z = -
0.671, p = 0.502) were found. Additionally, no significant two-way interac-
tions between group and item type (Z = -0.176, p = 0.861), group and condi-
tion (Z= -0.734, p = 0.463), item type and condition (Z = -0.434, p = 0.665), 
or 3-way interaction between group, item type and condition were found (Z = 
-0.488, p = 0.625) (Figure 7.7) 
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Figure 7.7: Cost analysis on manual recall data (means and standard errors) 
Benefit analysis on manual recall data [2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (condition: 
R2 vs. R3) x 2 (Item type: Unimanual vs. Bimanual) 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed a main effect of item type (Z= -
4.105, p < .000), with more unimanual (Mdn = 1) than bimanual (Mdn = 0,). 
No main effects of group (Z = -0.270, p = 0.787) and condition (Z = -1.615, p 
= 0.106) were found. The interaction between item type and condition was 
analysed by comparing the differential score of the condition, and comparing 
it between conditions. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test found a significant inter-
action (Z = -2.319, p = 0.02) (Figure 7.8). Bonferroni-corrected (α = 0.025) 
post-hoc comparisons showed that in the R2 condition, significantly more 
unimanual (Mdn = 1) than bimanual items (Mdn = 0) were recalled (Z = -
3.504, p = 0.000). In the R3 condition, a trend was found (Z = -2.230, p = 
0.026), meaning that in R3 condition, there was a tendency for more uni-
manual (Mdn=1) than bimanual items (Mdn=0) to be recalled. No significant 
interactions were found between group and item type (Z = -1.586, p = 0.113) 
and group and condition (Z = -1.318, p = 0.187). Moreover, the three-way 
interaction between group, item type and condition was not significant (Z = -
0.032, p = 0.974).  
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Figure 7.8: Benefit analysis on manual recall data (means and standard er-
rors) 
In summary, in relation to manual data, no DF costs and benefit ef-
fects were found, contrary to what was expected. In the cost analysis, no 
significant results were found. In the benefits analysis, it was found that more 
unimanual than bimanual items were recalled. Additionally, an interaction be-
tween item type and condition revealed that in the R2 condition more uni-
manual than bimanual items were recalled. In the R3 condition, the same 
tendency was found but results were non-significant. 
Cost analysis on pedal recall data [2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (condition: R1 
vs. F1) x 2 (Item type: Unipedal vs. Bipedal). 
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a main effect of group (Z = -2.358, p 
= 0.018), with HP recalling more items than AHP. A Wilcoxon signed rank 
test found a main effect of condition (i.e. DF cost) (Z = -2.617, p = 0.009), 
with more items being recalled in R1 (Mdn = 1), than in F1 condition (Mdn = 
0). No main effect of item type was found (Z= -1.08, p = 0.277). The interac-
tion between item type and condition was analysed by comparing the differ-
ential scores between the two levels of each variable. A Wilcoxon signed 
rank test showed a significant interaction (Z = -2.03, p = 0.04) (Figure 7.9). 
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Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons (a = 0.025) found no significant 
difference in the number of unipedal compared to bipedal items recalled in 
R1 (Z = -1.291, p = 0.197), or in F1 conditions (Z = -1.01, p = 0.310). No sig-
nificant interactions between group and item type (Z = -1.261, p = 0.207), 
and group and condition (Z = -0.308, p=0.758) were found. The tree-way in-
teraction between group, item type and condition was also not significant (Z 
= -0.449, p = 0.653) (Figure 7.9). 
 
Figure 7.9: Cost analysis on pedal recall data (means and standard errors) 
Benefit analysis on pedal recall data [2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (condition: 
R2 vs. R3) x 2 (Item type: Unipedal vs. Bipedal)]. 
A Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed a main effect of item type that 
approached significance (Z = -1.723, p = 0.085), which showed that partici-
pants tended to recall more bipedal (Mdn = 1) than unipedal (Mdn = 1) items. 
No main effects of group (Z = -1.319, p = 0.187) and condition (i.e. DF bene-
fit) (Z = -1.345, p = 0.179) were found. No significant interactions between 
group and item type (Z = -0.967, p = 0.33), group and condition (Z = -0.324, 
p = 0.746), and item type and condition (Z = -0.297, p = 0.767) were found. 
In addition, no significant interaction between group, item type and condition 
was found (Z = -0.948, p = 0.343) (Figure 7.10).  
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Figure 7.10: Benefit analysis on pedal recall data (means and standard er-
rors) 
Together, results on pedal data revealed that the DF cost effect was 
found, but the DF benefit was not. In the cost analysis, a main effect of group 
was also found, with HP patients recalling more items than AHP. Moreover, a 
significant interaction between item type and condition was found, but with-
out significant pairwise comparisons. Regarding the benefit analysis, a non-
significant trend main effect of item type was found, which showed that par-
ticipants had the tendency to recall more bipedal than unipedal items. 
Cost analysis on manual recognition data [2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (condi-
tion: R1 vs. F1) x 2 (Item type: unimanual vs. bimanual)]. 
As expected, no significant main effects of group (Z = -0.450, p = 
0.653), item type (Z = -0.229, p = 0.819) or condition (Z = -0.258, p = 0.796) 
were found. In addition, no interactions between group and item type (Z = -
0.598, p = 0.550), group and condition (Z = -1.271, p = 0.204), item type and 
condition (Z = -0.229, p = 0.819), or between group, item type and condition 
were found (Z = -0.297, p = 0.767). 
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Benefit analysis on manual recognition data [2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 
(condition: R2 vs. R3) x 2 (Item type: Unimanual vs. Bimanual)]. 
As above, no main effects of group (Z = -1.013, p = 0.311), item type 
(Z = -1.265, p = 0.206) and condition (Z = -5.77, p = 0.564) were found. Also, 
no interactions between group and item type (Z = -1.12, p = 0.911), group 
and condition (Z = -0.284, p = 0.776), item type and condition (Z = -1.151, p 
= 0.25), or between group, item type and condition was found (Z = -0.217, p 
= 0.828).  
Costs analysis on pedal recognition data [2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (condi-
tion: R1 vs. F1) x 2 (Item type: Unipedal vs. Bipedal). 
A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a main effect of group that ap-
proached significance (Z = -2.634, p = 0.088), with HP group recognizing 
more items (median = 2) than AHP (median = 2). No main effects of item 
type (Z = -0.812, p = 0.417) and condition (Z = -0.277, p = 0.782) were 
found. Additionally, no significant interactions between group and item type 
(Z = -0.517, p = 0.605), group and condition (Z = -1.057, p = 0.291), item 
type and condition (Z = -0.06, p = 0.953), and group, item type and condition 
were found (Z = -0.429, p = 0.668). 
Benefit analysis on pedal recognition data [2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (condi-
tion: R2 vs. R3) x 2 (Item type: Unipedal vs. Bipedal)]. 
As expected, no main effects of group (Z = -1.452, p = 0.147), item 
type (Z = -0.378, p =0.705) and condition (Z = -0.656, p = 0.512) were found, 
and no interactions between group and item type (Z = -0.24, p =0.81), group 
and condition (Z = -0.914, p = 0.361), item type and condition (Z = -0.839, p 
= 0.839), or group, item type and condition were found (Z = -0.806, p = 
0.420). 
Overall, and as expected, recognition data yielded no significant re-
sults, with the exception of the cost analysis on pedal items, where a main 
effect of group was found, with HP patients recognizing more items in rela-
tion to the AHP group.  
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7.5. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate unconscious forgetting (re-
pression) in AHP, using a novel version of the classic DF paradigm. Four 
main hypotheses were developed. Firstly, the DF cost and benefit effects 
were expected in the recall conditions in both groups. Also, given the claim of 
the present study that AHP patients would unconsciously forget more actions 
they cannot perform, compared to those they can, it was expected that ano-
sognosic patients in relation to HP would recall more unilateral than bilateral 
items in the F1 condition. Lastly, no effect of groups, item types and condi-
tions was expected in the recognition analyses. Data from stroke patients 
were also compared to those of healthy controls in the same task, in order to 
identify differences in performance selective for AHP. 
Similar to the pilot, the clinical study found that overall more pedal 
than manual items were recalled. As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, it 
could not be excluded that this differential recall was due to familiarity differ-
ences between the pedal and manual actions used in the task, and therefore 
separate main analyses were performed for manual and pedal actions for 
cost and benefit effects, for recall and recognition conditions. Secondly, con-
trary to what was expected, the standard DF findings on recall data were not 
replicated and only the DF cost effect on pedal items was found, while in the 
pilot study only the DF cost effect was found for manual and pedal items. 
These results are not consistent with the existing literature on the task (e.g. 
Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993), according to which, the DF costs and 
benefits should have been elicited by both manual and pedal items in both 
studies. The discrepancy between the two studies regarding the DF effect on 
manual items could be attributed to a combination of smaller sample size of 
the clinical study, worse memory performance of stroke patients due to neu-
ropathology, and the fact that more pedal items were recalled overall. Hence, 
there might not have been enough strength in the study to allow the DF cost 
to manifest in the clinical study. The puzzling lack of benefit effects in both 
studies could be due to differential recall for the different item categories, 
discussed below. Regarding recognition, contrary to expectations, the cost 
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effect analysis on pedal items found that HP patients recognised more items, 
compared to AHP. However, unlike the pilot study, no other results on 
recognition were found.  
Examining the main hypothesis, findings did not support the hypothe-
sis that AHP patients would forget more bilateral, than unilateral items. Spe-
cifically, with regards to manual items, no results of significance were found 
in the cost analysis, unlike the pilot study, where more bimanual than uni-
manual items were recalled, especially in R1 condition. In the benefit analy-
sis, more unimanual than bimanual items were recalled, and a significant in-
teraction of item type and condition showed that in R2 condition more uni-
manual than bimanual items were recalled. This direction was also present in 
R3, but as a non-significant trend. These results are similar to the pilot study, 
although a tendency to recall more unimanual than bimanual items was 
found in the R3 condition only. Regarding pedal items, in the cost analysis it 
was revealed that HP patients recalled overall more items than AHP patients. 
Moreover, a significant interaction of item type on condition was found, but 
without any significant pairwise comparisons. No difference in the item types 
recalled was found, contrary to the pilot study, where, in both R1 and F1 
conditions, more bipedal than unipedal items were recalled. Lastly, the bene-
fit analysis found that more bipedal than unipedal items were recalled overall, 
a finding also consistent with the pilot study. Taken together, results regard-
ing the type of items recalled were relatively consistent between the two 
studies, with discrepancies, as above, possibly due to the differences in 
sample size. Interestingly, however, no item laterality (e.g. unimanual vs. bi-
manual) was consistently found to be more (or less) recalled throughout both 
studies, suggesting a different recall procedure not only for pedal and manu-
al items, as explained before, but also for bilateral and unilateral actions. 
To the investigator’s knowledge, this was the first study to systemati-
cally investigate memory repression in AHP. However, the list-method of the 
DF task has been previously used to investigate repression in people with 
traumatic experiences (e.g. childhood sexual abuse), typically expected to 
dissociate from unpleasant (trauma-related) memories and therefore to re-
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press them (see Geraerts, & McNally, 2008 for review). Several studies have 
consistently shown that trauma survivors do not show superior inhibition of 
trauma-related words (Devilly, et al., 2007; Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic, 
Merckelbach, & van Heerden, 2006; McNally, Clancy, Barrett, & Parker, 
2004; McNally, Ristuccia, & Perlman, 2005), however a number of investiga-
tions have also shown otherwise (DePrince, & Freyd, 2004; Moulds, & Bry-
ant, 2005;), demonstrating that the findings on repression are far from con-
clusive. A DF study on repressors without traumatic experiences also found 
that they forgot more negative F (to-be-forgotten) words, than did nonre-
pressors (Myers, Brewin, & Power, 1998; see also Myers, & Derakshan, 
2004). In summary, there has been no consensus in the literature on whether 
repressors are more able than nonrepressors to inhibit negative (or trauma-
related) material more than positive. Along these lines, the results the study 
did not provide evidence for the existence of repression in AHP.  
 The present study had a number of limitations that need to be taken 
into account when interpreting the results. To begin with, the sample size 
was small, especially for a study aiming to identify unconscious memory pro-
cesses in a neurological population with already deteriorated memory per-
formance. In addition, the use of manual and pedal actions, unilateral and 
bilateral, most probably influenced and confounded the results, and the par-
ticipants’ performance, in the ways discussed above. Moreover, the lack of 
proper randomisation of the lists used in that different conditions (e.g. R1, 
R2, etc.), possibly affected the results by not distributing the bias introduced 
from the different action types in each list. Lastly, no prior assessments for 
implicit and explicit awareness were obtained, and such a distinction would 
have been important in interpreting the results.  
Overall, the study did not provide support to the hypothesis that AHP 
patients would repress recollection of actions they cannot perform, compared 
to the ones they can. However, investigating the possibility of repression in 
AHP patients remains an interesting and unanswered question. Future stud-
ies on this topic could improve on the limitations of the present study, and 
could also amending the content of the material presented to participants. 
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Specifically, it would be interesting to investigate forgetting for trauma-related 
words without action involved (e.g. the picture of a wheelchair) in comparison 
to neutral words irrelevant with illness and paralysis.  
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8. General Discussion 
8.1. Introduction 
The overall aim of the present thesis was to advance the current state 
of knowledge on how awareness is constructed and updated in Anosognosia 
for Hemiplegia (AHP). Based on experimental and clinical research on AHP, 
outlined in Chapter 1, as well as on a newly proposed theoretical account 
(Fotopoulou, 2014; 2015), this thesis has argued in favour of a new meth-
odological and theoretical approach to AHP. Specifically, it was suggested 
that a swift from modular, motor or cognitive, theories to a more dynamic 
model of bodily awareness is necessary. As discussed in Chapter 1, the pre-
sent thesis aimed to: (1) investigate the role of interoceptive and exterocep-
tive interaction in body awareness disorders; (2) investigate disruptions in 
inferential processes underlying AHP; and (3) investigate the contribution of 
emotion and cognition in motor awareness.  
The aims were achieved by combining experimental protocols and 
neuropsychological testing. A series of experimental group studies (Chapters 
3-7) were conducted to examine the aforementioned aims, using AHP pa-
tients and HP patients without anosognosia. Pilot studies with healthy con-
trols were also conducted, to provide validation and baseline performance for 
the tasks used in the studies, and additional comparison groups.  
In this final chapter, the experimental findings of all studies are re-
viewed collectively and interpreted in the context of a more dynamic account 
of motor awareness, integrating emotional and cognitive factors. Findings are 
then further discussed in relation to the construction of body awareness and 
bodily self. Moreover, future avenues of research, potential rehabilitation in-
sights and the limitations of the current thesis are also presented. 
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8.2. Review and interpretation of experimental findings 
8.2.1. Affective, self- and other touch on body awareness 
The contribution of affective touch as an interoceptive modality on 
body representation, including on the malleability of body ownership, has 
been consistently reported in previous studies (e.g. Crucianelli, et al., 2013). 
Similarly, self-touch has been found to increase sensory perception of the 
self-applied stimulus (e.g. Valentini, et al., 2008; Weiskrantz, & Zhang, 1987, 
but see also Blakemore, et al., 2000; Weiskrantz, et al., 1971), while more 
recent findings have also demonstrated its ability to affect body ownership 
(e.g. Van Stralen, et al., 2011). The study presented in Chapter 3 was the 
first to investigate how affective and self-generated touch, individually or in 
interaction, affect the two main domains of body awareness, body ownership 
and motor awareness. In the experimental task, self- and other-generated 
touch, at pleasant or neutral velocity, was applied on the right or left forearm, 
in right-hemisphere AHP and HP patients.  
In line with previous research (Valentini, et al., 2008; Weiskrantz, & 
Zhang, 1987; White, et al., 2010), the present study found the self-touch en-
hancement effect, that is touch was perceived as more intense when it was 
self-applied. When touch was applied on the left forearm, this effect was 
found in both pleasant and neutral velocities. However, when touch was ap-
plied on the right forearm, only AHP patients perceived it as more intense. 
Regarding pleasant touch, only anosognosic patients had the tendency to 
perceive it as more pleasant, and this result was not significant. With regards 
to the main experimental results (i.e. on Ownership and Motor Awareness 
scores) it was found that only the AHP group had the tendency to improve on 
body ownership, despite the fact that both groups had similar levels of DSO 
at the onset of the task.  Importantly, this improvement had the tendency to 
be mediated by affective, but not neutral touch, although this finding was not 
statistically significant. An interaction between Group, Instructed Agency and 
Velocity was also found but without any further significant comparisons. Re-
garding Motor Awareness, an interaction of Group and Velocity was found, 
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but without further significant findings. Here, an attempt to speculatively in-
terpret this interaction in the context of the study and the existing literature 
will be made. However, it should be clearly stated from the outset, that since 
no significant findings were found on Motor Awareness, this discussion is 
theoretical and merely exploratory, providing a clearer understanding of the 
findings and trends, in order to identify further avenues for exploration on the 
topic. Returning to the results on Motor Awareness (see Chapter 3, Figure 
3.4), it can be observed from the direction of the data that, in the AHP group, 
affective touch, compared to neutral touch, might lead to more improvement 
in Motor Awareness, although as mentioned above no such formal result was 
found. No results from the HP group were found (or expected) with regards 
to Motor Awareness, as the group did not have any symptoms of AHP. Also, 
findings on Ownership and Motor Awareness were specific for the left arm, 
as no DSO or AHP symptoms were present for the right arm in any of the 
groups. Moreover, as expected, affective and self-touch were not found to 
affect awareness of drawing neglect. Based on the above findings and the 
assumed direction of the data, it could be argued that improvement in Own-
ership and speculatively also in Motor Awareness, was modulated by affec-
tive touch, while there has been no indication that self-touch contributed to 
this process. These results and presumed directions described above seem 
to be in line with existing research findings on Interoception and body owner-
ship, discussed below.  
Affective touch, as a recently re-classified interoceptive modality, has 
been systematically and consistently found to have a crucial, facilitatory role 
in affecting body ownership. Studies have demonstrated that affective touch 
in the context of the rubber hand illusion has the potential to enhance the il-
lusion of the paradigm (Tsakiris, et al., 2011), while other studies specified 
that this enhancement of illusion was specific for the subjective (embodiment 
questionnaire) but not objective measure (proprioceptive drift) of the task 
(Crucianelli, et al., 2017; Crucianelli, et al., 2013; Lloyd, et al., 2013, but see 
Van Stralen, et al., 2014). Furthermore, Crucianelli et al (2013) demonstrated 
that applying affective touch during the rubber hand paradigm leads to higher 
levels of subjective body ownership.  Similarly, the (non-significant) findings 
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of the present study seem to suggest that affective touch improved body 
ownership on AHP patients, which, importantly, were the only group to per-
ceive pleasant touch as indeed more pleasant. Moreover, as discussed 
above, there was a presumed effect of affective touch on motor awareness, 
which however was inferred from the data and not based on findings. To the 
extent that ownership and motor awareness constitute the pillars of body 
awareness (Gallagher, 2000), the findings of this study (although inconclu-
sive) highlight the role of interoception, and specifically of affective touch, in 
constructing the embodied ‘self’ (Craig, 2009; Damasio, 1999). 
The term interoception, according to Craig (2002), refers to the affec-
tive feelings originating from within the body, sub-serving homeostatic pur-
poses, that is, representing a sense of the physiological condition of the 
body. Interoceptive inputs are mediated by a specialized pathway, separate 
from the ones mediating discriminatory exteroceptive inputs. This pathway 
converges signals from the body to the posterior insular cortex, where they 
integrate with exteroceptive signals, in a posterior-to-anterior fashion (Craig, 
2009; 2010). Interestingly, the role of the insula in AHP has been consistently 
replicated (see Besharati, et al., 2014; Fotopoulou, et al., 2010; Karnath, et 
al., 2005; Vocat, et al., 2010), possibly suggesting an impairment in the in-
teroceptive system. 
Moreover, the ability of AHP patients to perceive affective touch as 
more pleasant than neutral, and their improvement in terms of ownership and 
(possibly) awareness mediated by an interoceptive modality fail to provide 
evidence for interoceptive deficits in anosognosic patients (Fotopoulou, 
2015). The potentially beneficial effect of self-touch on disorders of owner-
ship and awareness, would be an important topic for future studies. Besides 
providing valuable knowledge about the construction of the feeling of ‘self’, 
studies on the topic could also examine the contribution of self-touch in re-
habilitation of AHP and DSO.  
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8.2.2. Belief updating processes in AHP  
Previous research has highlighted the apparent inability of the majority 
of AHP patients to use feedback to optimally update their beliefs and esti-
mates (e.g. Moro, et al., 2011; Vocat, et al., 2013). The study presented in 
Chapter 4 was the first to investigate how AHP patients update their prior be-
liefs based on newly available evidence, and the role of different levels of sa-
lience in this process. 
Before commencing with the clinical study, the present study first 
aimed to investigate, whether the belief updating deficits observed in AHP 
could be related to previous experimental findings in healthy participants 
suggesting that updating occurs less in response to unpleasant information. 
Specifically, previous studies (e.g. Sharot, et al., 2011) demonstrated that 
participants presented an asymmetrical pattern of update, responding less to 
undesirable than desirable information. The pilot study aimed to address the 
following question: could the deficits observed in AHP be the result of such 
asymmetrical updating, in response to the negative and highly unlikely 
events that anosognosic patients were experiencing (i.e. paralysis following 
stroke)? In the study, the updating pattern of healthy participants in response 
to highly likely and highly unlikely desirable and undesirable information was 
examined. The results revealed that participants updated their prior beliefs 
for all types of events, regardless of pleasantness or probability. It can there-
fore be concluded that AHP is not the result of a typical updating process in 
response to highly unlikely and unpleasant events. However, it should be 
noted that because of the study design, data analysis did not allow for further 
statistical comparisons that would allow the investigation of previous findings 
(Sharot, et al., 2011) 
Regarding the clinical study, at the onset of the task, patients were 
asked to assess the subjective importance of being able to perform three ac-
tions related to independent living (e.g. use cutlery to cut food). Patients 
were then requested to perform the motor actions and for each action they 
provided an estimate of their anticipated performance, pre-, during- and af-
ter-execution, and an estimate of how confident they were in their answers. 
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According to the results, no significant difference was found between the 
AHP and HP groups in terms of importance of actions, estimates of perfor-
mance, or confidence in their answers (precision). Overall, the study findings 
did not provide further evidence to the notion that AHP patients do not learn 
from their failures, that is, they do not update their beliefs in order to integrate 
new information (e.g. motor failures), while at the same time adhering to the 
existing ‘web’ of beliefs (Fotopoulou, 2014).  
The question of belief formation and updating inferences in AHP was 
further examined in Chapter 6. This study examined updating in the cognitive 
and emotion domains, from 1st and 3rd person perspective. Typically, as pre-
viously discussed, AHP patients present with deficits in belief formation on 
the cognitive domain (e.g. providing estimates about their performance). 
However, anosognosic patients have also been systematically found to dis-
play inappropriate emotional reactions, such as being overly cheerful 
(Gainotti, 1972). Moreover, differences in awareness between 1st and 3rd 
person perspectives in AHP patients are also well established in the litera-
ture of AHP (e.g. Fotopoulou, et al., 2009; Marcel, et al., 2004). The present 
study was the first to examine in parallel how cognition and emotion are up-
dated from the 1st and 3rd person perspectives, in AHP. In the experiment, 
patients performed a motor task separately with their left and right arm and 
were asked to provide cognitive and emotional estimates before and after 
each arm’s execution, from their own and the experimenter’s point of view. It 
was found that at the onset of the task, AHP patients were found to give 
more incorrect (i.e. anosognosic) responses, compared to HP that performed 
almost correctly. The results showed that anosognosic patients updated 
more than hemiplegic controls, and that there was a tendency to update 
overall more in the cognitive than in the emotion domain. Specifically, the 
AHP group was found to have the tendency to update more in the cognitive 
than emotion domain, although this difference was not significant. Moreover, 
single case analyses found that only two out of 18 patients showed differen-
tial deficits in emotion compared to cognition (i.e. a ‘classical dissociation’; 
see Crawford, Garthwaite, & Gray, 2003). No such difference was found for 
the HP group. In addition, it was found that regarding emotion, more update 
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tended to occur in the 1st, compared to the 3rd person perspective, although 
again the difference was not significant, and no such distinction was found 
for the cognitive domain. An interaction between domain, perspective and 
group was also found, but with no further significant comparisons. In the right 
arm (control) condition, no significant results were found.  
Taken together, both studies discussed above (Chapters 4 and 6) 
seem to suggest that in AHP, there is at least some degree of appropriate 
updating in the cognitive domain (e.g. what patients think happened regard-
ing their motor performance). It could be argued that the findings are not fun-
damentally different from previous studies that, although clearly demonstrat-
ing a belief-formation deficit in AHP, have nevertheless identified several pa-
tients that were able to update adequately (Vocat, et al., 2013; Moro et al., 
2011; Cocchini, et al., 2010; Marcel, et al., 2004). The findings together natu-
rally raise two questions: what, in these two studies, helped AHP patients 
update their cognitive beliefs, and why was cognitive domain better updated 
than emotion? With regards to the first question, the present thesis specula-
tively proposes that in the first study, updating of prior beliefs could have 
been attributed to increased salience of feedback. More specifically, it is be-
lieved that when patients were asked to reflect on the subjective importance 
of the action they were about to perform (and given that the actions were 
found to be indeed important to both groups) the inability of AHP patients to 
perform the task became more salient. In other words, the prediction error 
between their expectation (i.e. that they are able to perform the action) and 
their experience (i.e. they were not able to perform the action) became more 
salient, and able to modify their expectations. Regarding the second study, it 
is suggested that the requirement of the task to adopt another person’s per-
spective about the patients’ motor performance, contributed to their more 
correct (i.e. less anosognosic) cognitive answers post-execution. Specifically, 
at the onset of the task, AHP participants answered more incorrectly (i.e. 
anosognosic) than HP controls, both for 1st and 3rd person perspectives. 
However, it is speculated that since patients expected to be asked the same 
questions after the execution, they were ‘forced’ to consider the experiment-
er’s viewpoint throughout the task. In other words, they were ‘forced’ to con-
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sider the 3rd person perspective of the situation, which, consistently with pre-
vious studies, led to increased motor awareness both in the 1st and in the 3rd 
person perspective post-execution. Indeed, previous studies have demon-
strated the ability of AHP patients to better judge the severity of their hemi-
plegia when asked from a 3rd person perspective (Marcel, et al., 2004), and 
to become more aware of their motor as well as ownership deficits after vid-
eo playbacks (Besharati, et al., 2014; Fotopoulou, et al., 2009; Jenkinson, et 
al., 2013).  
On the other hand, results suggest that AHP patients did not update 
as well in the emotion domain as they did in the cognitive. Moreover, patients 
overall updated more in the emotional 1st than 3rd person perspective. In oth-
er words, AHP patients remained abnormally ‘happy’ throughout the task de-
spite the fact that they cognitively acknowledged their motor failure, as dis-
cussed above. This suggests an inappropriate emotion response, a finding 
that has also been established in previous studies. AHP patients have been 
found to be overly positive or optimistic about their prognosis and usually do 
not present with catastrophic reactions or depressive feelings (Orfei, et al., 
2007). However, when negative feelings are induced following experimental 
manipulation (Besharati, et al., 2014) or discussions of negative themes, un-
related to illness or paralysis, such as death or separation (Kaplan-Solms, & 
Solms, 2000), AHP patients gain temporary awareness of their motor defi-
cits. However, the difference in update between 1st and 3rd person perspec-
tive with regards to emotion has not been previously reported.  
In summary, this thesis has drawn on behavioural methods to explore 
differences in cognitive and emotion updating processes, from different 
visuo-spatial perspectives. It has been experimentally suggested (although 
not demonstrated on the basis of significant findings) that emotion and cogni-
tion could be updated differently, possibly also requiring different types of 
feedback in order to be updated.   
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8.2.3. Spontaneous perspective taking in AHP 
The ability in AHP to spontaneously adopt the 3rd person perspective 
was the focus of Chapter 5. Previous studies have shown that AHP patients 
seem to process information about their body differently from the 1st and the 
3rd person perspectives (e.g. Fotopoulou, et al., 2009; Marcel, et al., 2004). 
Despite the fact that they demonstrate increased awareness and more im-
provement in awareness from a 3rd person perspective, anosognosic patients 
seem unable to spontaneously adopt and use this perspective, unless specif-
ically instructed. Thus, the aim of this study was to investigate whether AHP 
patients were able to use social cues to spontaneously adopt another per-
son’s perspective, compared to HP patients and healthy controls. Additional-
ly, and in order to establish the validity of the task, as well as a baseline per-
formance, a pilot study was conducted with young and old healthy partici-
pants, using the same task as AHP patients. Participants were presented 
with a video of a person with two kinds of objects in front of them, in-between 
them and the viewer. The person in the video reached to the item closest to 
them, while looking at it congruently to the movement, incongruently, or not 
at all. Participants were asked about the relationship of one object to the oth-
er (front/back) and their response indicated which perspective they had as-
sumed. The results of the study showed a strong bias towards 1st person 
perspective, in both the clinical and importantly also the pilot studies. As out-
lined in Chapter 5, it is not unlikely that the results were confounded by the 
study limitations, however further interpretations are discussed. 
Before discussing the clinical study findings, it is important to highlight 
that in light of the results of the pilot, which was concluded halfway through 
the clinical study, it was decided that the latter not be continued; therefore, 
only two AHP and five HP patients were included. Consequently, no safe 
conclusions can be drawn from this study about spontaneous perspective 
taking in AHP. The results showed that no AHP patient, compared to 20% of 
HP controls, took the 3rd person perspective in the congruent condition, while 
no other patient of either group adopted this perspective for the other condi-
tions. Similarly, healthy participants adopted their own, 1st person perspec-
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tive more than the 3rd. The finding was in contrast with the study by Furlanet-
to et al. (2013). In their original task, the authors used similar videos with ac-
tors acting upon objects, and gazing either congruently or incongruently with 
regards to the action, on no gaze was shown. Their results had highlighted 
the importance of social cues in spontaneous perspective taking, as the 3rd 
person perspective was mostly adopted in the incongruent condition. The au-
thors suggested that the finding was due to the ambiguity of the actor’s inten-
tions in this condition, leading the participants to make greater effort to infer 
them and thus unconsciously and automatically adopting the actor’s visuo-
spatial perspective. 
As described above, the experimental process required participants, 
both healthy and brain-damaged, to judge the location of an object compared 
to another in terms of front-back, instead of right-left used in previous studies 
(Furlanetto, et al., 2013; Tversky, & Hard, 2009). The reason for this differen-
tiation was to control for neglect in stroke patients. However, previous re-
search on perspective taking has suggested that it involves two distinct sys-
tems: Level 1 and Level 2 (Flavell, et al., 1986). Level 1 reflects mostly the 
understanding on another person’s line of view and which objects are visible 
and invisible to them. This level does not rely on body movement stimulation 
(i.e. mental rotation), but rather, it mostly depends on inter-objects relations 
(Kessler, & Rutherford, 2010). On the contrary, Level 2 reflects the ability to 
represent the world from another person’s point of view, requiring Theory of 
Mind (ToM) and is considered an embodied process, as it requires mental 
self-rotation (Hamilton, et al., 2009). Importantly, Level 1 serves front/back 
judgments, while Level 2 serves right/left. It is therefore understood that by 
employing the front/back judgments, the study might not have examined per-
spective taking as it intended to. However, if the study indeed examined 
Level 1 perspective taking, then it can be concluded that both healthy and 
AHP and HP patients prioritised their own point of view, compared to the ac-
tor’s.  
In summary, this study aimed to investigate spontaneous perspective 
taking in AHP, based on social cues. Most probably due to methodological 
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issues, the aim was not achieved, however the question still remains unan-
swered. Therefore, future studies are needed, that will use tasks engaging 
Level 2 perspective taking, in order to examine whether AHP patients indeed 
encounter deficits in spontaneously adopting the 3rd person perspective.  
8.2.4. Repression and AHP 
The relationship between AHP and motivation has a long tradition, 
starting from early theories that conceptualised AHP as a motivated defence 
mechanism (e.g. Weinstein, & Kahn, 1955). The study described in Chapter 
7 was the first to examine the relationship between AHP and motivation, on 
memory. Specifically, the aim of the study was to investigate whether motiva-
tion led AHP patients to increased forgetting (repression) of actions they 
could not perform. This was investigated by using a version of the Directed 
Forgetting (DF) paradigm, in which unilateral and bilateral, manual and pedal 
items were presented, in form of pictures accompanied by action phrases. A 
pilot study was also conducted, in young and older participants, to establish 
the validity of the task, as well as a baseline performance.  
As far as the basic hypothesis of the task is concerned, the results 
showed that in both clinical and pilot studies the cost effects of the task were 
mostly elicited but no benefit effects were found, while recognition scores al-
so yielded some important results, contrary to the literature of the task. 
Moreover, with regards to the specific hypotheses, in both studies pedal 
items were better recalled than manual, while the pattern of recognition of 
the sub-categories (unimanual – unipedal; bimanual – bipedal) was relatively 
consistent between the two studies, and discrepancies were speculated to 
be due to difference in sample size and performance. As discussed in Chap-
ter 7, it cannot be excluded that results were, in fact, confounded by method-
ological issues. Overall, the study did not provide evidence of repression in 
AHP. 
The absence of experimental evidence of memory repression is in 
contrast with clinical observations that very much resemble repression. Ra-
machandran (1994) describes a characteristic example, in which an AHP pa-
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tient temporarily regained awareness by means of caloric vestibular stimula-
tion. During the effect of the stimulation, the patient was able to acknowledge 
her paralysis and admitted she was paralysed for days, indicating that the 
events she had been denying (her paralysis) had nevertheless been suc-
cessfully encoded in long term memory. When the effect wore off, the patient 
became anosognosic again, and, most importantly, although she could de-
scribe the episode of the stimulation in great detail, she had no explicit 
memory of her admitting the hemiplegia. Consequently, Ramachandran 
(1994) concluded that this episode was a manifestation of repression. Turn-
bull et al. (2014), based on these clinical observations, recently proposed a 
theory, according to which the brain damage in AHP patients could produce 
cognitive deficits otherwise essential for normal emotion regulation. As a 
consequence, ‘wishful’ emotions (e.g. what the person wanted to do) seem 
to undermine realistic cognition. The clinical findings described above are not 
in line with the findings of the study, but before proceeding to providing alter-
native explanation, a brief overview of the concept of repression should be 
given. 
According to the psychoanalytic doctrine, people tend to forget trau-
matic experiences, which can then be retrieved by special means (e.g. see 
Breuer, & Freud, 1895). Freud viewed repression as the foundation of psy-
choanalysis, but despite research efforts, today, over a century later, there is 
still great controversy surrounding the validity of this concept (Kihlstrom, 
2002; see Rofé, 2008). Several aspects of repression are debated, including 
its very existence (for reviews see Erdelyi, 2006; Pope, et al., 1999). Contra-
ry to the aforementioned original psychoanalytic assumption, a number of 
studies have demonstrated that traumatic experiences can, in fact, enhance 
memory (e.g. McNally, 2003; Pope, et al., 1999), while others, using the Di-
rected Forgetting (DF) paradigm, found that trauma survivors do not show 
superior inhibition for trauma-related words (McNally, et al., 2004; McNally, 
et al., 2005; Geraerts, et al., 2006; Devilly, et al., 2007). On the other hand, 
there are a handful of studies that have indeed reported increased inhibition 
of trauma-related words in people with traumatic experiences (Moulds, & 
Bryant, 2005; DePrince, & Freyd, 2004). Whether or not repression is a con-
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scious or a directed procedure is also a subject of debate (Erdelyi, 1990), as 
are, consequently, the mechanisms underlying it. Specifically, Anderson & 
Green (2001) conducted a memory study, which found that when participants 
intended to forget a word and inhibited its recollection, the word would even-
tually be forgotten. In other words, they claimed to have found the experi-
mental analogue of repression. On the other side, it was claimed that their 
findings were merely the effect of intended forgetting, while the material was 
not emotional and therefore no direct analogies can be drawn with repres-
sion where an event causing negative feelings is forgotten. It is important to 
mention that Freud’s ideas about repression changed over time, from de-
scribing it as an intentional attempt to prevent distressing materials from 
conscious awareness, to considering it one of the several defence mecha-
nisms operating outside conscious awareness.  
A review of the literature on repression was not the scope of this sec-
tion. Instead, the aim was to highlight the controversies and inconclusive 
findings on this much-debated field. Taking together the above findings and 
propositions, it is possible that clinical observations of AHP typically thought 
of as repression in AHP might in fact not be repression in the classical, 
Freudian sense, which involves inhibitory procedures blocking the memory 
from retrieval. Instead, as proposed by Turnbull et al. (2014) these presenta-
tions could be the manifestation of an emotion dysregulation, prioritizing what 
the patient wants (e.g. “I want to walk”) over the realistic cognition (“I cannot 
walk”).  In fact, it could be tentatively argued that this was manifested in the 
study in Chapter 6, where results found that AHP patients updated more 
cognitively than emotionally. In other words, they remained abnormally fixat-
ed to their prior emotions, despite being better able to cognitively update and 
acquire a more realistic approach of their motor deficits. 
8.3. Implications on theories of bodily self 
Overarchingly, the present thesis aimed to address the wider question 
of how we construct our bodily self. This topic has traditionally been the cen-
tre of debate, usually between philosophy, psychology and neurology, and 
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more recently also neuroscience (see Feinberg, & Keenan, 2005). Starting 
as early as William James (1890) and in order to better study the self, the 
concept has been divided to, and approached from different dimensions. In 
his early work, James (1890) viewed the self as being both the subject and 
the object of experience (see also Neisser, 1988 and Robins, Tracy, & 
Trzesniewski, 2001 for more recent models on different levels of self). A 
more recent philosophical approach by Gallagher (2000; see also Chapter 1) 
has integrated multidisciplinary viewpoints of self, and proposed a distinction 
of two core aspects of the self, the ‘minimal’ and the ‘narrative’. The narrative 
self is thought to be constructed on beliefs, autobiographical memories and 
intentions (Conway, 2005) and to be based on the, more basic, minimal self. 
The latter is considered a bodily grounded self, constructed by the perception 
and experience of the world through our body, and is comprised by a sense 
of agency (i.e. I initiate the action) and a sense of ownership (it is my body 
which is moving). This thesis has aimed to improve the current understand-
ing on this embodied aspect of self through the study of AHP, a prototypical 
disorder of body agency. 
In this thesis, it has been proposed that the bodily self is constructed 
by the dynamic interaction and integration of exteroceptive, interoceptive and 
proprioceptive signals (Tsakiris, et al., 2007). The main findings of the study 
in Chapter 3 indicated that affective touch, an interoceptive modality, tended 
to improve body ownership and could possibly also improve motor aware-
ness, although these findings were inconclusive and assumed, respectively. 
These results, if confirmed, will provide further evidence for the role of intero-
ception in constructing the coherent bodily self. The development and exist-
ence of this bodily self also relies on the presence of other agents around us 
(Fotopoulou, 2015). Specifically, while the basis of self-awareness is the in-
teraction and convergence of signals into a 1st person perspective (Blanke, 
2012; Vogeley, & Fink, 2003), the bodily self is developed in the social con-
text of other people and therefore requires the ability to perceive their own, 
allocentric, 3rd person perspective. The study in Chapter 6 suggested (alt-
hough it did not demonstrate conclusively), that in the emotion domain AHP 
patients had the tendency to update more (i.e. become more aware) from the 
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1st than 3rd person perspective. Therefore, this thesis was able to indicate 
that improvement and disruption in awareness could possibly occur inde-
pendently in the two perspectives, which further supports the previously sug-
gested notion, that the egocentric (1st person perspective) and allocentric (3rd 
person perspective) perspectives have a distinctive contribution in the con-
struction of body awareness (e.g. Besharati, et al., 2015).  
Given the importance of both embodied and social cognition (1st and 
3rd person perspectives respectively) in the construction of body awareness, 
it had also been hypothesised that their integration possibly occurs develop-
mentally, and that both emotional and cognitive processes allow, but also 
depend on, a flexible, spontaneous ‘switching’ between perspectives. This 
approach implies that there is a ‘mentalisation of the body’ process that un-
derlies coherent body awareness (Fotopoulou, 2015). The present study 
(Chapter 5) aimed to further investigate whether disruption of this mentalisa-
tion process could be attributed to inability to spontaneously switch perspec-
tives. However, due to methodological flaws, the aim was not achieved, but 
as mentioned above, this remains an important question to be answered by 
future studies.  
The results of the present thesis on emotion and cognition could also 
have an application on the field of affective neuroscience. Specifically, this 
thesis (Chapter 5) found indications (but no significant findings) that im-
provement of motor awareness can occur differently on the cognitive and 
emotion domain, while findings from Chapters 5 and 6 combined seem to 
suggest that awareness in the cognitive domain might be improved with 
(possibly) increased salience of feedback or facilitated 3rd person perspec-
tive, while the same feedback seemed to have lesser effect on emotion. This 
indication, despite not being a conclusive result, highlights the need to in-
clude the affective, emotional component as contributor, or even primary 
cause, or neurological and behavioural deficits. Moreover, the lack of evi-
dence of repression (in the classical, Freudian sense that involves memory 
inhibition) in Chapter 7, does not disprove the suggestion of an emotion 
dysregulation, where the egocentric needs of the person undermine realistic 
 192 
cognitions (Turnbull, et al., 2014). Such an egocentric-laden approach would 
also be consistent with existing evidence supporting the roe of the right hem-
isphere in emotion regulation (see Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack; Chambers, 
Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009).   
8.4. General limitations 
The limitations of each specific study have been discussed in detail in 
the previous, corresponding chapters. In this section, the wider limitations of 
the thesis will be discussed, that need to be taken into account when inter-
preting the findings and drawing conclusions.  
Firstly, the sample sizes in all experimental studies in the present thesis 
were relatively small, particularly in comparison to most previous neuropsy-
chological studies. However, identifying not only suitable AHP patients, but 
also HP controls has become increasingly challenging over the last years, 
despite the inclusion of new recruitment sites in the study. The difficulty in 
encountering suitable patients could possibly be attributed to thrombolysis. 
On the other hand, it is the case that previous neuroscientific studies using a 
small sample size (e.g. Berti, et al., 2005; Fotopoulou, et al., 2008; Jen-
kinson, et al., 2009) have been able to draw significant conclusions.  
A second limitation relates to the patients’ participation in the experi-
mental studies. Participants were acute neurological patients, some also with 
a rare neurological syndrome, and therefore the assessment process was 
affected by a number of factors, such as resolution of the syndrome, medical 
complications, discharge or transfer, adjusting the assessment according to 
the patient’s schedule (e.g. physiotherapy, ward rounds, other studies, etc.) 
or fatigue. As a consequence, some participants took part in some of the ex-
perimental studies, and some other participants the rest of the studies, and 
the same problem was also the case during the neuropsychological assess-
ment. This problem made comparisons between studies, as well as conclud-
ing overall from the studies, difficult, as different sample sizes often meant 
different confidence in the results. However, this is an unavoidable limitation 
when working with such acute neurological patients with a rare syndrome. 
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Recruitment from various locations, both in London, UK and in Vero-
na, Italy also created significant limitations. Assessments and experimental 
protocols were conducted in English and in Italian respectively, which could 
significantly compromise their validity and reliability, although most of the 
neuropsychological tests were standardised and validated for both popula-
tions. A positive outcome from recruiting from different countries is of course 
the fact that it allowed the identification and inclusion of more patients within 
the limited time frame of this thesis, increasing the sample size. In addition, it 
provides sufficient evidence that AHP is not a culture-specific syndrome, but 
rather a universal disorder of disruption of awareness. 
Classification of AHP patients could also be considered a further limi-
tation. As described in details in Chapter 1, AHP has a rich clinical presenta-
tion and varies significantly between patients. The present study grouped to-
gether all patients presenting with AHP, regardless of the other characteris-
tics or the severity of the disorder. This option was selected due to the rare 
occurrence of AHP and the small numbers of the AHP group, which did not 
allow for further sub-classification. However, the systematic use of the Fein-
berg scale was able to give an estimate of the severity of AHP, including 
some examination of implicit and explicit awareness, although n no case 
thorough and sufficient.  
In this thesis, patients were classified as having AHP, or not. Howev-
er, as discussed in detail in Chapter 1, AHP is not a uniform disorder, but ra-
ther it presents as different subtypes with different clinical characteristics. 
Due to the rarity of the syndrome, the number of AHP patients was small and 
there was no option to further classify them according to the subtype (e.g. 
with or without explicit or implicit awareness).  
8.5. Conclusion 
This thesis explored the construction of the bodily self through the 
prism of a prototypical disorder of self-awareness, Anosognosia for Hemiple-
gia. The study specifically investigated the contribution and modulation of in-
teroceptive and exteroceptive signals in constructing motor awareness and 
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body ownership, the complex emotional and social factors and the belief-
formulation processes in AHP. The findings, although not conclusive, seem 
to point towards the direction that AHP patients do not present with major 
deficits in interoceptive perception, as their body ownership improved (alt-
hough not significantly) in response to affective touch. Moreover, a differen-
tial update process for emotion and cognition was implied by the data, with 
the former remaining more resistant to feedback, supporting the theory of 
emotion dysregulation in AHP. Lack of evidence for repression in the sense 
of memory inhibition further strengthens the position of the emotion dysregu-
lation theory as a plausible explanation for repression-like presentations in 
AHP. Lastly, in terms of social factors, the present study did not succeed in 
identifying a potential deficit in spontaneous perspective taking in AHP.  
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Appendix A. Information sheet and Consent form for neurological patients 
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Fax +44 (0) 20 7633 0061 
 
 
 
Patient Information Sheet 
Version 4: 25.05.11 
 
Study Title: Awareness of Illness Following Brain Damage 
 
Invitation Paragraph 
 
You are invited to participate in a psychological study conducted at St. Thomas’s Hospital and King’s 
College Hospital. Before you decide to take part it is important for you to understand why the research 
is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. If you are currently unsure, you 
can think it over and let us know if you decide to take part any time in the following three weeks.  
 
The Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) is an organisation dedicated to offering information and 
advice to users of the NHS and can be contacted for advice on taking part in research. Your local office 
is located at: 
- St Thomas' Hospital  
 Knowledge and Information Centre (KIC), ground floor, North Wing, Monday - Friday, 10am - 
5pm.  Telephone: 020 7188 8801 or 020 7188 8803 or email pals@gstt.nhs.uk. 
- King’s College Hospital  
Hambleden Wing, near the main entrance on Bessemer Road, Monday - Friday, 10am - 5pm. 
 Telephone: 020 3299 3625 or 020 3299 3601 or email kch-tr.PALS@nhs.net.  
- St George’s Hospital  
Blackshaw Road, Tooting, London, Monday - Friday, 10am - 5pm. Telephone: 020 8762 1255 
3601  
 
Thank you for reading this information. 
 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
The overall purpose of this study is to explore and evaluate the subjective experience of illness 
following brain damage. Being aware of what has happened to you and how it may affect your fu-
ture life is sometimes seen as a simple mental task. In reality, it is a very complex cognitive pro-
cess (a mental ability) and one that has not been sufficiently explored by scientists. Crucially, 
some patients may partly or wholly lose such ability, if certain areas of their brain are affected. 
This study aims to investigate the neurological and psychological basis of such processes. More 
specifically, the purpose of the study is to understand how emotions and thoughts about oneself 
may affect one’s perception of motor and visual difficulties and their everyday consequences.  
 
2. Why have I been chosen? 
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In total, around 60 individuals will participate in this study. You, as well as the other participants, 
were chosen based on the type of brain dysfunction you have and particularly the site of the prob-
lem.  
 
3. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you 
are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw at any 
time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect the standard of care you receive. 
According to your notes you have not participated in any other research, but please note that if 
you have been involved in any other research project, you should not take part in this study. 
 
4. What will happen to me if I take part? 
You are asked to take part in this study by participating in different psychological studies and 
tasks. These will take place in four to six different sessions, which will last a maximum of an hour 
each and will be scheduled, at your convenience, on non-consecutive days. In the first session 
you will be encouraged to describe the experience of your neurological illness and give its history. 
A number of standard cognitive tasks of memory, attention and problem-solving will also be ad-
ministered in the subsequent. For example, you will be asked to complete a number of tasks con-
cerning knowledge (e.g. defining words), thinking (e.g. interpreting proverbs), attention (e.g. iden-
tifying common patterns in figures), memory (e.g. recalling pictures) and body awareness (e.g. 
questions about your body). In the following sessions you will be asked to answer a number of 
questions regarding your present emotions and the view you have of yourself following your ill-
ness. Later, you will be asked to perform certain cognitive tasks such as completing sentences, 
and memorising words or phrases. You need to be concentrated in order to complete these tasks. 
In subsequent sessions, we will explain the details of certain of the administered tests in ways that 
we will not be able to reveal until you have completed the tasks. If you wish you may also ask for 
feedback on your answers, although the full results of the study will not be available at that stage. 
Your answers may be audio- and video- recorded. If out-patient appointments are arranged (sub-
ject to your agreement and convenience) we will reimburse your travel expenses to and from the 
hospital. 
Please note that these sessions are independent of your clinical care and treatment, and they 
should not interfere with the latter at any stage and for any reason. Please also note that they are 
not needed for your care.   
 
5. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks involved in this research, but if you should experience mental 
and/or physical fatigue, or any form of psychological distress please be aware that you could in-
form the investigator immediately and discontinue the session or even the study, if you wish and 
without consequences.  
 
6. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no direct benefit to yourself from taking part in the study. The information we get from this 
study may help us to understand and treat future patients with similar brain damage better.  
 
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential.  Any information about you which leaves the hospital will have your name and ad-
dress removed so that you cannot be recognised from it.  All audio- and video- recordings made 
will be suitably anonymised, securely stored and made accessible only to the investigators. Anon-
ymous data will be extracted from these recordings and the tapes will be destroyed 3 years after 
the completion of the study. Anonymous data will be retained for 5 years following their potential 
publication.  
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In the process of checking that this study is being carried out properly and the data collected is 
correct, authorised individuals (monitors or auditors) who may be employees of the company 
funding this research, or employees of external bodies, the ethics committee or regulatory authori-
ties, may be granted access to any information held about you. This includes medical information 
and medical records. Anyone granted such access will also treat the information as highly confi-
dential. By signing the consent form you agree to this access. 
 
We will place a copy of this information sheet and a copy of the signed consent form in your hos-
pital notes. 
 
8. What if new information becomes available? 
Sometimes during the course of a research project new information becomes available. If this 
happens we inform the Ethics committee. If there is any substantial change the forms and 
information given to volunteers will be modified from the original used in previous volunteers. 
We are a leading establishment in this area of research and if any new information relevant to this 
study becomes available the researchers will discuss this with you.  You are free to withdraw from 
the study at anytime. 
 
9. What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study we will destroy all identifiable information about you. We will retain 
and continue to use any data collected before such withdrawal of consent unless you request that 
you do not want us to use any data collected from you. 
 
10. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will form the basis of future scientific papers. These will be submitted 
for publication approximately one year following the completion of the study. Your identity and the 
confidentiality of your answers will be protected.  
 
11. What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation ar-
rangements.  If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a 
legal action but you may have to pay for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have 
any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the 
course of this study, the normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be avail-
able to you. 
 
12. Who is funding the research? 
The study is funded by two Volkswagen Foundation Grants and is sponsored by the Institute of 
Psychiatry.  
 
13. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the South East London Research Ethics Committee. 
 
14. Contact for Further Information 
 If you have any questions regarding this study, or concerns regarding the manner in which the 
study was conducted or would like to be informed of the results when the study is completed, 
please feel free to contact the investigators: 
 
 
•   Address for all communications: 
Dr. Katerina Fotopoulou 
Academic Unit of Psychiatry, 3rd Floor, Block 8, South Wing, St Thomas’s Hospital, London, 
SE1 8AZ. Email: a.fotopoulou@kcl.ac.uk. Fax: 020 7633 0061  
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CONSENT FORM 
Version 3: 25.05.11 
 
Study Title: Awareness of Illness Following Brain Damage 
 
Please initial the following  
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dat-
ed ............................(version ............) for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
  
    
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal 
rights being affected. 
  
    
3. I understand that the data collected during the study will be analysed and 
used in the final report and follow-up publications.  However, I have been 
made aware that data will be anonymised. 
  
 
    
4. I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by 
members of the research team or regulatory authorities where it is relevant 
to my taking part in research.  I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to my records. 
  
 
    
5. Do you understand that some of your answers in the study will be audio- 
and video-taped? scientific purposes? Do you consent to the unattributed 
and confidential use of these recordings for scientific purposes? 
  
    
6. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Participant                                                                                                                     
Signed .............................................………................     Date ........................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ......................................................………........................ 
 
Researcher 
Signed .............................................………................     Date ........................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ......................................................………........................ 
                             
        NB Three copies should be made, for(1) participant, (2) researcher, (3) hospital notes 
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Appendix B. Initial Awareness & Ownership Assessment, Bisiach (1986); 
Scale and Berti (1996); Cutting, (1978) 
Initial Awareness & Ownership Assessment 
Bisiach (1986); Scale and Berti (1996); Cutting, (1978), 
 
General Question 
Where are you?  
Why are [or were] you in 
the hospital? 
 
 
Specific Question (ULL, LLL) 
“Can you move left arm?”  
“Can you move left leg?” 
 
 
 
ONLY FOR patients with moderate motor weakness, ask: 
  
“Can you move in your 
arm/leg as usual? Is there any 
weakness in your arm/leg?” 
 
 
If patient replies yes, continue with confrontation test 
 
Confrontation with requested motor action (ULL LLL) 
“Please move your left arm. Have you 
done it?” 
 
“Please move your left leg. Have you 
done it?” 
 
 
Ownership: belonging and attribution  
Point to the patient’s left hand. 
“Is this your hand? Does it feel like it 
belongs to you? “ 
 
“Does it ever feel like it belongs to 
someone else?” 
If yes, ask: “Anyone in particular? 
 
 
 
Scoring: 0-3 
 
0= disorder is spontaneously reported or mentioned by the patient following a general question about 
his complaint; 1= disorder is reported only following a specific question about the strength of the pa-
tient’s left limb;  
2= disorder is acknowledged only after its demonstration through routine techniques of neurological 
examination; 3= no acknowledgement of the disorder can be obtained.  
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Appendix C. Feinberg Anosognosia for Hemiplegia Questionnaire; Feinberg 
et al. (2000) 
Feinberg Anosognosia for Hemiplegia Questionnaire 
1 “Do you have weakness anywhere?”  
2 “Is your arm causing you any problems?”  
3 “Does it feel normal?”  
4 “Can you use it as well as you used to?”  
5 “Are you fearful about losing your ability to 
use your arm?” 
 
6 “Is the sensation in your arm normal?”  
7 “The doctors tell me that there is some pa-
ralysis of your arm. Do you agree?” 
 
8 (Left arm is lifted and dropped in left hemi-
space.) “It seems there is some weakness. 
Do you agree?” 
 
9 (Left arm is lifted and dropped in right hem-
ispace.) “It seems there is some weakness. 
Do you agree?” 
 
10 “Take your right arm, and use it to lift your 
left arm. Is there any weakness of your left 
arm?” 
 
TOTAL     /10 
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Responses for each item were scored as 0 if the patient showed awareness of defi-
cit; 0.5 for partial awareness; and 1.0 for complete unawareness or denial. 
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Appendix D. Patient demographics and medical history form 
Patient Demographics  
Name   Age   
Code   DOB   
Hospital Number   Education level (years)   
Ward/Hospital   Occupation   
Gender   Hearing aids/glasses/other   
Assessors   Handedness   
Date of onset   Admission date   
Place of admission   Referral [date & place]   
Patient Address 
    
Telephone 
    
Next of Kin 
    
Address 
    
Telephone 
    
GP Name 
    
Address 
    
Telephone  
    
Inclusion criteria       
Unilateral R lesion     
<4 months     
Motor disorder     
Anosognosia     
LCF>5     
Clinical notes        
Admission        
Circumstances     
Admission      
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Presentation       
Diagnosis       
Type of Lesion     
Scans done     
Radiology reports       
Neurological Exam       
Date & Description     
      
        
Date & Description       
      
      
        
Assessments     
Acute Session 1 date   
  Session 2 date   
  Session 3 date   
  Session 4 date   
2 Weeks Session 1 date   
  Session 2 date   
  Session 3 date   
  Session 4 date   
1 Month Session 1 date   
  Session 2 date   
>6 Months Session 1 Date   
  Session 2 Date   
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Patient History and Medical Files 
Relevant Medical Info Ethanol   
  Drugs   
  Smoker   
  Diabetes    
  Blood pressure   
  Family history   
  Sleep   
  Appetite   
  Past medical history   
      
Medication     
      
Psychiatric History     
      
Family History     
      
Social History Married/Divorced/Widow   
  Relationship   
  Children   
  "race"/culture   
  Place of birth   
  Hobbies/Interests   
  "religious"   
Mood (reported/observed) Anxiety   
  Depression   
  Irritable/cooperative   
Speech Fluent/Spontaneous    
  Monotonous   
  Impoverished/quality    
ADLS     
      
Clinical impressions Appearance   
  Mood   
  Alert/Concentration    
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  Avoidance   
  Egocentric characteristics   
  Other   
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Appendix E. Nottingham Sensory Assessment scores for all patients, for 
body parts excluding Elbow, Wrist and Hand.  
Table E.1: Nottingham Sensory Assessment groups’ scores 
  AHP (N = 16)  HP (N = 7)  Mann-Whitney 
  Median IQR  Median IQR  Z p 
FACE 
Light Touch 1.5 2.0  1.0 2.0  -0.165 0.869 
Pinprick 0.0 2.0  0.0 0.5  -0.962 0.336 
Pressure 0.5 2.0  0.0 2.0  -0.082 0.934 
          
TRUNK 
Light Touch 0.5 2.0  0.0 0.0  -1.487 0.137 
Pinprick 0.0 2.0  0.0 0.0  -1.628 0.104 
Pressure 0.0 2.0  0.0 2.0  -0.257 0.797 
          
SHOULDER 
Light Touch 0.0 0.5  0.0 2.0  -0.354 0.724 
Pinprick 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.5  -0.449 0.653 
Pressure 0.0 2.0  0.0 2.0  0.000 1.000 
          
KNEE 
Light Touch 0.0 0.0  0.0 2.0  -0.354 0.724 
Pinprick 0.0 0.0  0.0 1.3  -1.313 0.189 
Pressure 0.0 0.0  0.0 2.0  -0.331 0.740 
          
ANKLE 
Light Touch 0.0 0.0  0.0 2.0  -0.094 0.925 
Pinprick 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  -0.775 0.439 
Pressure 0.0 1.0  0.0 2.0  -0.100 0.921 
          Bilateral Simultaneous Touch and Tactile Localisation subtests required in-
tact pressure scores on the Pressure subtest, on which both groups were 
found to have deficits. Therefore, Pressure data were insufficient to perform 
comparison analyses. Additionally, too few Proprioception scores were ob-
tained.  
All patients from both groups had intact scores on the right (unaffected) side 
for all subtests, therefore the scores were not presented here.  
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Appendix F. Supplementary control analyses and non-parametric figures of 
experimental results of Chapter 3: The Effect of Affective, Self and Other 
Touch in Body Ownership and Motor Awareness 
1. Control analyses for randomisation 
The (1) Ownership, and (2) Motor Awareness pre-touch (baseline) 
scores of each patient’s first block were compared between AHP and HP 
groups, to examine if the groups differed significantly at the beginning of the 
task. In case a patient had started the task with a right-arm block, the score 
of the first left-arm block they had done was used. 
Ownership scores  
No main effect of Group (Z = -0.176, p = 0.860) or Order was found 
(χ2(5) = 7.646, p = 0.177).  
Motor Awareness scores 
No main effect of Group (Z = -0.556, p = 0.578) or Order was found 
(χ2(5) = 1.842, p = 0.871).  
2. Control analyses on baseline scores 
In order to investigate whether AHP and HP groups significantly dif-
fered in terms of ownership and awareness in the self-touch task, we com-
pared the pre- awareness and ownership scores of each patient, for the first 
condition they performed in the task, and compared them between groups.  
Ownership scores 
A Mann-Whitney test found no significant difference between the 
baseline ownership scores of the two groups (Z = -0.262, p = 0.803). (AHP 
Mdn = 0.33; HP Mdn = 0.33).  
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Motor Awareness scores 
A Mann-Whitney test found a significant difference between groups (Z 
= -2.858, p = 0.004), with AHP group having a higher score (Mdn = 0.67), 
and therefore being more ‘anosognosic’ than the HP group (Mdn = 0).  
3. Non-parametric figures of Chapter 3 
 
Figure F.1: Intensity of touch scores for left arm: the Self-touch enhance-
ment effect (medians and interquartile range) 
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Figure F.2: Pleasantness of touch scores for left arm (medians and inter-
quartile range) 
The figures for Ownership and Motor Awareness analyses based on 
medians are not presented, as all medians were found to be zero. 
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Appendix G. Pilot study material for Chapter 4 
 Life Event Actual Probability 
1 Being Assaulted 5% 
2 Getting Electrocuted 3% 
3 Unemployed 8% 
4 Appendicitus 12% 
5 Victim of fire 2% 
6 Pet running away 4% 
7 Identity fraud 6% 
8 Kidney stones 10% 
9 Witnessing extreme violence 20% 
10 Computer virus 14% 
11 Becoming homeless 1% 
12 Diagnosed with an STD 16% 
13 Sunburn 83% 
14 Needing to go to hospital 96% 
15 Breaking a toe 84% 
16 Breaking a new year’s resolution 96% 
17 Bus being late 89% 
18 Cold sores 80% 
19 Food poisoning 95% 
20 Needing a dentist 93% 
21 Death of a close friend 98% 
22 Allergic reaction 82% 
23 Back pain 81% 
24 Losing your keys 86% 
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Appendix H. Non-parametric Figures of Chapter 4: Belief Updating process-
es in AHP 
 
Figure H.1: Prediction Errors and Update Estimates for Left and right Posi-
tion (medians and interquartile range) 
 
Figure H.2: Prediction Errors and Confidence Updates for Left and right Po-
sition (medians and interquartile range) 
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Appendix I. Single Case Analysis using the Revised Standardised Differ-
ence Test (RSDT) (Garthwaite, & Crawford, 2004; Crawford, & Garthwaite, 
2005) 
  Update (Cognitive)a   Update (emotional)b   Dissociation Testc 
Patient Score t p (1-tailed)   Score t p (1-tailed)     t p (1-tailed)   
AHP            
1 1 1.411 0.08820  2 3.497 0.00138   1.335 0.09980  
2 0 0.000 0.50000  1 1.694 0.05422   1.084 0.14672  
3 2 2.821 0.00588  2 3.497 0.00138   0.432 0.33545  
4 1 1.411 0.08820  0 -0.108 0.45757   0.972 0.17237  
5 2 2.821 0.00588  1 1.694 0.05422   0.721 0.24029  
6 1 1.411 0.08820  1 1.694 0.05422   0.182 0.42903  
7 2 2.821 0.00588  0 -0.108 0.45757   1.873 0.03918  
8 0 0.000 0.50000  -2 -3.713 0.00086 * 2.373 0.01486 ** 
9 0 0.000 0.50000  0 -0.108 0.45757   0.069 0.47281  
10 0 0.000 0.50000  0 -0.108 0.45757   0.069 0.47281  
11 2 2.821 0.00588  0 -0.108 0.45757   1.873 0.03918  
12 0 0.000 0.50000  0 -0.108 0.45757   0.069 0.47281  
13 0 0.000 0.50000  0 -0.108 0.45757   0.069 0.47281  
14 1 1.411 0.08820  0 -0.108 0.45757   0.972 0.17237  
15 1 1.411 0.08820  2 3.497 0.00138   1.335 0.09980  
16 2 2.821 0.00588  1 1.694 0.05422   0.721 0.24029  
17 2 2.821 0.00588  -1 -1.911 0.03654 * 3.021 0.00385 ** 
18 2 2.821 0.00588  0 -0.108 0.45757   1.873 0.03918  
                          
(a): HP control mean = 0; SD = 0.69; N = 18 
(b): HP control mean = 0.06; SD = 0.54; N = 18 
(c): Correlation between Cognitive and Emotional updates in HP control sample = -0.159 
*: significant deficit 
**: significant dissociation (differential deficit) between unimpaired cognitive update ability 
and emotional update deficit. 
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Appendix J. Non-parametric Figures of Chapter 6: Cognitive and emotion 
update in AHP, and the contribution of perspective taking 
 
Figure J.1: Median baseline scores for left arm (medians and interquartile 
range) 
 
Figure J.2: Update scores for left arm (medians and interquartile range) 
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Appendix K. Non-parametric Figures of Chapter 7: The effect of motivated 
forgetting on memory in AHP (Pilot Study 2). 
 
Figure K.1 Cost analysis on manual recall data (medians and interquartile 
range) 
 Figure K.2: Benefit analysis on manual recall data (medians and interquar-
tile range) 
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Figure K.3: Cost analysis on pedal recall data (medians and interquartile 
range) 
 
 
Figure K.4: Benefit analysis on pedal recall data (medians and interquartile 
range) 
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Appendix L. Non-parametric Figures of Chapter 7: The effect of motivated 
forgetting on memory in AHP (Clinical Study). 
 
Figure L.1: Cost analysis on manual recall data (medians and interquartile 
range) 
 
 
Figure L.2: Benefit analysis on manual recall data (medians and interquartile 
range) 
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Figure L.3: Cost analysis on pedal recall data (medians and interquartile 
range) 
 
 
Figure L.4: Benefit analysis on pedal recall data (medians and interquartile 
range) 
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